

IRAN'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND JCPOA NEGOTIATION



Author and translator:

Bennito Beshir

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Preface

The atomic program of Iran began during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. In another account, the initiation of Iran's atomic program can be interpreted back to the late 1950s when the United States government, as part of its "Atoms for Peace" initiative, provided Iran with a small atomic reactor. Then president of the United States in year 1953 had initiated the Atomic Program for Peace. America aimed to discourage other countries worldwide from seeking atomic weapons by promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, in the early years, Iran did not have much use for its reactor. But with a sudden increase in oil revenue and rising oil and gas prices, Mohammad Reza Shah began contemplating the creation of an atomic program for Iran. In Shah's view, Iran's atomic program represented innovation and modernization. For this reason, he entrusted Akbar Etemad, a well-known Iranian nuclear specialist who had worked and studied extensively in the West, with the task of quickly preparing a comprehensive plan for Iran's atomic program. Simultaneously with this decision, some Western countries, especially the United States, France, and Germany, also endeavored to encourage Iran to develop and use atomic energy.

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Abstraction

The initial plan for Iran's atomic program aimed to generate approximately 23,000 megawatts of electricity in the future, about twenty years later. The goal was to have a "complete atomic energy industry. The German government was so eager for the participation of its companies in Iran's atomic program so that it declared that, it would guarantee all investments by Kraftwerk Union against any loss or damage. therefore, actively engaged in launching Iran's atomic program in Bushehr. Following the end of the imposed Iran-Iraq War, the history of Iran's nuclear dossier began in 2003 during the second term of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. This issue gained international prominence during the eight-year period of President Ahmadinejad and continues to this day. The fuel source for the Bushehr nuclear power plant is nuclear reactors, with the enriched uranium produced at the Isfahan Fordow site serving as the primary raw material. The strategy of the first stage was based on cooperation with Europe and gaining the trust of the international community through the "de-escalation" policy and distancing the dossier from the Security Council. In the second stage, a shift in focus from Europe to Asia occurred with the "Look to the East" policy, aiming to approach China and Russia. The strategy of the third stage was resistance against the demands of the Security Council, including the suspension of uranium enrichment, with a slogan of aggressive and demanding politics. The text of the comprehensive program of the Vienna agreement was a sign of a fundamental change in the examination of Iran's nuclear issue by the Security Council, which leads to a new relationship with Iran that is strengthened by the implementation of the comprehensive program. The first meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the P5+1 group, following the agreement in New York in September 2015, took place. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign Minister of Iran, discussed the latest developments related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with his counterparts from the P5+1 group and Federica Mogherini on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. In the implementation of Article 44 of the internal regulations, the report of the Special Commission on the JCPOA, its results, and consequences which underwent thorough examination in multiple sessions with the presence of esteemed members of the negotiating team, experts, jurists, and opinion leaders, ultimately received approval in the session on Saturday, October 3, 2015 to be presented for reading in the open session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. On the morning of October 11, 2015, with 133 affirmative votes and after some controversies, the urgent motion corresponding to the Islamic Republic of Iran's action regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan (JCPOA) between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group became a priority on the agenda of the Islamic Consultative

Assembly (Majlis). On October 18, 2015, the President of the United States issued an order for the preparedness of the government of the country to lift sanctions on Iran in line with the implementation of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). A little before the joint statement by the United States and Europe on the lifting of Iran's sanctions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also announced in a statement on its official website: The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on October 18, 2015, that it would provisionally implement the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement from the day the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is operational until its approval by the Executive Council, and it will fully implement the subsidiary arrangements Code 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement. The change in the Iranian government and the efficiency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 led to a shift in Iran's approach to nuclear negotiations. These political transformations occurred at a time when the opposition group does not take advantage of the opportunity to suspend enrichment in Iran. With the inauguration of the eleventh government, Iran's approach to pursuing the nuclear dossier underwent a transformation. In this new approach, Iran, by setting a new red line that focused on continuing enrichment under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and without sanctions, initiated serious negotiations with the countries of the P5+1 group, led by the United States. During this period, the responsibility for the nuclear dossier was transferred from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of Mohammad Javad Zarif. In Trump's first period of presidency simultaneously with the start of U.S. sanctions against Iran, Europe implements the sanctions blocking law from August 8, 2018. On November 5, 2018, Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, emphasized in a press conference that the new sanctions against Iran are "the toughest ever" and stated that they target Iran's oil industry, banking system, and finances. The negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, have been on hold for a while. Some argue that efforts to revive the JCPOA should be abandoned, while many believe that "the future government will enter the negotiation arena with greater strength and achieve a better agreement.

Chapter 1

Iran's nuclear power plant and policies

The initial plan for Iran's atomic program aimed to generate approximately 23,000 megawatts of electricity in the future, about twenty years later. The goal was to have a "complete atomic energy industry." The scope of activities of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran expanded every day. In year 1977, this organization had more than 1500 employees. In year 1976, by the order of the Shah, a sum of 1.171 million dollars was allocated for the purchase of uranium, and the budget of the Atomic Energy Organization reached 3.1 billion dollars. Initially, France, Germany, and the United States were all eager to participate in Iran's atomic program. Germany and France wanted to allocate as much as possible of Iran's atomic market to themselves. German and French companies actively sought contracts in the field of Iran's atomic energy, and Iran's \$3 billion contract with the German company Kraftwerk Union for the establishment and operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was the most significant atomic contract of its kind. It was agreed that this power plant would start operating in the year 1981. The German government was so eager for the participation of its companies in Iran's atomic program that it declared it would guarantee all investments by Kraftwerk Union against any loss or damage. German companies, therefore, actively engaged in launching Iran's atomic program in Bushehr. However, doubts from the United States government led some of its companies to withdraw from participating in Iran's atomic program after some time. The U.S. government was concerned that Shah might have intentions of acquiring nuclear weapons. To alleviate these concerns and doubts, the U.S. asked Shah to address them with special assurances. Shah, however, did not yield to the pressure and insisted that Iran, as one of the first signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aiming to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, should enjoy all the rights granted by the treaty. According to the NPT, countries without nuclear weapons and technology could declare that they have no intention of seeking nuclear weapons and could seek assistance from nuclear-armed countries for peaceful nuclear energy purposes. Signatory countries were obliged to report all their nuclear activities to international organizations and allow inspectors to visit their nuclear facilities. At that time, Iran was fully compliant with the provisions of the NPT, and Shah emphasized Iran's undeniable rights to a complete fuel cycle and enrichment. He was not willing to accept any restrictions in this regard, one of the main reasons for the U.S. concerns about Shah's atomic program was the potential use of plutonium. U.S.

authorities estimated that if Iran built the planned 23,000-megawatt atomic reactor, the annual plutonium production from this reactor would be sufficient for the creation of 600 to 700 atomic bombs. After detailed and sometimes tense negotiations, in June 1974 the U.S. government allowed its companies to sell an atomic reactor to Iran. However, Iran had to accept dual controls, both Iranian and American, beyond the regular controls on the operation of these reactors. The U.S. considered these controls necessary for two reasons: concerns that Shah was pursuing nuclear weapons, and the possibility that due to instability in Iran, Iranian opponents or foreign terrorists might gain access to nuclear fuel in Iran. During these negotiations, Shah had signed significant agreements with France and Germany to establish four atomic reactors in Iran. Shah expressed his willingness to purchase eight reactors from the United States as well. The U.S. State Department agreed to sale of these reactors to Iran. The same department proposed to the American company Bechtel that Shah be persuaded to invest about \$300 million in establishing a uranium enrichment facility in the United States. However, this offer from the U.S. was conditional on Shah providing the necessary assurances, and Shah repeatedly stated that he was not willing to grant the U.S. control over Iran's fuel cycle and the use of American nuclear fuel. The Ford and Carter administrations were under pressure from various forces to cooperate with Shah on the atomic issue. American companies were more concerned about losing the Iranian market. In the midst of these issues, the U.S. Defense Department had its own opinions and emphasized that the U.S. had to align with Shah. They argued that Iran and the U.S. had various and vital cooperation in defense and intelligence fields, and if Shah became dissatisfied with the atomic issue, it might poison other aspects of Iran-U.S. relations. The fact that France and Germany were eager to participate with Iran. Shah had asked Akbar Etemad to negotiate with India on collaboration in atomic issues, all contributed to doubling America's interest in reaching an understanding with Shah. Eventually, the U.S. decided to reach an agreement with Shah on the atomic issue, but until the end of Shah's rule, it followed a dual policy. On the one hand, it wanted a share of Iran's markets for American companies, and on the other hand, it was concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran. The condition for this agreement was the adherence to U.S. considerations in terms of not pursuing atomic weapons. The Carter administration only allowed American companies to participate in Iran's atomic program when Shah himself approved the signing of bilateral safety agreements and agreed that Iran would not attempt to establish a plant capable of turning plutonium into a usable form for a bomb. However, when all the provisions of these agreements were approved, events leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran had already begun. Iran and Shah were no longer interested in completing Iran's atomic program. In the weeks following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, it became clear that the German company had completed about three-quarters of the

launch of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that Iran did not need nuclear energy and that Shah had launched the Bushehr reactor merely to express his dependence on the U.S. and the UK. Therefore, he ordered the cessation of the Bushehr reactor operation. Several years later, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic regime changed their minds, and this time they secretly pursued the rapid completion of Iran's atomic program. The initiation of this program coincided with Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, using chemical bombs against Iran, and the international community did not strongly condemn these actions. According to the leaders of the Islamic Republic, Iran needed weapons to defend itself against such attacks. Therefore, almost all the countries that had once competed to participate in Iran's atomic program gradually joined the ranks of its opponents. They could not believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran would incur such exorbitant costs merely for uranium enrichment. As a result, more than forty years later, the Bushehr power plant, which had completed about 60 to 80 percent of its construction on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, has yet to start producing energy, as of the year 1980.

Chapter 2

Completion of Iran's nuclear power plant construction

Following the end of the imposed Iran-Iraq War, the history of Iran's nuclear dossier began in year 2003 during the second term of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. This issue gained international prominence during the eight-years period of President Ahmadinejad and continues to this day. It pertains to the enrichment of uranium at the Fordow site in Isfahan and the heavy water reactor in Arak city, intended for use in the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The construction of two nuclear power plant units, each with a nominal capacity of one thousand megawatts has been ongoing. The technical consultation, superior supervision, and workshop aspects of this project are overseen by a Russian state-owned company that began 34 years ago and is currently nearing completion in Bushehr, having reached the experimental operational phase in October 2013. The fuel source for the Bushehr nuclear power plant is nuclear reactors, with the enriched uranium produced at the Isfahan Fordow site serving as the primary raw material. The amount of enriched uranium produced in Iran has been subject to increased economic and oil sanctions against Iran. This became a major pretext for the approval of new economic sanctions on Iran led by the United States government. In late 2012, these sanctions were intensified by the P5+1 group and the European Union after several rounds of negotiations with Iran, leading to the imposition of sanctions on Iran's oil exports and petrochemical products. Iran was forced to bypass these sanctions by secretly exporting crude oil through contracts and an abandoned port in Malaysia to Asian and African countries. It is noteworthy that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the uranium enrichment site, centrifuge machines, and other auxiliary equipment at the Isfahan Fordow site, among others, has incurred billions of dollars in expenses. According to reports, the technology and technical knowledge of uranium enrichment and the centrifuge method were acquired from a Pakistani nuclear scientist who had previously worked at Pakistan's nuclear power plant. Regarding the enrichment percentage of uranium, the main point of contention and justification for representatives of the P5+1 group (the European Union) and the United States is the level of uranium enrichment agreed upon. Initially, the P5+1 group agreed to a 5% uranium enrichment level during the first nuclear negotiations with Iran, but later voted to suspend enrichment, insisting that any suspension of enrichment and any disruption in negotiations must take into account lobbying and provocation by the Zionist regime in the U.S. Congress.

In conclusion, the central issue and pretext for the representatives of the P5+1 group (European Union) and the U.S. regarding the uranium enrichment percentage in Iran revolve around the fact that the P5+1 group initially agreed on a 5% uranium enrichment level during the first nuclear negotiations. However, later they voted to suspend enrichment, and their insistence on this matter involved considering lobbying and provocation by the Zionist regime in the U.S. Congress. Iran's stance on uranium enrichment was 20%, a position that had been previously rejected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in year 2009. Iran's declared goal in subsequent negotiations was to produce enriched uranium solely for peaceful energy production and for use in the Bushehr nuclear power plant, not for other purposes such as nuclear bomb production. According to Dr. Mohsen Renani, a professor and member of the faculty at the University of Isfahan, in his book "Political Economy and the Iranian Nuclear Debate," the prolonged negotiations between the P5+1 group and Iran represent an advanced nuclear game played by the West against Iran, primarily driven by U.S. economic and oil interests. It should be noted that in this nuclear game, three Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in Tehran and Isfahan in three stages in early 2011 by Western agents and Israeli mercenaries. To shed light on the advanced nuclear game, Dr. Renani's perspective is quoted, stating that the nuclear issue in Iran is framed as a sophisticated atomic game between the U.S. representing the West, and Iran, with both parties pursuing specific interests. Clearly, the U.S. seeks to ensure its security and maintain its past political dominance, while Iran aims to acquire the capability to produce peaceful nuclear energy and gain global credibility. Iran's goal is realized when it can achieve full uranium enrichment capability, encompassing the benefits of Iran becoming a nuclear state, regional power, and gaining global credibility. In this complex game of information asymmetry, the West has the upper hand. It can send misleading information to guide Iran's behavior in a particular direction. Driven by its own interests, the West can send inaccurate information to manipulate Iran's actions in the nuclear field. This is evident in the gradual and staged release of information about Iran's nuclear activities by the West. The West did not provide all information about Iran's nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at once. Instead, it disclosed part of its information in each stage based on the needs of that stage of the game. However, if Iran is to disrupt this game and assume that the West continues its "tricky and devious" strategy, it cannot bring about a stable strategy. Instead, it risks deviating from its original path. On the other hand, if Iran changes its strategy abruptly, the only solution for Iran is a situation where it must shift its strategy from a tricky and devious one to a conciliatory one in this case, although Iran may not achieve maximum benefits in the game, it disrupts the hidden interests of the West, exactly equal to the hidden interests of oil-exporting countries.

Therefore, by abruptly changing its strategy, Iran can play a "self-serving" game against the West, disrupting its hidden interests in the continued nuclear game.

Summary of the history of the Iranian nuclear dossier:

Until the effective implementation of the eleventh government, "Government of Prudence and Hope," three types of thinking prevailed in three stages (October 6, 2003, to August 15, 2005; August 16, 2005, to October 20, 2007; and October 21, 2007, to August 3, 2013, the end of Ahmadinejad's term). During this period, the responsibility for the first stage was with Dr. Rouhani, the second stage was with Ali Larijani, and the third stage was with Saeed Jalili. The strategy of the first stage was based on cooperation with Europe and gaining the trust of the international community through the "de-escalation" policy and distancing the dossier from the Security Council. In the second stage, a shift in focus from Europe to Asia occurred with the "Look to the East" policy, aiming to approach China and Russia. The strategy of the third stage was resistance against the demands of the Security Council, including the suspension of uranium enrichment, with a slogan of aggressive and demanding politics. With the advent of Dr. Rouhani's government and the appointment of cabinet ministers, Mohammad Javad Zarif took over the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the tenure of this government, new negotiations on Iran's nuclear program began. Zarif represented Iran in UN sessions and negotiations with the P5+1 group (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany), discussing the subject of agreements. The initial stages of negotiations in Geneva brought the parties close to agreements, but differences of opinion persisted. During this period, unprecedented economic sanctions were imposed by the United States and the European Union against Iran, resulting in a reduction of more than half of the country's oil exports. Despite these sanctions, many American companies declared economic cooperation with Iran. On November 24, 2013, after three days of intense negotiations, the Geneva 3 agreement was reached. In the critical moments when unsuccessful speculations about the strengthening of the Geneva 3 negotiations were circulating, the spell of failure broke, and Iran and the West took the most significant step towards ending the decade-long deadlock and mutual distrust. They recorded their first historic agreement, marking the conclusion of the Geneva 3 talks after numerous multilateral discussions, extensive negotiations, and unprecedented, lengthy talks regarding Iran's uranium enrichment program. As a result, the West officially acknowledged Iran's right to uranium enrichment for the first time, and, in return for Iran's agreement on some of the West's requests regarding nuclear

activities, such as 20% uranium enrichment, activities at the Arak heavy-water reactor, and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a part of the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union on Iran would be lifted. After a six-month period from the Geneva 3 negotiations, in May 2014, IAEA inspectors entered Iran and visited the Fordow and Arak sites. Subsequently, reports of the inspections were presented to the head of the European Union. In late May 2014, during extended negotiations, the Foreign Minister of Iran and the P5+1 group initiated the preparation of the detailed text of the Iran-West nuclear agreement in Vienna and Turkey. However, during this time, a group of fundamentalist representatives, known as "Delvapasan" and their supporters, expressed opposition to the nuclear agreement in Tehran through false speeches and deceitful statements at one of the universities. They also produced and distributed a famous CD titled "I am Rouhani" in an attempt to undermine the agreement. Still, with the support of the Supreme Leader, the President, the Parliament Speaker, a majority of reformist representatives, and high-ranking military officials, this opposition group became silent and ceased its activities. According to Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the main provisions of the Iran-West nuclear agreement were determined during the late negotiations in June 2014. After lengthy negotiations in Vienna, in June 2014, the Iranian negotiating team and the Western negotiating team (P5+1) group announced that approximately 65% of the text of the nuclear agreement had been agreed upon regarding Iran's enrichment programs. Still, further examination of the remaining 35% required additional time. Relying on an agreement between the head of the Western negotiating team (P5+1) group and the representative of the United States, a maximum of four months was given to finalize all the provisions of the nuclear agreement. Additionally, it was agreed that during this four-month period, all economic sanctions against Iran would be suspended. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Western Union would unblock an additional \$2.8 billion from the frozen funds, and the proceeds from Iran's oil sales would be freely deposited into the Central Bank of Iran in six installments through the desired foreign banks. This agreement was reached during the preliminary stages of the negotiations, in initial agreement where Iran requested a total of 2.4 billion dollars for oil and gas exports. This amount was to be paid in eight installments through specified foreign banks chosen by the Western negotiating group to Iran's central bank. In October 2014, nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) were held in New York for a week. However, due to a lack of expected progress during the talks, Russian Foreign Minister mentioned proposing a set of formulas with China, which had not faced opposition until then. The text claims that the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 group and Iran had progressed to about 95%, but there were still significant differences in positions between the United States and Iran.

The Iranian Foreign Minister acknowledged existing substantial gaps between the United States and Iran in the nuclear negotiations. The head of the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidential Institution also emphasized that diplomatic efforts must persist in resolving the Iranian issue, despite the lack of significant progress in the New York talks. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the United States, after engaging in discussions with Iran, stated that although achieving a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran is still uncertain and difficult, there is a likelihood that diplomacy will serve our interests. Following these negotiations, major foreign companies started to engage with Iran, and the first deal with an American company, Boeing, took place after 35 years. expectations of increased foreign investment in Iran after the complete lifting of sanctions and the positive developments in trade cooperation. the expectations of many economic experts who anticipated foreign companies planning to enter Iran after the complete lifting of sanctions. However, events in the 2014 and 2015 indicated that foreign entities were still waiting for the removal of sanctions against Iran. Despite this, significant companies, including energy giants like Total and Royal Dutch Shell, as well as automotive manufacturers like Peugeot and Citroën, and financial institutions like Deutsche Bank and Renaissance Capital of Russia, participated in investment sessions related to Iran. Additionally, the head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce announced positive developments, stating that the sale of Boeing components to Iran, the request from European automakers for commercial cooperation, and the prospect of several hundred billion dollars in trade cooperation between regional countries and Iran are positive signs. These events were seen as encouraging for foreign investors even before the complete removal of sanctions. The mater emphasizes that the increased foreign interest in collaboration with Iran in foreign trade indicates a significant economic reality for the country. According to a comprehensive government plan in the field of investment, it was expected that within five years, a total investment of over \$700 billion would take place in various sectors, including oil, self-sufficiency, petrochemicals, mining, food, clothing, etc. Approximately \$400 billion of this amount was allocated specifically to the oil sector. Also in late November 2014 in which related to the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group, after six days of negotiations over the lifting of economic sanctions against Iran and the enrichment levels at Iran's nuclear facilities in Oman, and the execution of the trilateral nuclear memorandum by Zarif, Ashton, and Kerry, as well as the bilateral talks between the foreign ministers of Iran and the United States, and the visit of the King of Oman to Tehran for a meeting with the Speaker of the Parliament in 22 November 2014, the Iranian negotiating team, led by Mohammad Javad Zarif, went to Vienna for further negotiations.

After three days of staying at the Kubergh Hotel in Vienna and behind closed doors, on 23 November 2014, Reuters, citing a European source, reported a lack of significant progress on the enrichment levels and the lifting of sanctions, stating that the possibility of an agreement by the 24 November 2014 is very slim. However, some foreign media outlets had already announced a political agreement between the two sides, and in the final hours of the same day, news of an agreement broke. President Obama had also stated that he would satisfy Congress in case of an agreement. Despite these positive developments, foreign media, especially American media, intensified their speculations and discussions against the overall progress of the negotiations. Nevertheless, some statements from Western officials regarding the prevailing atmosphere in the negotiations were optimistic, suggesting the existence of favorable conditions and a high likelihood of reaching an agreement. Eventually, on the 24 November 2014, it was officially announced that the Geneva Agreement would be extended for another seven months until, July 1, 2015, providing both parties with an opportunity for diplomatic efforts. At night on 24 November 2014, President Hassan Rouhani officially announced that there is no way other than reaching an agreement and ending sanctions. He emphasized Iran's logical approach to negotiation and dialogue, stating that nuclear negotiations are serious and will continue earnestly until reaching a final agreement. He expressed the belief that pressure and sanctions against Iran have been futile. Foreign Minister of Iran and Catherine Ashton, the coordinator of the P5+1 group, issued a joint statement, declaring the extension of the Joint Plan of Action until June 30, 2015, to provide more time for negotiations. They affirmed their commitment to continue diplomatic efforts, aiming to finalize the negotiations within the shortest possible time, preferably within four months. In the statement, it was mentioned that Iran and the P5+1 group countries reconfirmed their commitment to fulfill their obligations. They also indicated that they preferred to reach a comprehensive solution in Vienna, but considering the progress made and the need for further examination of new ideas, they were confident that a secure path towards a comprehensive solution exists. On November 28, 2014, following the statements of the Supreme Leader regarding support for the Iranian negotiating team and the extension of the Geneva agreement, the President of the Parliament, along with Friday prayer leaders in various cities, officially expressed their support for the Iranian negotiating team and the extension of nuclear talks with the P5+1 group. The new round of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 group which had started in March 2015, was expected, according to Zarif's previous announcement possibly leads to a final agreement around the March 30, 2015. In early April 2015, negotiations on the Iranian nuclear deal held in Lausanne, Switzerland concluded after 72 hours of intense discussions, reaching a historic agreement. As stated by Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Zarif, all differences were resolved. On Friday, April 3, 2015, the agreement was officially

announced by Zarif (Iranian Foreign Minister), Mogherini (head of the P5+1 group), Kerry (US Secretary of State), and Obama (U.S. President), receiving approval. Now, with fewer concerns, we can consider that the differences have been resolved, and there is no obstacle to ending the disputes between Iran, the P5+1 group, and the United States. Many people may not realize that the danger has passed, and the agreement has paved the way for a secure future for Iran. If we pay attention to the conditions of the region and the world, we will find that the efforts of the negotiating teams of Iran and the United States have mutual benefits. In fact, the dispute revolves around whether Iran should be the primary power in the region, or it should be Turkey or Saudi Arabia. This issue encapsulated all the tensions of the recent two years. Saudi Arabia had openly declared its enmity towards Iran for a year. Moreover, to counter Iran, even Israel had aligned itself against Iran, and Turkey, claiming regional leadership, had closed ranks against Iran. Israel, alongside these two countries, had practically stated multiple times that "the threat from Iran is greater than that from ISIS." Saudi Arabia, which had emphasized the need for the Arab world to confront Iran, also considered Iran a significant threat. Thus, the agreement between Iran and the United States is, in fact, America's choice for a regional ally. Throughout the one and a half years that the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States became serious, President Rouhani's government focused on its most important program during these negotiations. In this regard, most regional events aimed to prevent an agreement between Iran and the United States. Now, assuming that instead of focusing on the agreement, Iran was entangled in one of three unfortunate incidents, such as launching an attack on Israel in Gaza, directly engaging in war with ISIS in Iraq, or entering into tension with Saudi Arabia over Yemen, the objectives of Israel and Saudi Arabia would have been achieved. Fortunately, with the rationality of the United States and the efforts of moderate and rational forces within Iran's government at that time, this agreement was reached. If the agreement between Iran and the United States had not been reached, or even if the announcement of the initial understanding had been postponed for several months, it would have meant that Iran was entering a state of uncertainty economically, politically, and internationally. Moreover, the continuation of sanctions would have intensified the economic crisis in Iran, leading to political and international isolation. In Iran, hardliners would have gained momentum, and the moderate and reformist movements would have lost their ability to prepare for the upcoming elections. In the United States, the failure to reach an agreement with Iran would have meant the defeat of the Democratic Party against the Republican hardliners and the Israeli lobby. If this agreement had not been concluded, Turkey and Azerbaijan, on one hand, and ISIS, located between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and the southern Gulf countries, on the other hand, would have pushed Iran toward complete destruction. The agreement between Iran and the United States will not

only lead to the enhancement of Iran's national power and economic reconstruction but also contribute to political development and democratization in Iran. However, it is unlikely that, this will happen in the next two to three months. The event in Lausanne, Switzerland, was not only a victory for President Rouhani's government but also a turning point for the entire Iranian government from revolutionary tendencies toward pragmatism. This shift, like an irreversible river, was crucial, especially because the entire government now seeks what the people want, and this pragmatism will promote political development. It should be noted that this victory is the result of the efforts, diplomatic skills, intelligence, patience, and precision of the negotiation team. A noteworthy point is that Saeed Jalili, the head of the nuclear negotiation team in the tenth government, perhaps did not understand the meaning of his statement when he openly said to Javier Solana on July 19, 2009, "Diplomacy is like an Iranian carpet; it progresses millimeter by millimeter, precise, delicate, but ultimately beautiful and enduring." Jalili was neither a diplomat nor familiar with negotiation principles, nor did he comprehend the meaning of carpets and delicacy. This statement was the policy implemented by Zarif and his team, who moved forward with the negotiations like weaving an Iranian carpet, strand by strand. The main beneficiaries of this agreement are the people who, throughout these years, considered prioritizing the country's interests over party and political affiliations. What matters now is the preservation of Iran's national interests.

Regarding the recent agreement in the negotiations between Iran and the West, a part of the content from a four-page document published on the website of the U.S. Department of State after the agreement is summarized as follows:

1. Iran committed not to build any heavy-water reactor for 15 years.
2. Iran committed to either destroy the Arak heavy-water reactor core, where plutonium is produced, or allow Americans to come to Iran, separate it from the reactor, and transfer it out of the country.
3. Iran committed not to build any new uranium enrichment facilities.
4. Iran committed to fully deactivate the Fordow nuclear facility, with no access to the site and facilities for 10 years, sealing it completely.
5. Iran committed to deactivate all second-generation centrifuges and only use first-generation centrifuges, with up to 5,000 machines capable of enriching uranium up to 3.67%, i.e., below 4%, for 10 years (first-generation centrifuges have technology from 30 years ago).
6. Iran committed to dilute a portion of uranium above 5% and bring it below 5%, keeping it for the Tehran research and medical reactor, while enriching the remaining uranium above 5%.

7. Iran committed to having all imports under the supervision and inspection of Europe and the West.
8. Iran committed to having all conventional weapons under the supervision and inspection of the United Nations and the West, with no right to manufacture any missiles or weapons.
9. Iran accepted and signed the Additional Protocol and committed to its provisions.
10. Iran committed to having all international activities of the country under the supervision and scrutiny of the United Nations for a limited period.

The determination of the timing for lifting sanctions and the method of inspecting these key issues has been a point of contention. A week after the end of the Lausanne negotiations, political and media debates over the results and content of the joint statement continued. The main points of discussion revolved around two issues: sanctions and the establishment of an inspection regime for Iran's nuclear programs, leading to various positions from Iran and the P5+1 group countries. The differences mentioned in the solutions obtained in the negotiations used to announce their resolution, but according to negotiation officials, the details and technical solutions of the negotiations in the coming months will be clarified. This dispute, which has attracted the attention of most global media, had become face-to-face with the mutual positions of Iranian and American authorities, including the defense minister of the country. After the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and the President of Iran announced that the lifting of all sanctions should take place on the same day as the signing of the agreement and that the oversight of Iran's nuclear programs should not lead to access to Iran's military programs, White House officials stated that the lifting of sanctions would be done "step by step" and after ensuring Iran's commitment to the "verification" of its nuclear programs. U.S. officials also stated that there should be the possibility of extensive inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities and even military areas. In one of the latest positions, Ashton Carter, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, claimed that "the goal of the U.S. government in negotiations is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons production capabilities." He said, "The final nuclear agreement with Iran will include inspection of the country's nuclear facilities, so this agreement is not based on trust but on verification." However, Obama describes the Iranians differently after the final negotiations. The central theme of President Obama's remarks in a conversation with Friedman is as follows: The finalization of the agreement with Iran regarding the nuclear program is a rare opportunity that arises once in a lifetime to conclude the nuclear challenge with Iran and establish stability in the Middle East. In my opinion (Obama), what is very clear is that the Supreme Leader of Iran, in these (nuclear) negotiations, granted freedom of action to Iranian negotiators and gave them the discretion to facilitate the

achievement of this framework of agreement. The biggest threat faced by Arab countries is not from Iran but rather from internal dissatisfaction within their own countries. It's challenging to say these things, but it needs to be addressed that there are individuals determined to sabotage any agreement, having no interest in listening to the opinions of nuclear scientists or other experts. They only view this matter through a partisan lens. Therefore, I do not want to jeopardize an international agreement based on their political approach, and I hope to achieve results that allow Congress to express its views on this matter. Still, without undermining the special powers of the presidency, ensuring that if we truly obtain a "good" agreement, we can implement it. Obama also reiterated his support for his government's policy towards countries like Iran and Cuba, stating, "Engagement, along with achieving key strategic needs, will better serve America's interests with these countries than sanctions and eternal isolation." Referring to his correspondence with Iran's Supreme Leader, Obama emphasized, "I have not directly spoken with him. In the letters he sends, there is usually a lot of reference to what he perceives as past hostilities against his country, but in my opinion, what is very clear is that he has granted freedom of action to Iranian negotiators in these (nuclear) negotiations and has given them the discretion to facilitate the achievement of this framework of agreement. Iran can be a powerful regional force." In response to the question of what message he has for the Iranians to persuade them to accept the agreement, Obama added, "Tehran does not need hostile positions against other actors to become a power center in the region. Considering its size, resources, and population, Iran can be a very powerful regional force."

The recounting of Ahmadinejad's efforts for negotiation with the United States, as narrated by Seyyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Al-Beradei regarding the messages and correspondence of the former government with the White House, is as follows:

During George W. Bush's presidency, the United States never responded positively to Ahmadinejad's repeated requests for direct negotiations. A member of Obama's government contact group in 2012 mentioned that Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a senior assistant and close associate of Ahmadinejad, had discussed the possibility of opening the door to direct negotiations with high-ranking former U.S. officials. However, the White House stated that they did not want to engage in discussions with Iranians outside the framework of the (P5+1) group regarding Iran. Additionally, Mohammad Al-Beradei, in his memoir published in Persian as "Era of Deception: Atomic Diplomacy in the Age of Betrayal," writes: "Ahmadinejad, through letters in 2009, expressed Iran's readiness for unconditional and mutually respectful bilateral negotiations via Obama." Obama, ignoring Ahmadinejad's request to the Supreme Leader and not writing a letter to him, sent a message to

Ahmadinejad acknowledging his understanding of Iran's governmental structure and knowledge of the individuals' positions within it. This letter led to Ahmadinejad's displeasure. During Ahmadinejad's last trip to New York, contrary to his speeches attacking the United States, he strangely softened his tone in his final remarks and stated, "Iran recognizes the position of the United States, and believes that we can have a relationship with each other." These statements elicited a direct response from the international affairs advisor to the Supreme Leader, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who said, "Iran's general policies regarding the United States have not changed, and no new decision has been made in this regard. It should be noted that after Obama's stance and his speech, Saudi Arabia welcomed the Lausanne statement. However, the central theme of Iran's former Foreign Minister's remarks is as follows:

On the day the resolution is approved, both parties must take actions, and there is a gap between approval and the implementation of the agreement. We also need to take actions at Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and other nuclear facilities in line with the agreement, which is the responsibility of the system's authorities. From the moment this resolution is implemented and the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that we have taken the necessary actions, at that moment, the United States is obliged to lift all economic and financial sanctions imposed against Iran. According to international law, the U.S. government commits to lift all sanctions, but the situation in the European Union is different, and sanctions will be lifted immediately on the same day the agreement is finalized. Zarif added, "With confidence, I tell all friends not to worry; constructive criticism is good, but we are in the midst of negotiations. If we delve into more details, we have opened our hands, so critics should trust negotiators. When we have a thousand centrifuges in Fordow, it means Fordow is operational, and some groups are eager to attack Iran, but they lack the courage. There also is thousand centrifuges in Fordow that can be used at any time, and no one should think they can bring down the regime with military threats. If either party violates the agreement, we can quickly revert to our nuclear issue." Former Iranian Foreign Minister also appeared on a program on the state-run TV network to elaborate on the achievements of the Swiss nuclear negotiations. Mohammad Javad Zarif, during these statements, clarified the ambiguities arising from the media and political discussions that followed the reading of the Swiss statement in the negotiating countries. He emphasized that all Security Council and European Union sanctions would be lifted upon the finalization of the comprehensive agreement on the July 1, 2015, and all economic and financial sanctions imposed by the United States would also be lifted after the resolution is implemented and the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Iran has taken the necessary actions. Zarif also noted that the Swiss statement does not have coercive aspects. The Foreign Minister of Iran stated: "If you want to prevent the

violation of people's rights, you may have to repeat a matter over a hundred times, but since we approved the Geneva agreement in December 2013, we have been negotiating for 16 months, and during these 16 months, the issues have not changed because certain issues were clear and their positions, especially before the Geneva agreement, were entirely evident. This is because they demanded the destruction of the Arak facility with bulldozers and soil removal in Fordow, insisting that Iran should have more than 200 or 300 centrifuges and called for decades-long restrictions. We witnessed these positions in June 2014 when they had just made progress, but they understood that they could not shut down Iran's nuclear program. The other party exaggerates; we will resist." Former Iranian Foreign Minister, while congratulating the Iranian nation for the acknowledgment by the U.S. Secretary of State that they cannot bring the people of Iran to their knees, stated: "John Kerry used an interesting term for his statement, and we remember that the Islamic Revolution in Iran began with the uprising of Imam Khomeini against capitalism. The term Mr. Kerry used was that we cannot 'capitulate' the people of Iran, indicating that the message and ideals of Imam Khomeini, which required standing firm against capitulation, are now evident in the negotiations. We hope these negotiations will yield results with divine assistance and the support of the people. If the other party insists too much during the drafting phase, we will resist. "The head of the diplomatic apparatus mentioned that the Zionist regime and hardliners in the U.S. sought to formulate plans, pouring water into the mills of their enemies to create a security threat from Iran and portray Iran as a source of danger. They claimed Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons and said, "We must close Iran's four paths to nuclear weapons." If you say we should close these four paths, I must say that we closed these paths ourselves. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution has issued a fetwa consistently emphasizing that the use of weapons for mass slaughter is religiously forbidden, and these paths are closed in history, and you cannot see them. Our honor is standing up against six powerful countries, and they themselves admitted that they could not surrender Iran. The head of the diplomatic service said about the "fact sheet" and the text of the agreement as:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not published anything and a series of achievements has been written. The Americans say that this is the negotiation, but My text and Mrs. Mogherini (President of the European Union) is about an hour and a half. Before the press interview, it was prepared and we had negotiated about it ourselves. He added: Of course, this is not a legal text, but a press release, because we said from the beginning that we have an agreement, and it is an agreement that will be completed in July 2014 at the latest. This press release was a joint statement that we negotiated and it took 2-3 hours. We discussed the solutions and these solutions are in the form of cursive writing and still have disagreements and

parentheses. This statement was compiled between us and several rounds of negotiations. So, my colleagues translated it and I told my colleagues that we must be sure that the same text is translated, and we went to the ministerial meeting at the end, and I and Araghchi reviewed this text again so that it does not have too much or too little of the original text, and we are sure and the ministers were waiting for us to have an accurate translation for the text. Regarding the problem that was given to the negotiating team, he added: They told us why it was written above this text that "this text is not legal" and we answered because this is a draft text. The head of Iran's diplomatic agency emphasized that the press release is not binding and stated: Although the draft is important and we have started drafting it, it is not a legal document, but we will finally reach a final agreement by July 1, 2015. He added: Of course, we have not yet decided whether to sign the agreement or to issue it, but we all agreed that a resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be issued in the Security Council, which violates all previous resolutions and this agreement. conforms that. Zarif emphasized: After these steps, an agreement will be reached and this agreement will become an international agreement, and we are now considering reaching those solutions to finalize the international agreement. Explaining the international agreement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said: In this agreement, there are sentences and phrases that are a complete sentence. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran stated that we have reached all the solutions and clarified: the solutions are the same, but their attitudes may be different, but regarding the activity of more than 5 thousand centrifuges in Natanz and more than a thousand centrifuges in Fordow, he emphasized: In the scribbler of my statement and Mrs. Mogherini's statement, it was discussed about the number of centrifuges, that more than five thousand centrifuges will operate in Natanz and more than one thousand centrifuges in Fordow. Both centrifuges that are in Natanz will be enriched. Zarif continued: The decision of the Iranian regime is that the centrifuges that are in Fardo are there as our method that we use for our own work, and we do not intend to enrich with those centrifuges, and as the Americans have said, the fissile materials It should not be injected into centrifuges and we have never said otherwise. The Americans have not said anywhere that 1000 centrifuges will be in Fordow, and there are also cases where there is no parenthesis and it is agreed that 1000 centrifuges whose chain is rotating without materials will remain there. It is worth mentioning the statements of several Iranian and foreign experts and officials in this regard.

European Union: The Swiss declaration is the only valid document

Spokesperson in charge of the European Union's foreign policy: The statement that Iran and the European Union published in Lausanne, Switzerland on April 2, 2015 is a general statement and is recognized as valid by all negotiating parties.

Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization: The Atomic Energy Organization and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have jointly prepared a fact sheet that is now in the hands of Mr. Zarif, and if they deem it expedient, they will announce this fact sheet.

OBAMA: It's wrong to say that we would have gotten a better deal if we had pushed harder.

Schultz and Kissinger: Iran has not destroyed any of its main infrastructure and facilities and only places them under temporary safeguard restrictions, which in many cases will only be the sealing of a warehouse or periodic inspection by inspectors of declared sites.

(Fact sheets) or interpretations of the Swiss statement were published one after another in the capitals of the negotiating parties. After the publication of the American fact sheet, its French version was published two days ago, and then it was reported that the Iranian fact sheet was also ready to be published. Then, **Ali Akbar Salehi**, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, referring to the contradictory statements of American officials regarding the Swiss statement, said: The Atomic Energy Organization and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran have prepared the fact sheet of Iran and it is now in the hands of the Foreign Minister and it Will be published at discretion. This was despite the fact that a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Islamic Council had previously informed about the letter of a number of representatives to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the request to publish the Iranian "Fact Sheet" as soon as possible and said: Although the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other members of the team The negotiators stated in their interviews that the fact sheet of the Americans is not true, but our emphasis is that this issue should be officially answered by publishing the Iranian report and published as a document.

According to ISNA, Catherine Ray, the spokesperson for the foreign policy of the European Union, in response to reports that there are discrepancies between the statement published in Lausanne, Switzerland and the fact sheet presented by the United States, said: The statement that Iran and the European Union made on April 2, 2015 in Lausanne, Switzerland, it is a general statement and is recognized as valid by all the negotiating parties. These statements of the spokesperson responsible for the foreign policy of the European Union became news while previously Mohammad Javad Zarif and Abbas Araghchi in their separate television interviews,

The European Union authorities' objection to the American statement was based on the Swiss statement. American officials, however, have stated in their own statements that these documents do not differ from each other and that the negotiating parties have only focused on different parts of it. Wendy Sherman, the American chief negotiator, in an interview with the American TV channel "MSNBC", described the differences published in the key points sheet between Iran and the United States (Fact Sheet) as different narratives that fit within the same framework. In general, the American fact sheet was questionable. The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization considered the correct narrative of the Lausanne talks to be based on the positions of Iran's senior negotiators and declared the stabilization of Iran's nuclear rights as the most important achievement of the negotiations. Ali Akbar Salehi, in an interview with "Al-Alam" news channel, referring to the conflicting perceptions of the American authorities about the Swiss statement, which led to the publication of facts contradicting the Swiss statement, said: "The same words that we have criticized, I and Mr. Zarif and Araghchi, all these are fact sheets. "Now, it's not that we don't have facts, but the responsibility for this lies with Iran's chief negotiator, Dr. Zarif, who can publish them with Dr. Rouhani if they see fit." He reminded: "The fact sheet of the Americans is also about the same conversations that we had, but they state incorrect, ambiguous and questionable things. But the basis of the issues was about Natanz, Fordow, Arak, sanctions and accesses and inspections. For example - which I say like this and I don't know if it is in their fact sheet or not - they say that they can also visit our military facilities, while there is no such thing, but we will implement the annexation protocol. If they wanted fact to mean fact, they should have written it. But they infer and derive from the additional protocol in their favor, which we do not agree with." Stating that "there is a significant gap between common understanding and agreement", Salehi noted: "Everyone wants to have their own narrative and interpretation of the nuclear negotiations; But it should be noted that, first of all, we have not reached any agreement until today, and everything that has been done so far has been a common understanding on various issues. There is a significant gap between a common understanding and an agreement. It helps to agree. He emphasized: The red lines that have been determined are that we should have the right to enrich uranium, the Arak heavy water reactor should maintain its nature, researched and developed, and should remain exceptionally with us in terms of inspection and access. do not collide Regarding the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, this was stated by the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The head of the Atomic Energy Organization pointed out that "if everything goes well and is agreed upon, one of the actions that the Islamic Republic has agreed to take is to implement the additional protocol" and added: "It is stated in a part of the additional protocol If

they want to access a non-nuclear site, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not allow them to visit that site, but it can allow them to take samples from around the site without entering the site, under the supervision of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Stating that the approval of the additional protocol should be discussed in the Islamic Council, Salehi said that it is possible that the parliament will temporarily allow it until the additional protocol is approved at its own time, which depends on the negotiations between the government and the Iranian parliament. The head of the Atomic Energy Organization emphasized about the lifting of sanctions and the differences regarding whether the sanctions will be lifted all at once or gradually: "This issue is clear. When an agreement is reached and this principle of dialogue has been announced - first, the resolutions of the Security Council will be lifted, then it will enter We are in the implementation stage. So, first, an agreement will be reached and an agreement will be signed by both parties that is binding, and the resolutions will be canceled on the same day, and then it will enter the implementation phase, in which there are a series of actions that we must take and there are also actions that they must take. In the continuation of the controversial discussions of the understanding between Iran and the West and the statements and interpretations of various American publications regarding this understanding and the continuation of the negotiations and the start of the preparation of the text of the nuclear agreement, currently on April 30, 2015, the consultations of the deputy foreign ministers of Iran and the responsible foreign policy of the European Union was in progress regarding the writing of the text of the comprehensive plan of joint action. The U.S. government announced: If the US Congress prevents the final agreement, the U.S. will be left alone in sanctioning Iran. In this report, the US Secretary of State warned the Congress that even if they prevent the implementation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, the system of sanctions against Tehran will still collapse, thus an important clause of the Congress's plan to monitor a possible agreement with Iran in the first review session. And he did not vote in the US Senate. After the Congress representatives put the plan to monitor the nuclear agreement on their agenda from April 28, 2015, the majority of the American senates opposed the clause of this plan that considers the nuclear agreement as an "international treaty". they did; The opposition refers to the disagreement of American representatives on the way to resolve Iran's nuclear issue. This amendment, if approved, would have required the U.S. government to submit the nuclear agreement with Iran as an international agreement to the U.S. Senate to become binding if the agreement is approved by the U.S. Congress, which was approved by 57 negative votes to 39 positive votes. The affirmative vote was opposed in the U.S. Senate. According to "Hill Information Base", while this amendment was expected to be approved in the open floor of the U.S. Senate, but shortly before the vote, Condoleezza Rice, the former U.S.

Secretary of State during the George Bush era, announced that from the point of view The White House supports this. This is despite the fact that the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee had recently approved a plan according to which Congress will be allowed 30 days after reaching a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group. review it and, if necessary, express his opinion against it. According to this plan, US President Barack Obama will not be allowed to cancel congressional sanctions against Iran during these 30 days. After Obama announced that he would sign the plan with amendments, some U.S. senators decided to add amendments to the plan to make it more difficult to reach a nuclear deal. For this reason, dozens of amendments were added to the plan, which continued to be reviewed and voted on; These amendments make the final support of the Iran deal subject to various conditions, including the recognition of Israel or non-cooperation with North Korea. After raising these issues, the U.S. White House emphasized that if the proposed plan changes, Obama will veto it. Also, Wendy Sherman, the political deputy of the US Department of State, said that "if more conditions and amendments are added to this proposed plan, the U.S. president may reconsider his support for it." Meanwhile, one day before the review of the "surveillance" plan, the Bloomberg news channel quoted John Boehner, the speaker of the US House of Representatives, as saying that the Republicans had enough votes to finally block Barack Obama's veto of the plan. At the same time as senators are trying to limit the powers of the White House to reach an agreement with Iran, US Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized in an interview with the "Boston Globe" newspaper: "If the Congress for political reasons wants a possible nuclear agreement with destroy Iran, this action will mean the end of the system of sanctions against Iran." According to IRNA, citing the website of this American newspaper, John Kerry added in this interview: "If Russia, China, Germany, France and England approve this agreement and all the experts of these countries say that it is a good agreement, but the Congress If he wants to destroy this agreement for political reasons, all those countries will separate themselves from the path." Kerry added: "In this case, there will be no more sanctions because none of these countries will implement the sanctions in such a situation, and the United States will not be able to keep the 5+1 group together." Also, the U.S. foreign minister emphasized: "All the words and hadiths we have heard from Benjamin Netanyahu and Republican members of Congress that the pressure on Iran should be intensified will not happen."

In another part of this conversation, while considering the importance of the details of the agreement, which should be determined by June 30, 2015, Kerry added: "One of the important aspects of the framework of the agreement (Swiss statement) is the close supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the overall cycle.

Iran's nuclear fuel is for 25 years." In the end, John Kerry once again raised the threat of military action and claimed: "If Iran goes towards a weapons program, then we can quickly go to sanctions or to the military option." Iran's negotiating team, headed by Mr. Zarif, arrived in Austria on June 27 2015 to continue the nuclear negotiations and finalize the preparation of the famous Geneva agreement text, with the visit of Kerry and Zarif, the foreign ministers of the United States and Iran, and they will remain in Vienna until the end of this round of nuclear negotiations, which enters the final phase. Nuclear negotiations on how to cancel Iran's economic sanctions and periodic visits to Iran's nuclear sites were held for 10 days with the 5+1 group and the US Secretary of State. On July 2, 2015, it was officially announced by the media of the country and the western media that about 80% of the text of the agreement has been prepared, but in order to reach the desired result of the final negotiation, it needs an extension of 7 days. So that the last day of the official signing of the text of the Geneva Agreement by the US Congress was June 30, 2015. In this regard, on July 1, 2015, Mr. Amano, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, arrived in Tehran to visit Iran's nuclear sites. Abbas Araghchi, the senior member of Iran's nuclear negotiator, stated that we are ready to cooperate with the international agency in terms of possible military dimensions. and speed up these collaborations to reach a clear conclusion in this regard. According to ISNA's report, Araghchi called the issue of possible dimensions an old issue and stated that once claims were made regarding Iran's nuclear program, which was the basis of pressures and sanctions. But now there is a good opportunity to resolve these issues and claims that were raised in the past in a calm atmosphere. We are ready to cooperate with Mr. Amano so that it is clear that the claims that exist and the cases that have been opened against Iran are false and the white record of Iran's nuclear program is shown. Araghchi assessed the visit of the Director General of the International Agency to Iran as good and successful and said: that, the reports we have received from Tehran and the reports given by his colleagues show that this trip was a successful and forward-looking diplomatic trip, and also about the negotiations and how to reach a possible agreement based on observing the red lines. He stated, according to a report, each of the negotiating parties in Vienna during this period (Iran and Group P5+1) was supposed to take the mentioned draft to their respective countries on the July 4, 2015, and the final opinion of the high-ranking officials of their countries. ask about the mentioned text. According to the same news, Iran's nuclear team came to Tehran

on the same day with the text of the proposed agreement to decide on that text. It was evident from the evidence that the negotiation process was moving in a positive direction. It was not far from the observers' eyes that Amano had gone to Tehran this time with the aim of bringing the views closer together. Amano's presence in Tehran at this particular point of time indicated a fundamental change of position. It seems that he was given a mission to adjust positions towards Iran according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. In its previous positions, the Agency had claimed that Iran has suspicious military plans in line with its nuclear program and asked Iran to prove that it does not have such a plan. This was while the director of the agency had specified and confirmed the existence of military purposes in Iran's nuclear program in his latest position. Now, the powerful and influential countries of the world, in the form of the 5+1 group, have decided to agree with Iran on the nuclear program and how to cancel the imposed economic sanctions. In this way, it was necessary to prepare the ground for this understanding by the International Nuclear Agency.

Note: The International Atomic Energy Agency is an international organization that was established in 1975 to promote the peaceful use and prevent the military use of nuclear energy, and the main purpose of establishing this international organization can be to guarantee the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Atomic propaganda at the level of the international community and its efforts to use this energy for peaceful purposes are considered by the members of the agency. Of course, despite the establishment of this organization, it can be said that the number of countries with nuclear weapons has not only decreased, but has also grown continuously. This is a clear indication of the inefficiency of this agency. The countries of India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa have acquired deadly weapons during the years after the establishment of the Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has not played a role in important and impactful projects such as Iraq and then North Korea. More importantly, in the case of Iraq, although the total observations and reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated that there is no active program to produce weapons of mass destruction in Iraq's nuclear program, but the US approach ignores the performance and report of the inspectors of this agency and the decision to attack. It was to Iraq and also North Korea, which had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985 in exchange for receiving four light water reactors from the former Soviet Union, but in early 2003, the United States claimed that North Korea's nuclear tests are suspicious and indicate a deviation towards militarization. Of course, it should be

considered that the nodes of negotiations with Iran are in two directions, one in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the other in the 5+1 group. At this point of time, Amano had taken a big step in informing and resolving disputes with a clear position. The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency emphasized that it is possible to present a report on the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program by the end of the year. Of course, he considered the presentation of this report conditional on Iran's cooperation and said that if the final agreement is reached, the international agency is ready to cooperate in the above-mentioned cases, it is clear that the announcement of the "agreement" does not require the approval of the international agency, and in fact the parties have accepted that at the stage After reaching an agreement, resolve the remaining disputes around the issue of claimed studies (PMD). It is reminded that the possible military dimensions are said to be related to the research in the field of explosive devices, which are based on undocumented documents against Iran's nuclear program, and according to this claim, Iran started to carry out before the year 2003, this research is aimed at obtaining atomic weapons. But Iran had rejected these claims and until now this issue has not been resolved so that after the Lausanne meeting and the formulation of the general framework of the negotiations, it went to the negotiating table in the form of a solution for a possible agreement in Vienna, and then as the parties approached an agreement and through consultation It was determined that the international agency, which itself was the source of the publication of baseless claims against Iran and was its supervisor, has included the visit to Iran's military centers in its list of requests to Iran to deal with this case within a short period of time. . Amano had explicitly stated that he considers it necessary to provide a text guaranteeing the absence of military dimensions in Iran's nuclear program by June 30 of the same year, and at the same time, an informed official had also stated that a written agreement between Iran and the international agency regarding Some of the agency's claims have been set aside, an agreement whose purpose is to accelerate the implementation of the framework of cooperation to resolve the issue of "PMD". It is that the Achilles heel of the negotiations had become after the Lausanne meeting. Now an informed sources informs about the resolution of this issue in the form of a timetable for its implementation. At the same time, discussions continue on the issuance of the UN Security Council resolution and this Meanwhile, the possible agreement will not become official until the resolution of the UN Security Council is issued. And now mid-July 2015, this resolution is supposed to be issued within the next three or four days and after the official announcement of the final agreement, and then After that, Iran and the United States will take the desired agreement to their parliaments for review, and after these new stages, the implementation of the parties' commitments will begin. After several years and

several governments, the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group were approaching their final days to reach a comprehensive agreement, and these negotiations entered their final phase on June 27, 2015, with the visit of Kerry and Zarif to Austria. The final round of negotiations of Iran's nuclear negotiations with Group P5+1 started on June 27, 2015 and with two extensions after the deadline of July 1, 2015. finally, on July 14, 2015 after 18 days of intensive and serious discussions, the text of the comprehensive nuclear agreement ended.

The text of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group consists of 100 pages and 5 appendices. These nuclear negotiations had two preliminary and final stages, which was carried out with the Geneva agreement and was extended three times until the final stage of negotiations was completed. Until finally, on July 13, 2015 they reached the final conclusion and the comprehensive plan of joint action included measures on the part of Iran to build trust and resolve concerns, and on the other hand, while continuing Iran's nuclear program, comprehensive sanctions against Iran were lifted in a time process will be. This agreement, which was reached on the 14th day of July 2015, should be taken to the capitals (Iranian Islamic Council and the US Congress) to be formalized after the final review and approval. In this regard, it should be added that a new event in Iran's nuclear negotiations took place and US President Obama showed flexibility towards the new resolution of US senators. So that the political conflict that started between the American statesmen and the representatives of the Congress of this country since the formation of the initial nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 group (Geneva) entered new stages in the United States as the parties became more serious about reaching a comprehensive agreement. After the President of the United States repeatedly criticized the array of opponents of the negotiations in the American political scene during the negotiations with Iran and announced that any decision contrary to the current diplomatic process between Iran and the negotiating parties will be vetoed by him, American lawmakers in this case keyed a new plan to interfere in the path of agreement with Iran. This plan was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with 19 positive votes and no negative votes, and it has a high chance of being approved in the Congress. By accepting the fact that, the will of Iran and the great powers of the world are more serious than ever to seek an agreement, the Congress representatives seriously put the plan of monitoring the possible agreement on the agenda, and the plan that was previously opposed Barack Obama was seriously faced and an action aimed at limiting the powers of the head of the executive branch to solve an important issue in the American foreign policy was interpreted, however, part of the obligations of the United States in a possible agreement regarding sanctions was tied to the decisions of the Congress and the

efforts of the Republic. The radical request to gather more votes of the representatives to neutralize Obama's veto power, prompted him to show flexibility regarding the possible signing of the plan of the representatives to monitor the final agreement with Iran, while the representatives supporting this bill also made moderate changes. They created its content, which was accompanied by the strong support of members of both major parties in Congress. In this way, Obama, by abandoning his earlier decision to "veto" the approval of monitoring the agreement, by revising and amending the said plan, changed the role of Congress. As an observer, he accepted the text of a possible agreement with Iran. According to the report published by the foreign media including the Associated Press, this plan requires the President of the United States to submit the text of the agreement to the Congress for review within five days after reaching an agreement with Iran, and based on this plan, the review period of the final nuclear deal with Iran in the US Congress will be reduced from 60 days included in the original plan to 52 days, and 30 days of this time were spent on considering a possible agreement with Iran in the Congress and 10 days were also allocated for the US President's comments. The US Senate and representatives will have another 12 days to re-vote in this regard in case of "veto" of the Congress resolution by Barack Obama. During this one-month period, Barack Obama can cancel the sanctions imposed by the US government, but the sanctions approved by the Congress will remain in force until the end of the review of the nuclear deal with Tehran. According to the plan agreed by the senators of both Democratic and Republican parties, the president must guarantee to the Congress every 90 days that Iran has adhered to the final agreement. Earlier in this plan, it was emphasized that Barack Obama should also guarantee every three months that Iran does not support terrorism, but this clause was deleted in the final version of the plan of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. White House spokesman Josh Earnest stated that "parts of this plan are not acceptable to the U.S. government, but the changes have been made enough for Obama to sign it," and said: "The issue of the plan is no longer to approve or reject the final agreement with Iran; Rather, its purpose is to vote on whether to maintain or lift congressional sanctions against Iran. Also, the US foreign minister welcomed the agreement of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. government regarding the plan to monitor the agreement and said that "this has given me confidence on the eve of the 30th June deadline of the year 2015, that has been set to reach a final agreement". He added: "I am confident about the president's ability to negotiate an agreement and his ability to make the world safer" setting a period of 52 days after the possible signing of the final agreement; with the aim of clarifying the resolution of the disagreement between the White House and the Congress; At the same time, Iran's high-ranking officials have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of canceling all sanctions on the

same day of signing the final agreement. The political conflict between the American statesmen and the representatives of this country is happening while the Iranian authorities believe that in the course of negotiations, the internal issues and disputes of the great powers have nothing to do with the agreement process with Iran. Marzieh Afkham, also the spokesperson of Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, in response to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's decision and its effect on the negotiation process, said: "We are negotiating with the governments, and in our opinion, the governments are on our side. In this case, the most important words of Iran's foreign minister in an interview are as follows: The day the resolution is approved, the parties must take actions, and there is a gap between the approval and implementation of the agreement, and we must also take actions in Fordow, Natanz, and Arak. and our other nuclear equipment, which is agreed upon by the authorities of the system, and from the day this resolution becomes effective and the Atomic Energy Agency confirms that we have taken the necessary measures, at that moment, the United States is obliged to remove all economic and financial sanctions against Iran. He had decided to stop. According to international law, the American government undertakes to cancel all sanctions, but the situation is different in the European Union, and after the agreement is finalized on the same day, the sanctions of the European Union will be immediately canceled and the agreement will become permanent when I will confidently tell all my friends not to worry if we go into more details, we have opened our hands, so critics should trust the negotiators. The reflection of Zarif's words in the world media and Mohammad Javad Zarif's defense of the Lausanne negotiations and the explanation of the statement read at the end of the meeting received special attention from a large number of world news circles, and the American media considered Zarif's statements as an attempt to convince Iran's internal critical currents, which was likely in the coming months, oppose the process of negotiations leading to a comprehensive agreement. In this connection, the "Wall Street Journal" newspaper referred to Zarif's words about the lifting of sanctions, which were read in the final statement of Lausanne, and quoted the Iranian Foreign Minister as saying: "If finalized the nuclear agreement will lift all U.N Security Council sanctions against Iran's nuclear program, as well as U.S. and European Union sanctions. The newspaper noted: "Despite the criticism of the opposition in Iran, the nuclear understanding has been widely welcomed in Iran's political structure." The American Washington Times also considered Iran's foreign minister's statement as "an attempt in advance to appease the opposition in order to present different interpretations of the Lausanne Declaration". Al-Jazeera news network website, which chose the headline of Iran's foreign minister's defense of the historic nuclear agreement for its article wrote: "According to Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran will be able to resume its nuclear activities once again if the West does

not adhere to its commitments. According to Zarif, Iran has the ability to take countermeasures and will be able to resume its activities at the same level if the other party does not comply. He also emphasized that the statement issued after the recent negotiations is not binding. Regarding Iran's defense of its achievements in the recent meeting, the New York Times pointed to the extensive efforts of the Tel Aviv authorities and wrote: "Israel is trying to reconcile its long list of expectations with the Lausanne Agreement in order to meet its demands if there are any deficiencies." to dictate to America in the continuation of the negotiation process". According to this American media, "Israeli analysts have claimed that the monitoring system of all Iran's nuclear programs was not considered in the recent understanding". The Zionist newspaper "Jerusalem Post" published an article investigating the issues that, in its opinion, constituted the key weaknesses of the nuclear agreement. This newspaper pointed out that based on the understanding of the parties, Iran will keep 5,000 centrifuges in Natanz and another thousand centrifuges in the underground facilities of Fordow, this is a problem in itself. Among other things that were criticized by this newspaper was that Iran will be able to continue its nuclear research and development activities. "Haaretz" newspaper also considered the improvement of Iran's economy and the recognition of this country by world powers as a nuclear country and an effective force in the Middle East as bad news for Israel. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran stated in a report: The UN Security Council had approved 6 resolutions against Iran, and the Security Council Resolution of 1929 is a great international disaster, and there were misunderstandings in the Geneva Agreement regarding the suspension or removal of sanctions, the reason for which was a different interpretation of a word. But in the statement, we have used a word that means "cancel" in the opinion of Westerners, and based on that, the sanctions should be canceled. Zarif stated: Of course, some clauses of the Security Council resolutions related to proliferation items and weapons will be removed from the Security Council resolution, but they will not be canceled and will be applied as a limit for a certain period of time that will be agreed upon. The head of Iran's diplomatic system stated: The day the resolution is approved, the parties must take measures, and there is a gap between the approval and implementation of the agreement, and we must also take measures in Fordow, Natanz, Arak and other nuclear facilities that are agreed by the regime officials. and these measures will definitely not be in vain, and it will be done over a period of time. Referring to the statement of the spokesperson of the U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the lifting of sanctions will last for 6 months, he said: This is his opinion and it depends on the activities of both sides during this period, but the best guarantee for us is the Security Council resolution that will be approved by this. The council of the countries negotiating with Iran must act on the agreed issues. Zarif stated: From the day this

resolution becomes effective and the Atomic Energy Agency confirms that we have taken the necessary measures, at that moment the United States is obliged to impose all economic and financial sanctions. to stop what he had imposed against Iran. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran further stated: According to international law, the US government undertakes to cancel all sanctions, but in the European Union, the situation is different and after the agreement is finalized, the sanctions will be canceled immediately on the same day. It should be noted that on July 20, 2015 the new resolution of the United Nations Security Council officially approved the official text of Iran's agreement with the United States and the 5+1 group. In this regard, Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that the architecture of sanctions will not be maintained by the Americans and added: in July 20, 2015, the US Treasury Department issued a statement to make the American people aware that, the sanctions have not yet been lifted, and this itself indicates that issues and both sides can stop it. If the agreement is not canceled by the other party it, and in this situation, the architecture of sanctions will definitely not be maintained. The Head of Iran's Diplomatic Service stated: If America wants to take another action after the nuclear agreement with Iran and act against the new Security Council resolution and impose sanctions on Iran again, these sanctions will become worthless. He said: "Suggestions have been made which, if accepted by the other side, will not return to other sanctions on various issues." If we reach an agreement, it must be a bilateral agreement, and in this agreement, we have reached the Arak heavy water power plant, and this is in the case that the Westerners were strongly against it in the past. Zarif by stating that, some of Iran's actions are in our interests: we design the Arak power plant, but due to the sanctions, they bought some parts from the black market, and this has always been a problem for us because sometimes these parts have a destructive function. It causes us problems. Iran has opposed the two-stage agreement. Iran's foreign minister continued: Iran is not looking for nuclear weapons and implements everything it says and writes, and if they return the sanctions, they will no longer have credibility among the world's public opinion, and we have shown the world that we stand by our word, and if they betray us, we can quickly return our nuclear issue. Zarif stated: If an agreement is signed, we will publish the same agreement and the people of Iran are aware, and the lie will not last, and the issues will be revealed quickly in the world of communication. The head of Iran's diplomatic service stated: The said statement is only a press release and contrary to what some say inside, it does not mean an agreement or a stage. He continued: "Those thousand centrifuges in Fordow are for our peace of mind that our facilities are standing because our conditions are changing today because once the world told us that Fordow and Natanz should be closed, but today this resolution of the Security Council will say that 5 thousand of centrifuge will spin in Natanz as long as the other

side is committed to its commitments and no country will be more committed to its commitments than Iran. Zarif clarified: Mr. Kerry himself admitted that in the past one year and a half, Iran has fulfilled all its commitments and this was also because we did not want to give an excuse to anyone and we spent this time while the world understood that we stand by our word and whenever the agreement is finalized, it will include the option that if the other party cancels its commitments. In a period of less than two months, Iran's foreign minister pointed to an article in the Associated Press that we now know that enrichment is only done in Natanz, and if we want to attack Iran, it will be easy for us. said: "When we have a thousand centrifuges in Fordow, it means that Fordow is standing and a group of people will definitely want to attack Iran, but they have neither the courage nor the ability to do so. There are also a thousand centrifuges in Fordow that can be used at any time and no one should to think that he can get away with the threat of a military attack. The United Nations Security Council approved the text of the nuclear deal between Iran and the countries of the 5+1 group. After months and days of breath-taking and intensive negotiations with Iran to end the nuclear challenge and after reaching a set of solutions, the five major powers of the Security Council, a few days away from the Vienna agreement, approved a resolution that ordered the cancellation of all sanctions issued against Iran. A resolution whose approval was described as a unique event in the history of the Security Council. Iran's senior negotiator said in an interview with Iran's Sima 1 news channel, saying that the Security Council resolution removes Iran from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, "Therefore, the UN Security Council no longer considers Iran's nuclear program as a threat." Araghchi said: "After the draft resolution on the lifting of sanctions against Iran was approved by the Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran issued a statement and announced that we no longer recognize the legitimacy of the sanctions and restrictions and all of them are invalid." Stating that this resolution will be accompanied by the letter of the 5+1 group countries to the Security Council, he stated: "One of the most important features of this resolution is that, unlike the previous 6 resolutions of the Security Council, this resolution is not under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter and no longer Iran's peaceful activities will not be considered as a global threat. He stated that in this resolution, which refers to Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, he clarified: "The generality of the resolution will not be under Chapter 41 of the United Nations Charter, and Iran's peaceful nuclear activities will no longer be considered a threat, and this is a fundamental development." The senior member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, in response to a question about what powers the Supreme National Security Council and the Islamic Council have in reviewing this resolution, said: "About the extent and level of involvement of each of these two institutions in this matter." A decision must be made, it is not possible

to comment at the moment. However, he added that the Islamic Council or any of these institutions that become responsible during this legal process can reject or approve this agreement in general, and it is not possible to reject or approve a part of this agreement, or to amend a part of it. but its generalities should either be rejected or approved. For example, if its general aspects are rejected, we will have to return to the negotiating table and negotiate for it, and it is not possible for this agreement to be approved with amendments." Araghchi said: "The new resolution that will be approved by the Security Council is based on the general principles of Chapter Seven of the Charter of Nations. The United States withdraws and refers to paragraph 41 in it, of course, in some specific paragraphs where the Security Council wants to state a binding issue, chapter seven is mentioned." A member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team. The comprehensive plan of joint action stated the elimination of sanctions regime and the sanctions committee of the Security Council and said: "The restrictions referred to in the aforementioned resolution are not recognized as sanctions. "One of the most important features of this resolution is that, unlike the 6 previous Security Council resolutions, this resolution is not under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, and Iran's peaceful activities will no longer be considered a global threat." He stated that in this resolution, which refers to Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, he clarified: "The generality of the resolution will not be under Chapter 41 of the United Nations Charter, and Iran's peaceful nuclear activities will no longer be considered a threat, and this is a fundamental development." The senior member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, in response to a question about what powers the Supreme National Security Council and the Islamic Council have in reviewing this resolution, said: "About the extent and level of involvement of each of these two institutions in this matter." A decision must be made, it is not possible to comment at the moment. However, he added that the Islamic Council or any of these institutions that become responsible during this legal process can reject or approve this agreement in general, and it is not possible to reject or approve a part of this agreement, or to amend a part of it. but its generalities should either be rejected or approved. For example, if its general aspects are rejected, we will have to return to the negotiating table and negotiate for it, and it is not possible for this agreement to be approved with amendments." Araghchi said: "The new resolution that will be approved by the Security Council is based on the general principles of Chapter Seven of the Charter of Nations. The United States withdraws and refers to paragraph 41 in it, of course, in some specific paragraphs where the Security Council wants to state a binding issue, chapter seven is mentioned." A member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team stated as, the comprehensive plan of joint action is the elimination of sanctions regime and the sanctions committee of the Security Council and said: "The restrictions referred to

the aforementioned resolution are not recognized as sanctions. One of these cases is dual-purpose in which goods that may be used in the nuclear military industry, their sale to Iran was prohibited based on previous resolutions, but in the new resolution, through a new channel that has been established, these goods can be purchased for industrial use. He continued: There are also restrictions in the field of weapons, and previous resolutions of the Security Council prohibited the purchase and sale of weapons from Iran and from other countries to Iran, and especially the purchase of large-scale weapons was prohibited. It turns into a 5-year limit that if it is buying and selling, it should be done by obtaining permission on a case-by-case basis by the Security Council. Araghchi also said regarding the restrictions on Iran's missile activities: According to paragraph 9 of Resolution 1929, Iran's missile activities are completely prohibited and it even allowed countries to resort to force against Iran, but now the Security Council wants missile activities in the aforementioned resolution, which is designed to carry a nuclear warhead, should not be carried out, while Iran basically has no nuclear-related missile activity in its security programs. He continued: The Security Council does not state the issue of limiting missile activities either under Article 41 or Chapter Seven, and only raises it as a "demand". Regarding the reversibility of the sanctions in the Security Council resolution and the comprehensive program, Deputy Zarif stated: "The issue of reversibility is for both sides. If the other side does not fulfill its obligations, we will immediately return to our nuclear program. This possibility also exists for the other side and in the resolution, It is also foreseen that if there is a violation by Iran, it can return to the previous situation. Of course, a 60-day process has been considered for this, and this right has been given to both sides." The new resolution of the United Nations Security Council has 12 preliminary clauses and 30 executive clauses, and the joint comprehensive action plan or the Vienna Agreement is attached to it, and this resolution is accompanied by the letter of the 5+1 group countries and their requests to the Security Council.

Chapter 3

Overview to the text of Joint comprehensive plan of Action

The text of the comprehensive program of the Vienna agreement was a sign of a fundamental change in the examination of Iran's nuclear issue by the Security Council, which leads to a new relationship with Iran that is strengthened by the implementation of the comprehensive program, and the independent and fundamental role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in verifying Iran's commitment to Safeguard agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials to undeclared targets and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and undeclared nuclear support activities, which are strongly mandated by the United Nations Charter, as soon as the Agency receives the approval of Iran's adherence to the text of the Comprehensive Plan, Article 41 of the New Resolution under Articles Numbers (2224) year 2010, (1929) year 2008, (1835) year 2008, (1803) year 2007, (1747) year 2006, (1737) year 2006, (1969) year 2015 gives to the Cancellation of the provisions of the resolution based on the new resolution of the Security Council of the Organization .The United Nations has finished dealing with Iran's nuclear issue, and the issue of "non-proliferation" is removed from the list of issues that are on the agenda of the Security Council. It is recalled that after the signing of the Vienna Agreement in July 2015, this nuclear agreement in our country and in the United States It was accompanied by many margins, so that a number of extreme politicians, consisting of a small number of fundamentalist representatives, were very opposed to the general text of the Vienna agreement, and this Vienna agreement also faced many opponents in the American Congress at first. Since it takes about two months to review and approve the text of the agreement in the Islamic Council of Iran and in the U.S. Congress, it must be finally approved so that it can be implemented officially as announced by the United Nations. In this regard, in Iran, as the media also announced that most of the opponents were the same extremists affiliated with the previous government (Ahmadinejad) who thought that their interests were at risk, and they were the same group that was

affected by the sanction so that many years of economic and financial profit of billions of dollars and profited from the dollar or were involved in the financial embezzlement of the Ahmadinejad government. Only about 40 to 50 members of the parliament announced their opposition in the parliament under various titles, and this issue was clear to the people. Also, in the U.S. Congress, a number of pro-Republican senators, who were under the influence of Zionist and extremist lobbies for a long time, were constantly opposed to the Vienna nuclear agreement, but after several reviews and votes in the Congress, most of the supporters of the Democratic Party and A small number of Republicans were supporters of the Vienna Agreement, so that in these two months, most of the American people also became supporters of the nuclear agreement after numerous surveys, as a result of which it was officially announced at the end of September 2015 that the senators of the Democrats and supporters of the nuclear agreement have won 42 percent of the agreement vote, so that they were able to approve the U.S. President's veto in the nuclear agreement and the lifting of US sanctions. Of course, according to the Vienna agreement, all European economic sanctions will be immediately canceled by the P 5+1 group after the implementation of the JCPOA. In this regard, it is necessary to know what the Iranian government expects from the JCPOA report in the Islamic Council. In October, 2015, Hamid Baideinejad, a member of Iran's nuclear negotiator team, presented the following article on this matter: Numerous and intensive meetings of the commissions, and special committee of the Islamic Council to review the nuclear agreement has reached its final stage with the formation of a special committee of the parliament. The main task of this commission is to present comprehensive reports that are based on the discussed facts of the negotiated understanding. These discussions included various topics that have focused on all aspects of nuclear understanding. In this case, it is expected from the members of the parliament to report, and they will prepare for the parliament to reflect the detailed findings of the negotiations conducted in the commission, so that the following principles should be included in the final reports of the parliament commission, especially the special commission, which includes the following items.

- 1- Acquiring the indisputable nuclear rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the implementation of enrichment, which was one of the most important goals of the nuclear negotiations and was included in the text of the

JCPOA in a way that Iran at that time, at the recent "NPT" summit, was in intensive negotiations as the head of the Non-Alignment Movement, he has strongly emphasized the realization of the nuclear rights of the NPT member countries.

- 2- Iran's nuclear development and realization program will be recognized and will continue without any obstacles in accordance with Iran's long-term plan, that will be presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency during the implementation of the JCPOA. This program is designed based on the goal that two or three years after the end of the 10-year nuclear understanding, Iran will enter the stage of progress in enrichment, and as a result, in two short periods, Iran will be able to produce the desired fuel for its nuclear power plant.
- 3- The principled position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding monitoring measures has always been that in case of reaching an understanding regarding fundamental nuclear issues, provided that Iran is not treated as a specific country and the basis of these monitoring measures is international documents, which accepted in the nuclear understanding son that all are within the framework of the additional protocol and none of them is outside the framework of this protocol. The discussion of timing for the implementation of regulatory measures is also based on the general political understanding between Iran and the countries of the 5+1 group, and the period of implementation of the understanding is 20 years, and the period of 10 years in addition to this time means that the implementation of regulatory measures by Iran will continue for 30 years, but Iran rejected this long period and finally, after intensive and long negotiations, the period of understanding was limited to 10 years, and at the time of the regulatory measures, it was considered for an additional 5 years in total to 15 years, and for two special measures, i.e., regulatory measures on Centrifuge production and assembly workshops were considered for a period of 20 years, and for monitoring measures on mines and purification facilities, a period of 25 years was considered.
- 4- If explicitly stated in the JCPOA, the economic, financial, and banking sanctions of the European Union countries will be entirely lifted on the day of the agreement's implementation. European countries will, for the first time and without any delay, simultaneously lift all sanctions against Iran on the day of JCPOA implementation. On the other hand, the United States, due to the challenges of congressional opposition, cannot lift its sanctions on the day of JCPOA implementation. However, it has committed to ceasing the

implementation of all its sanctions against Iran. This implies that the practical consequences of lifting sanctions will occur. Additionally, Swift restrictions on non-sanctioned Iranian banks will be lifted.

- 5- All United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran, including all Council structures such as the Security Council Committee and the panel of experts of this Committee, will be annulled or removed.
- 6- The implementation of the JCPOA imposes no restrictions on defense programs, including Iran's missile program. Iran also rejects any action that may have a negative impact on its defense programs.
- 7- There are no specific arrangements in the JCPOA for inspecting military facilities, and Iran has consistently declared its opposition to inspections of military sites.
- 8- The principle of reciprocity for the parties to the agreement, contrary to what some critics label as a weakness of the agreement, is the strength of the agreement. The method of reciprocity, as stated in the JCPOA, has significantly increased the cost of agreement failures. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity guarantees the implementation of the agreement.

Here, I found it necessary to recount some information about the history of economic sanctions against Iran.

Since 1979, led by the United States, Iran has been under economic sanctions through four channels. What you read below represents 43 years of economic warfare against Iran. On November 8, 1979 following the seizure of the spy nest (U.S. Embassy in Tehran) by Imam's line students in Iran, Jimmy Carter the president of the United States at that time banned arms exports to Iran under the export control act, additionally on November 14 1979 with the executive order of president of the United States all of Iran's assets with American banks were frozen. On April 7, 1980 any exports other than food and medicine to Iran were prohibited by the executive order of president of the United States. More over on April 17, 1980 all Americans were prohibited from any financial transactions with Iranians and any imports from Iran were also declared as illegal. On January 23, 1984 the U.S. department of state added Iran to the list of internationally terrorist-supporting countries imposing severe and stringent controls of exports to Iran. In September 25, 1984, Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States, imposed further export restrictions on the shipment of equipment to Iran under the U.S. Export

Administration Act. On October 23, 1987, with the executive order of the President, all imports from Iran except newspapers and refined petroleum products from third countries were banned. Also, on October 29 of the same year, the U.S. Congress approved the ban on the entry of American goods and products into Iran. On Feb. 20, 1995, with the executive order of the President of the United States, any transactions for the development of Iran's oil were prohibited, and all American companies were banned from investing in Iran's oil resources. On April 21, 1995, almost all commercial and investment transactions in Iran were banned by the executive order of President Bill Clinton. On August 23, 1995, the so-called D'Amato Law was passed in the U.S. Congress, allowing the President to sanction non-American companies providing Iran with oil industry technology. On July 22, 1996, the Iran Sanctions Act was passed in the United States, imposing penalties on non-U.S. companies investing more than \$20 million annually in Iran. On August 19, 1997, just 16 days after the start of the seventh Iranian government and the enforcement of the presidential decree, the Iran Sanctions Act was further tightened by the executive order of the U.S. President. On July 31, 2006, the first resolution of the UN Security Council on the Iranian nuclear case was extended with the votes of the Council members. Although this resolution lacked practical measures, it emphasized Iran's obligation to halt enrichment. On December 22, 2006, the second resolution of the UN Security Council was passed with the votes of all 15 member countries, tightening financial and arms sanctions in addition to the previous resolution. On March 24, 2007, the third resolution of the UN Security Council was passed with the affirmative votes of all 15 member countries, adding new financial and arms sanctions to the previous resolution. Also, on October 23, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department included some Iranian banks and several entities and companies affiliated with the IRGC on its sanctions list. On February 20, 2008, the fourth resolution was passed with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention (Indonesia) by the members of the UN Security Council. In this fourth resolution, travel and financial restrictions on Iranian individuals and companies associated with the IRGC were intensified. On September 22, 2008, the fifth binding document of the UN Security Council, with the approval of all 15 members, was passed, which did not include new sanctions against Iran. On July 23, 2009, the sanctions on gasoline-exporting companies to Iran were approved in the U.S. Senate. On May 22, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill imposing sanctions on companies conducting trade with Iran. On June 9, 2010, the sixth resolution declared any commercial activity related to uranium enrichment and other nuclear materials with the technology of other countries forbidden in connection with Iran. On June 17, 2010, Iran's Post Bank was sanctioned, and the U.S. Treasury Department took action against several Iranian shipping companies. Simultaneously, 23 Iranian Oil energy, and insurance companies were sanctioned. On July 23, 2010, the European

Union and Canada passed a new round of economic sanctions against the energy and shipping sectors of the Islamic Republic. On October 23, 2010, the United States imposed new sanctions against 37 European companies and 5 Iranians, alleged to be involved in Iran's shipping sector. On December 22, 2010, 24 international shipping companies were sanctioned due to their trade with Iran. On April 12, 2011, the British Foreign Minister announced that the European Union had agreed to impose sanctions on 32 Iranian officials due to human rights violations. On June 24, 2011, the largest Iranian airline, and one of the main operators in Iran's ports were sanctioned. On the same date, the European Union added three IRGC commanders to its sanctions list on charges of involvement in Syria's internal affairs. On June 30, 2011, the European Union sanctioned the Quds Force of the IRGC for supporting the Syrian government. They also included 3 IRGC commanders in the sanctions list of the European Union and the United States. On August 24, 2011, the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on 15 individuals and 5 entities associated with Iran. On October 19, 2011, the Canadian and British governments sanctioned 5 Iranians accused of plotting to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington. On December 1, 2011, the European Union added more than 180 Iranian individuals and entities to its sanctions list. These measures were a response to Iran's refusal to comply with international demands regarding its nuclear program. On December 13, 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department announced that Major General Firouzabadi, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Deputy Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, was placed under sanctions. On December 21, 2011, sanctions were imposed on 10 Iranian shipping companies. On December 23, 2011, Switzerland announced the freezing of assets belonging to 180 Iranian individuals and entities. On January 1, 2012, President Obama signed an executive order imposing sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, and foreign companies engaging in transactions with the Central Bank of Iran would be subject to penalties. On January 23, 2012, the European Union agreed to impose gradual sanctions on Iran's oil exports and foreign transactions with the Central Bank of Iran to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Also, on January 24, 2012, after approving sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran, the U.S. Treasury announced sanctions against Iran's Tejarat Bank. On February 29, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Dubai Bank for its alleged assistance to Iran in evading international sanctions. On March 24, 2012, the foreign ministers of the European Union added 18 new names to the blacklist of Iran. As a result, the entry of these individuals into the European Union was prohibited, and their bank accounts within the Union were also frozen. On March 28, 2012, An Iranian airline company and three military commanders of Iran were added to the list of U.S. sanctions. On April 11, 2012, the foreign ministers of 27 European countries, during their meeting in Brussels, decided to impose sanctions on the import of Iranian oil to European

countries. On July 13 2012, the U.S Government imposed sanctions on 50 Iranian companies and financial institutions, including the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), along with 58 ships and 27 affiliated entities. On December 21, 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added four companies and another Iranian citizen to its sanctions list, accusing them of involvement in Iran's nuclear program and ballistic missile activities. Additionally, on February 6, 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatollah Zarghami, the former head of IRIB, under new measures. On March 11, 2013, the foreign ministers of the European Union, while extending their existing sanctions against Iranian officials, added nine more Iranian individuals to their blacklist. Additionally, on May 10, 2013, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on a joint bank between Iran and Venezuela. since July 2014 until the time of the eleventh government, a total of 55 cases of sanctions have been imposed by the European Union, the U.S. Congress, and the President of the United States against Iran and companies engaged with Iran. Overall, during these 43 years, from November 1979 until the current date 25 cases of sanctions have been imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department and U.S. Presidents. The U.S. Congress also has imposed seven cases of sanctions from November 1987 until the current date. Additionally, six resolutions regarding sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program were adopted by the UN Security Council from August 2006 to June 2010, and thirteen economic sanction measures have been applied by the European Union against Iran from August 2010 until the current date. Please note that my information is accurate up to January 2022, and the situation may have evolved since then.


Review the visits of Iranian presidents to New York (United Nations Headquarters)

In his trip on the September 26, 2015, the President of Iran participated in the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations. During this visit, Hassan Rouhani reiterated the proposals which he had previously presented in the years 2013 and 2014, emphasizing the idea of a world "free from violence and extremism" ahead the leaders of the United Nations member countries. In the New York trips for participating in the United Nations General Assembly, the top executive officials of Iran have experienced various ups and downs. Until now, Iranian officials have attended the UN General Assembly 14 times. The first notable presence was in October 1980 when the late Mohammad-Ali Rajai, then Prime Minister, accompanied by a minister, a lawyer, four reporters, and a cameraman, traveled to New York. This participation was influenced by the commencement of the imposed war. During the visit, Rajai's meeting with then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim turned into an opportunity to protest against the aggression of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq. However, during the imposed war, the situation escalated, reaching the bombing of Iranian oil tankers in 1987 and the military clashes in the Persian Gulf. As a result, Ayatollah Khamenei, the President of Iran at that time, along with a three-member delegation, attended the forty-second UN General Assembly. In his 90-minute speech, Ayatollah Khamenei focused on the necessity of unity among Third World governments and their confrontation with the domination system. He criticized the performance of the United Nations and the Security Council for supporting Iraq's invasion of Iran. He also called for the elimination of two unjust discriminations within the UN: the "veto" power and "permanent membership" in the Security Council. Ayatollah Rafsanjani, who served as the President of Iran during the first eight years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and also held direct leadership of the country's executive branch, did not attend the United Nations General Assembly despite his emphasis on a cooperative and tension-reducing foreign policy and efforts towards national-building and economic development. However, after eleven years since the last high-ranking official from Iran attended

the UN General Assembly, this trend changed with the visit of the reformist President to New York. This visit took place during the crisis and brutalities of the Taliban and their takeover in Afghanistan, and the situation at that time bore a striking resemblance to the current situation in the Middle East with the activities of ISIS. However, the president of Iran had declared his intention to be a messenger of peace for the nations of the world with this plan "Dialogue of Civilizations" stood behind the podium of the United Nations General Assembly and presented the "Dialogue among Civilizations" initiative, emphasizing the elimination of discrimination as well as "recognition of "veto" power, and calling for the cooperation of all countries in the fight against terrorism. The petitioner announced that foreign policy and action emphasize confidence building and de-escalation. As a result of this visit, his proposal to designate the year 2001 as the "Year of Dialogue among Civilizations" was approved by the majority of votes in the UN General Assembly was approved by the majority of votes in the United Nations General Assembly. Afterwards, many European countries, by reinstating their ambassadors to Tehran, created a groundwork for further communication with Iran. then President of Iran, once again, assumed the responsibility of the executive branch in the first year of his second term and attended the United Nations General Assembly session. This session was influenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, which resulted in a delayed convening. Consequently, the meeting began with expressions of condolences for the September 11 attacks, leading to a global call for dialogue and a renewed defense of the idea of the "Dialogue among Civilizations. After that, Ahmadinejad, the former President and government of Iran, became the first head of state to attend the United Nations General Assembly regularly and annually as the highest executive authority of the country. During his two presidential terms, he traveled to New York 8 times, with more focus on the sidelines of his trips than the main purpose. In these trips, he emphasized Iran's right to use peaceful nuclear energy and controversial topics such as Holocaust denial were frequently mentioned in his speeches. However, it was clear that his position against the Holocaust, alongside his doctrine of hegemonic management, added to the negative reaction of Western countries and the complexity of the Iranian nuclear issue. Some notable incidents during Ahmadinejad's speech at Columbia University in 2007 included protests and opposition by American senators to the visit of the Iranian President to the site of the September 11 terrorist attack in 2008, attributing the incident to the

U.S. government, as well as the leaving of the venue by officials of various Western countries. These incidents led to a situation where the positions of countries towards Ahmadinejad's ideas and Iran's domestic issues reached a point where in his fifth speech at the United Nations, 145 member countries out of 193 left the hall. The tenth government of Iran's President also put forward proposals such as declaring 2011 as the year of nuclear disarmament and nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none, as well as establishing a truth-finding committee to investigate the September 11th incident. However, in the turbulent atmosphere of Iran's relationship with the international community, these proposals were not voted upon and remained part of his speech. The travels of Ahmadinejad in the last two years of his presidency (years 2011 and 2012) not only became controversial abroad but also stirred controversy within Iran. The accompanying delegation of the president, listed prominently, included a significant number of his relatives, deputies, and advisors. In his final trip to the United Nations, he was accompanied by 140 individuals, and the cost of their stay in a Manhattan hotel amounted to one billion and two hundred and twenty-five million Iranian rials. This led to criticism, and there were calls for him to refrain from his New York visit. However, the revelation of these details had been prevented due to the questioning by members of the parliament. It is worth noting Ahmadinejad's efforts for negotiations with the United States during this period. During the George W. Bush era, the United States never responded positively to Ahmadinejad's repeated requests to initiate direct negotiations. In the year (2012-2013), an American member of the second-track contact group during the Obama administration in year 2011 spoke about nuclear negotiations, stating, "Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a senior assistant and close friend of Ahmadinejad, had talked to former high-ranking U.S. officials about the possibility of opening the door to direct negotiations. However, the White House had stated that they did not want to engage in discussions beyond the 1+5 framework with Iranians. Mohammad AlBaradei, in his memoir titled "The Era of Nuclear Diplomacy in the Age of Betrayal," writes in Persian: "In 2009, Ahmadinejad, through a letter to Obama, declared Iran's readiness for unconditional bilateral negotiations based on mutual respect." Obama, disregarding Ahmadinejad's request to write a letter to the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, sent a message to Ahmadinejad, stating that he is familiar with Iran's governmental structure and knows who holds what position. This letter resulted in

Ahmadinejad's displeasure. During his last trip to New York, contrary to his speeches criticizing the United States, Ahmadinejad, in a peculiar stance, abandoned his confrontational approach and stated, "Iran recognizes the position of the United States, and we believe that we can have a relationship with each other." These statements elicited a clear reaction from the international affairs advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. Subsequently, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati stated, "Iran's overall policies toward the United States have not changed, and no new decision has been made in this regard. he fifth-ranking executive official of Iran participated as the eleventh President of Iran in the General Assembly of the United Nations in the past two years. His presence was influenced by the positive domestic atmosphere created with a moderate approach, which was well-received by member countries of the United Nations. During this session, the Iranian President addressed various issues, including those related to Syria, Palestine, the Israeli regime, and the nuclear dossier. However, his entry into the discussion, advocating a foreign policy based on tension reduction and interaction, led to an unprecedented reception. Except for Israel, all officials and representatives of all member countries of the United Nations stood up during his speech. Additionally, they approved the Iranian President's proposal, titled "A World Free from Violence and Extremism," with a majority of votes.



Chapter 4

Statistical analysis of two records of Iran's nuclear team

In the world of diplomacy, where everything unfolds behind closed doors, the ultimate measure of success or failure for diplomats is the outcome of negotiations and the comparison of agreed-upon objectives with negotiating teams. However, another important indicator is the statistics of the number of days and hours negotiators spend, reflecting the dedication of diplomats and the course of the negotiations. From this perspective, reviewing the track record of the previous nuclear negotiating team under the leadership of Saeed Jalili and the current team led by Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Mohammad Javad Zarif reveals noteworthy points that aid in a more objective comparison of their capabilities and levels of success.

The significant difference in the interaction of nuclear diplomats

The differences between nuclear diplomats are significant. It is crucial to assess their approaches and strategies to better understand these differences. One of the key factors is the level of diplomatic skill and expertise possessed by each individual. Effective diplomats must possess a deep understanding of international relations, negotiation techniques, and the specific issues surrounding nuclear diplomacy. Another significant difference lies in their ability to build and maintain relationships with their counterparts from other nations. Diplomats must possess strong interpersonal skills to establish trust and rapport, which can greatly influence the outcome of negotiations. This includes the ability to listen actively, empathize, and effectively communicate their own country's positions and concerns. Furthermore, the effectiveness of nuclear diplomats can also be measured by their ability to navigate complex political landscapes and domestic pressures. They must have a comprehensive understanding of their own country's political dynamics and be skilled at managing internal stakeholders. Lastly successful nuclear diplomats are those who can adapt and respond to changing circumstances. They must constantly assess the evolving strategic and technological landscape of nuclear diplomacy and adjust their approaches accordingly. Overall, the differences between nuclear diplomats involve a combination of skills, relationships, political savvy, and adaptability. It is the combination of these factors that ultimately determines their level of success in achieving their negotiation goals.

During 71 months of stewardship and 9 rounds of negotiations, Saeed Jalili's tenure as the head of Iran's nuclear negotiating team ended fruitlessly. Seventy-one months of unproductive effort was the sum of all that Jalili experienced during his eight-year term in the ninth and tenth administrations. He took on the responsibility of the nuclear team at a time when Iran and the West were in a confrontational atmosphere. Jalili adopted a hostile approach when he entered the decision-making cycle of nuclear negotiations. Throughout the 9 rounds of talks held from year 1999 up to 2013 with the members of the P5+1 group, he engaged in short-term dialogues (lasting one to two days) in total, culminating with the last one in Almaty-2 on the 5th and 6th days of April, 2013. Jalili's total negotiation days amounted to only 16 days out of 71 months. In other words, during his 2146 days of responsibility in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on average, he participated in negotiations every 238 days.

Failure to shape negotiations in the real sense

Hamid Baeidinejad a former member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, calculates that in the 9 rounds of talks where Mr. Jalili engaged with the P5+1 group, negotiations concluded in a very short time. By a simple calculation, it can be considered that the total duration of Mr. Jalili's negotiation sessions reached 16 days. However, the overall time for recent rounds of talks is reduced to 8 days. Even if we consider that at least half of the time was allocated to very large and strategic discussions, and some time was dedicated to bilateral meetings, it can be said that the total time for these talks, compared to the nature of discussions in recent rounds, will be at most 4 days. According to Baeidinejad, based on calculations during this period, it can be assumed that the two parties did not even enter the negotiation stage, let alone reach any significant agreement, such as accepting Iran's enrichment rights by the West. After transferring the responsibility of pursuing and conducting negotiations to Zarif and his team, due to greater flexibility in the West following the June 2013 elections, Iran's negotiators and their professional approach in the course of the negotiations gained momentum. Negative perceptions of the West towards Iran and its nuclear diplomats gradually declined, and the enthusiasm for breath-taking and war of words diminished as the number and long hours of historic negotiations increased. Finally, the official announcement of the nuclear agreement on July 14, 2013 and the issuance of Resolution 2231 marked the successful outcome of the negotiations. During this round of negotiations, new records were set in the history of diplomatic talks. Amid the nuclear negotiations, Zarif, the former Iranian Foreign Minister, engaged in a total of 52 days of talks over 189 days, both collectively and individually, with the countries of the P5+1 group, starting from September 5, 2013. Additionally, both sides achieved interesting milestones during some negotiation sessions. Notably, both the Iranian and American foreign ministers

set records for the longest uninterrupted presence outside their capitals and respective countries. Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, broke the record for the longest continuous stay outside the United States and his country during the final phase of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the agreement. He stayed for 18 days to negotiate with Zarif during this period. Furthermore, the longest uninterrupted negotiation by a U.S. Secretary of State since World War II was set during the night of the Lausanne understanding, which concluded with the establishment of the main framework of the agreement. The negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, began at midnight and continued until the next morning when the Lausanne understanding was announced. The American television network "Fox News" described the Iran nuclear talks with the P5+1 group as the "longest diplomatic negotiations." During this process, senior American diplomats spent an unprecedented duration, at least within the past 37 years, focusing intensely on a specific issue at the negotiation table. The outcome of Zarif's efforts, along with his American counterpart and diplomats from both sides of the P5+1 group, resulted in a historic agreement. According to BBC, for the first time, it was agreed that all sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, including some previous sanctions such as restrictions on the sale of passenger aircraft, would be lifted. Additionally, in a landmark move at the United Nations, Iran became the first country to exit from Article 7 of the UN Charter without war or confrontation, nullifying previous resolutions and gaining the approval of Security Council members.

The negotiations in the Jalili period

number	date	Place of negotiation	negotiation period day
1	19 & 20, July 2008	Geneva	2
2	1 & 2, October 2009	Geneva	2
3	6 & 7, December 2010	Geneva	2
4	21 January 2011	Istanbul	1
5	14 April 2012	Istanbul	1
6	23 & 24 May 2012	Baghdad	2
7	18 & 19 June 2012	Moscow	2
8	26 & 27 February 2013	Almaty	2
9	6 & 7 March 2013	Almaty	2

16 days of negotiation in 2146 days of responsibility

The negotiations in the Zarif period

number	date	Place of negotiation	negotiation period day
1	23, September 2013	New York	1
2	27, September 2013	New York	1
3	15 & 16, October 2013	Geneva	2
4	7 up to 9, November 2013	Geneva	3
5	20 up to 24, November 2013	Geneva	5
6	17 up to 20, February 2014	Vienna	4
7	7 up to 9, April 2014	Vienna	3
8	13 up to 17, May 2014	Vienna	5
9	16 up to 20, June 2014	Vienna	5
10	2 up to 19, July 2014	Vienna	18
11	16 up to 27, September 2014	New York	12

12	14 up to 16, October 2014	Vienna	3
13	9 up to 11, November 2014	Muscat	2
14	18 up to 24, November 2014	Vienna	6
15	2 up to 4, March 2015	Montero	4
16	15 up to 20, March 2015	Lausanne	6
17	25 March to 2, April 2015	Lausanne	9
18	27 June to 14, July 2015	Vienna	17

106 days of negotiation in 687 days of responsibility

Chapter 5

P5+1 groupe foreign minister's meeting with Zarif to implement JCPOA

The first meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the P5+1 group, following the agreement in New York in September 2015, took place. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister of Iran at that time, discussed the latest developments related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with his counterparts from the P5+1 group and Federica Mogherini on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. After this meeting, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs stated that various country delegations, in pursuit of the operational preparations for the nuclear agreement, including determining the start date of JCPOA implementation, will begin their work on the same day as the agreement is approved in the Iranian parliament.

Mogherini, referring to the trip of Yukiya Amano, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to Iran, expressed her satisfaction with the visit, considering it a positive step. She added, "The Joint Commission for monitoring and implementing the JCPOA will hold its first session after the agreement comes into effect." She considered the discussion of the nuclear agreement by most speakers on the first day of the United Nations General Assembly as a significant diplomatic victory and expressed satisfaction with multilateral negotiations. In response to a question about the U.S. commitment to lifting sanctions, she stated, "All parties are committed to the full and timely implementation of their obligations." The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs also commented on the timeline for the implementation of the agreement, stating, "We are waiting for the decision of the Iranian parliament. In the text of the agreement, the deadline for the confirmation of the agreement is October, but if it is approved by the Iranian parliament earlier than that, and the necessary readiness in terms of technical measures is provided, the implementation of the agreement can take place earlier than the specified date." Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy for Legal and International Affairs at Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, regarding this meeting, stated: "Foreign ministers, expressing satisfaction with the

developments related to the JCPOA over the past two months, hoped for and expressed optimism during the legal stages in the countries of the P5+1 group. They stated their hope that the end of the legal review process of the JCPOA by the Iranian Parliament would initiate the implementation process." He added, "In this meeting, a brief review of the prerequisites for the implementation of the JCPOA in both the sanctions and nuclear areas was conducted, and potential obstacles were addressed. The meeting also focused on the implementation process of the roadmap between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, with positive evaluations from Yukiya Amano on this process, emphasizing the need to continue the roadmap until the closure of issues related to the past (PMD) is confirmed by the Board of Governors." One week after the meeting of foreign ministers from the P5+1 group with Iran's Foreign Minister Zarif regarding the implementation of the JCPOA, five members of the JCPOA Commission of the 9th Parliament of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran issued a protest statement. The statement, signed by Masoud Pezeshkian, Abbasali Mansouri Arani, Aladdin Boroujerdi, Mansour Haqiqatpour, and Gholamreza Tajgardo, discussed the achievements of the JCPOA. They expressed concerns from the beginning about the entry of a unilateral trend in the formation and regulation of reports and invitations of this commission. According to the statement, due to the actions of the commission's chairman, reports and ultimately the final text were formulated outside the parliament, which was considered a new phenomenon receiving significant attention in the parliament. According to this statement, it was decided, based on the commission's resolution, to listen to and discuss the reports of the specialized five committees and consider the members' opinions. Despite the presentation of committee reports, of which there are versions available, the final narration prepared by the respected chair of the commission, presented in the final session, was contrary to the previous trend and was formulated based on a narrative that had been opposed to the JCPOA from the beginning. Unfortunately, due to the bias prevailing in the commission, the conscientious objections of the members were not taken into account. The unilaterally drafted report, prepared outside the commission, was put to a vote by the present members of the commission and ultimately approved with a vote of 6 in favor and 4 against. Their inference was as follows: We, the signatories, believe that the statement read is not in line with the interests of the nation, and the very positive effects of the JCPOA, which could be a solution to many of the country's ongoing problems, have been overlooked. Subsequently, they listed 165 achievements of the Islamic Republic of Iran in various fields under the JCPOA. However, opponents of the JCPOA in the United States also attempted to halt its implementation, as clarified by the following text. The latest aggressive efforts by American hardliners to deadlock the implementation of the JCPOA: After the failure of anti-nuclear agreement representatives to pass a resolution opposing the nuclear deal in the U.S.

Congress, hardliners, with the aim of impeding the JCPOA's implementation, passed a new resolution in the country's legislature. According to Reuters, on October 8, 2015, U.S. lawmakers voted on a new proposal, under which the U.S. president would not have the right to lift sanctions on Iran unless Iran paid \$40 billion as compensation to Americans who, according to their claims, had been "victims of Iranian-supported terrorism." This proposal, with 251 votes in favor against 173 votes against in the U.S. House of Representatives, was approved. Western media considered the possibility of its approval in the Senate to be very low and believed that even if senators approved it, it would face a presidential veto. This speculation was reinforced by the swift reaction from the White House to the approval of the resolution by Congress. Before the House's vote, the White House had issued a warning to representatives through a statement, stating that "Obama will veto any legislation that interferes with the successful implementation of the JCPOA." The statement added: "This congressional proposal undermines the security and national interests of the United States, and therefore, if this proposal is approved by Congress, the President will veto it." The assessment of most observers, as analyzed by Reuters in its report, is that the hardline representatives in Congress, by approving this proposal, seek to demonstrate their continued opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. In the event of the victory of a Republican candidate in the presidential election in 2017, they intend to take actions against the President and also address the possibilities of the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Request for New Sanctions on Iran from the White House

Simultaneously with this proposal, the news outlet "The Hill" has pointed to another initiative, where a group of Congress members claim to be working on strengthening the Iran nuclear deal. This initiative, prepared by Democratic Senator Ben Cardin, obliges the White House to expedite the process of imposing new sanctions on Iran under the pretext of "terrorist activities," while increasing cooperation with the Israeli regime and presenting a regional strategy. In addition to Cardin, Senator Chuck Schumer was among the main architects of this proposal, and both senators have taken a position against the aforementioned agreement with Iran. Republicans are also making another effort to impede the implementation of the nuclear deal. They have declared their intention to file a lawsuit against the Obama administration to hinder the execution of the agreement and the reduction of sanctions against Tehran. Peter Roskam, a Republican lawmaker, stated in an interview with the "Washington Free Beacon" that John Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the House, plans to take legal action against the Obama administration for violating the Iran nuclear review law passed by the U.S. Congress. He emphasized that the decision to pursue legal action ultimately depends on consultations and highlighted that filing a

lawsuit against the government could have various consequences. A federal judge could potentially prevent the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran from being executed until the government provides all the side agreements to Congress. Another consequence of the lawsuit against the Obama administration could be the creation of fear among Western companies investing in Iran. The new Republican initiatives aim to continue opposing the Iran nuclear deal and global powers. Earlier, the Republicans, who control the majority of the House of Representatives and the Senate, tried to force a vote and express opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, obliging the Obama administration not to implement the deal. However, their attempts in the Senate failed, and they could not secure the necessary votes by the deadline of September 17, 2015. In the end, their anti-deal resolution was taken off the agenda without a vote, and Obama did not need to use his veto power.

Special commission's report of JCPOA in Tehran

In accordance with Article 44 of the internal regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the report of the Special Commission on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), its results, and consequences were presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly as follows:

In the implementation of Article 44 of the internal regulations, the report of the Special Commission on the JCPOA, its results, and consequences, which underwent thorough examination in multiple sessions with the presence of esteemed members of the negotiating team, experts, jurists, and opinion leaders, ultimately received approval in the session on Saturday, October 3, 2015 to be presented for reading in the open session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

Introduction and General Points of the Report

1. The Special Commission for the Evaluation of the JCPOA, its results, and consequences in the Islamic Consultative Assembly has meticulously examined the outcomes of the nuclear negotiations. Considering its legal responsibility in representing the esteemed people of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Commission conducted sessions over a period of more than 40 days. These sessions included meetings with the nuclear negotiating teams, high-ranking national and military authorities, university professors, and various experts to scrutinize the final text of the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 group, as well as Resolution 2231. This Commission had the privilege of holding 170 hours of working sessions, with 56 hours dedicated to discussions with officials from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Atomic Energy Organization, endorsers, critics, and relevant experts and intellectuals in the country. Out of this, 50 hours were spent on the Commission members' discussions, and 9 hours on meetings of the Commission's presiding board. Additionally, 15 sessions were held with specialized committees, amounting to 32 hours, allowing for extensive discussions with experts and specialists, document examination, and the analysis of their results. The Commission conducted 23 hours of field visits to enrichment sites such as Shahid Ali Mohammadi in Fordow, Shahid Ahmadi Roshan in Natanz, and the heavy water production plant in Arak. Workshops were organized with experts and officials involved in these projects, along with careful examination of their reports. By presenting a brief informational report, the Commission aims to express the representatives' views solely based on the interests of the Islamic Revolution and national interests, and present it to the Supreme Leader and the informed people of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. The Commission's efforts during this period aimed at obtaining a precise understanding of the text, handling the examination impartially, accurately, and comprehensively, listening to both supportive and opposing views, and scrutinizing relevant documents and statements to ultimately reach a reliable and comprehensive judgment on the JCPOA.
3. The principles guiding the Commission's review are derived from the role of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the Constitution, the perspectives and guidance of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, and his righteous successors. Based on a comprehensive approach, the Commission believes that the fundamental strategy of the Islamic system in managing the negotiation process was to secure Iran's full nuclear rights in accordance with international regulations, especially the right to industrial enrichment and the preservation of the nuclear research and development cycle. Simultaneously, it aimed for the complete and sustainable removal of all illegal sanctions and restrictions imposed against the Iranian people in the nuclear file. These two principles served as the main criteria for the Commission's arbitration on the JCPOA text.
4. The JCPOA Commission has prioritized the acknowledgment that the negotiating team, enjoying the trust of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the support of the nation, has exerted its utmost capacity over the past two years to formulate an appropriate strategy to safeguard national interests. The negotiations have been conducted under the supervision of the country's top officials. The Commission believes that the outcome of this

process carries significant strengths and weaknesses, encompassing opportunities and threats for the future of the revolution and the national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Commission has endeavored to meticulously identify these aspects, stabilizing strengths, capitalizing on opportunities, addressing weaknesses, and finding solutions to potential threats. From this perspective, the Commission sees itself as complementing the efforts of the negotiating team. It recognizes the achievements and rectifications made in the text, results, and consequences of the negotiations. Regardless of the outcomes, the Commission deems it necessary to express its appreciation for the sincere and dedicated two-year efforts of the negotiating team in this report.

5. Throughout its review process, the Commission has prioritized distrust towards the United States and trust in the country's officials, particularly the nuclear negotiating team, as its guiding principle. Therefore, the Commission initially used the text of the JCPOA, resolutions, and other available documents as the basis for its report in cases where clarity and transparency were sufficient. In cases of ambiguity or where the JCPOA text appeared problematic, the Commission used the official statements of the country's authorities as its reference. The overall conclusion of the Commission is that the collection of weaknesses in the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 is the result of the United States' efforts to turn the JCPOA into a tool to strategically restrain Iran and create infrastructure for penetration into the country, using the pretext of the post-JCPOA era. Therefore, the Commission has continuously and seriously monitored and evaluated the official positions of American authorities and experts on the subject, especially in the past two months, since the conclusion of the negotiations. Consequently, if any threat arises to the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the framework of the JCPOA, the Commission believes that the right of the Parliament is preserved to make appropriate decisions.
6. The Special Commission on the JCPOA believes that it has an extraordinary and historical mission because it has undertaken the assessment of a document that defines one of Iran's historical conflicts in the field of national security (the nuclear dossier) with its main adversary, the United States. For this reason, the Commission has endeavored not only to understand the various dimensions of the JCPOA but also to develop an appropriate approach to reduce its threats. This effort aims to provide responses to the questions that will undoubtedly be raised by future generations about this agreement.

7. The Commission has carefully examined the general policies and red lines of the Islamic system regarding the negotiations and the preliminary results. By reviewing the relevant legal requirements in this regard, it has conducted its analysis. To present an accurate report on the ongoing events and their outcomes, the Commission has used the available documents, focusing on the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 as the primary references. Utilizing collective wisdom, the Commission has addressed issues, and in case of ambiguity or enemy claims, it has considered the interpretation of the negotiating team and the documents submitted by them as the basis. To achieve this goal, the Commission has requested documents related to 40 questions about ambiguities from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 20 questions from the Atomic Energy Organization
8. Utilizing the opportunity of the presence of Yukiya Amano, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Iran, the Commission requested his attendance at its session from the esteemed government. Representatives of the people had the opportunity to remind him of the critical responsibility of this international institution, express their distrust, and object to the agency's actions and behavior over the past 12 years. They could present their grievances to him. At the end of the session, in addition to stating the Commission's important red lines regarding defense and security issues and the necessity of preserving the high dignity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Commission presented five important requests to the IAEA as follows:
 1. Non-political, technical, and transparent treatment of Iran's nuclear issue by the agency.
 2. Preservation of Iran's confidential nuclear information.
 3. Assistance in the development of Iran's nuclear technology.
 4. Facilitation of research and development of nuclear knowledge in Iran.
 5. The necessity of the agency's greater efforts toward global nuclear disarmament, starting with the West Asia and North Africa region.

As a result of this session, the Director-General of the IAEA assured the Commission that, firstly, the outstanding issues from the past regarding Iran's nuclear file (PMD) would be resolved by the end of the current year. Secondly, the IAEA would refrain from disclosing any confidential technical or human resources information related to Iran's nuclear activities. Thirdly, the agency would solely examine Iran's nuclear file based on technical grounds and avoid political interference in the process.

Examining the legal aspect of the JCPOA

1- The Commission believes that, regardless of legal debates on whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal) is a legal or political agreement, the commitments of both parties are explicitly stated in the text of the JCPOA and its annexes in a way that Iran's commitments are clear and explicit. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies its implementation. However, the Commission points out serious flaws in the commitments of other parties due to the complex provisions outlined in the agreement. It is evident that if other parties fail to fulfill their commitments, the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right to make decisions in the interest of the country. Regarding UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which appears to be the only legal basis for the JCPOA, the Iranian government has explicitly stated that it will not adhere to certain sections of it, especially those related to defense and security, and this declaration has been recorded in UN documents. In summary, the Commission considers the JCPOA as a political agreement between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other negotiating parties (P5+1 and the European Union). It believes that the esteemed government should seriously safeguard the nuclear infrastructure and achievements with all necessary precautions. In the event of a breach of the agreement by the other party, the government should make decisions based on national interests.

2- The Commission has concluded that the government's opinion on the irreparability and necessity of accepting or rejecting the JCPOA text as an all-or-nothing formula is not binding on the parliament. There are ways to condition and provide an authorized interpretation of the JCPOA.

3- The JCPOA Commission has assessed the issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 before its approval in the Iranian Parliament or, at least, the removal of its legal barriers regarding the voluntary acceptance of the Additional Protocol as a serious weakness in the path of the past two years of nuclear negotiations. The government has stated that it will not adhere to certain key sections of this resolution that undermine defense and security areas. The Commission supports this stance, although it does not reduce the legal obligations of this resolution for the country. Although the government has stated that, according to the agreement with the P5+1, violating the Security Council resolution will not be considered a violation of the nuclear agreement, the Commission is not convinced that the violation of the resolution will have serious consequences beyond harming the JCPOA for the country.

4- The Commission considers the fact that the JCPOA has replaced the N.P.T for Iran for a duration of 15 years and, in some cases, without any time limit, essentially exempting Iran from this treaty, as a serious weakness of this agreement. This document has significantly restricted some of the most important rights of the Iranian nation over a very long period and imposes more obligations on Iran than other members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to the Commission, as will be mentioned in the proposals of this report to the parliament, nothing in this agreement can be interpreted in a way that deprives Iran of its rights under the NPT. Moreover, the additional obligations specified in this agreement for Iran will only be valid as long as Iran has sufficient guarantees that these obligations have not been misused by European countries and the United States.

5- The Commission considers the inclusion of a limited industrial enrichment program using 5060 IR-1 centrifuges up to a 67.3% enrichment level in the text of the JCPOA as emphasizing Iran's legal and non-negotiable right to nuclear enrichment. However, the overall analyses suggest that it was accurate to go beyond expressing this right solely from Iran's perspective in the preamble of the JCPOA, stating that "Iran will pursue a peaceful, indigenous nuclear program, including enrichment activities, with an evolutionary trajectory and at a reasonable pace, to achieve a peaceful commercial program consistent with international non-proliferation norms." This pursuit aimed for a more explicit recognition of Iran's right to industrial enrichment in the JCPOA by the negotiating parties.

6 - While the law passed by the Iranian Parliament in 2005 prohibits the voluntary implementation of all measures, including the Additional Protocol, by the government, and the second paragraph of the "Government's Obligation to Preserve Iran's Nuclear Achievements and Rights Act," passed in July 2015, strictly authorizes inspections under the NPT, considering any inspections beyond that as prohibited, the government committed in the JCPOA to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol from the day of the agreement's implementation. The Commission regards this commitment as exceeding the government and the negotiating team's legal authority, stepping beyond the legal limits, and sees it as a negative aspect of the agreement until the issuance of a new permit by the Parliament or the annulment of the aforementioned laws.

7- After a careful examination of critics' opinions and the negotiating team's responses, the Commission concluded that the arbitration mechanisms outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and JCPOA paragraphs 36 and 37 are explicitly and intentionally set against Iran. The Commission's summary is that Iran

will not be the winner in any appeal to these mechanisms, and, therefore, it practically cannot react in any way to any general or specific violation by the 5+1 groupe that would lead to the unraveling of the agreement.

8- After considering various opinions on the position of Resolution 2231 under the UN Charter, the Commission has evaluated that placing the entire resolution under Article 25 of the UN Charter and its milder tone compared to previous resolutions, including Resolution 1929, is generally perceived as a positive development. However, since the main restrictions of Resolution 2231, just like Resolution 1929, are explicitly imposed under Article 41 of the UN Charter, and recalling that neither in Resolution 2231 nor in Resolution 1929 or any previous resolutions, the phrases "breach of international peace and security" or "threat to international peace and security" have been used for Iran, Iran has never been under Chapter VII in this regard.

9-The Commission's reviews specify that the statement of lifting the six previous Security Council resolutions in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Resolution 2231 is one of the positive outcomes of the negotiations and the resolution. Considering the possibility of the return of all previous resolutions under any pretext, as stated in paragraph 12 of this resolution, the Commission infers that this annulment is not complete but rather "conditional annulment" or "suspension of previous resolutions." In addition, the JCPOA lacks any legally binding and enforceable guarantees other than the non-binding Resolution 2231. Either party to the agreement can suspend its implementation and reimpose sanctions against Iran at any time it desires. Therefore, given Iran's fundamental actions in transforming and renewing its nuclear industry, this equation is considered risky for Iran in terms of reversibility and legal rights.

10-The Commission has learned that, in addition to weaknesses in the commitments of the other party, there is no mechanism in the JCPOA for the verification of the truthful implementation of the commitments by the negotiating parties beyond the will of the United States and other parties. However, for various commitments of Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has a very undesirable track record in impartiality and the performance of its technical and legal duties, has been designated as the verification authority. This amount of commitment from the United States and Europe to suspend or lift their oppressive sanctions or perform other duties is contingent upon the IAEA's reports.

11-Although the JCPOA is mentioned as part of Resolution 2231, it is stated below the sanctions section in the JCPOA that "the provisions of the resolution are not considered as being this JCPOA." Therefore, the purpose of issuing the resolution

was to annul the previous resolutions and to prevent their repetition. By explicitly stating in the sanctions section of the JCPOA that "the provisions of the resolution are not considered as being this JCPOA," it has separated the legal status of the JCPOA from the resolution. Thus, the negotiating team's argument regarding ambiguities about the relationship between the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 and the separate violation of each, stating that the annulment of the JCPOA as Annex A to Resolution 2231 is equivalent to the violation of the resolution, but the violation of the resolution will not be a violation of the JCPOA, was acceptable to the Commission, regardless of the negative consequences of the violation of the resolution. The esteemed government should consider this point in the executive procedures of the JCPOA.

12-The Commission believes that the end date of the JCPOA should have been automatically considered on the expiration day of the resolution, which is ten years after the implementation day.

The Commission believes that the lack of a clear definition of "fundamental non-performance" in paragraph 36 of the dispute resolution mechanism creates room for incorrect interpretations, excuses, and irreparable damages for the country.

Review of the Scientific, Technical, and Research Aspects of the JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal):

1-Based on the examination of various opinions and the study of available documents, the commission has concluded that the JCPOA places Iran's nuclear program on a minimum 10-year suspension without a clear roadmap for the future and from a long-term perspective. Since the commission did not observe the draft of the "long-term enrichment program" document between Iran and the P5+1, as referenced in the JCPOA, the text of the JCPOA is entirely ambiguous in this regard. In Annex I, paragraph 63 of the JCPOA, it emphasizes the construction of 200 IR-6 and 200 IR-8 centrifuges by the end of the tenth year without specifying the time, emphasizing the annual repetition of the same amount. The commission could not ascertain with certainty that all restrictions on the nuclear program, especially Iran's enrichment program, will be lifted after a certain period. Considering the severe restrictions imposed on research and development until the end of the tenth year, the possibility of reaching 190,000 SWU (Separative Work Units) enrichment from 6,000 SWU within a limited timeframe seems unattainable. Nevertheless, the commission considers the statements of the respected nuclear negotiating team as a basis, stating that from the thirteenth year, limitations on production quantity and, from the fifteenth year, restrictions on enrichment beyond 67.3% will be lifted to any necessary extent for peaceful use, allowing Iran to enrich uranium peacefully to

any necessary amount and level at an appropriate pace. According to the official report of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, by the end of the fifteenth year, Iran will be able to achieve a minimum enrichment capacity of 190,000 SWU.

2-After a thorough examination of the text and listening to various opinions, the commission has been convinced that the restriction on Iran's enrichment program in the JCPOA, based on a questionable concept claimed by the United States as "increasing the breakout time" of Iran's nuclear capability, is not a suitable basis for establishing a long-term agreement. The commission summarizes that this concept has not been a proper foundation for building a long-term agreement, and some of the concerning issues mentioned in the text are rooted in this concept.

3-Reviewing the third annex of the JCPOA regarding peaceful nuclear cooperation, the commission evaluates that the emphasized cooperation includes three parts: The first part involves cooperation in certain service-related activities that are well-performed in Iran. Therefore, while appreciating these activities, it is emphasized that this section is achievable within the country. The second part involves collaborations such as assisting in changing the nature of the Fordow facility to the "Nuclear Physics and Technology Research Center" based on accelerators and producing stable isotopes. Due to the ambiguity and illogical nature of this cooperation, as indicated in this report, and the explicit statement of the Atomic Energy Organization in correspondence with the JCPOA Commission that they have no intention of carrying out this collaboration, this section is not considered as a special recommendation or advantage. There are also scientific and precise computational reasons supporting the negativity of this part. In the third part, some positive collaborations are mentioned, which, if carried out, will undoubtedly be beneficial for Iran in terms of technical, scientific, and service achievements. However, by adding the necessary conditions, considering the national laws of negotiating countries, maintaining proportionality in all aspects, and avoiding imposing obligations, these mutual collaborations have been surrounded by an aura of ambiguity, leaving the possibility of non-implementation open for the negotiating countries in the JCPOA.

4-The commission concludes that, overall and in almost all aspects related to the technical part of Iran's nuclear program in the JCPOA, except for enrichment in 5060 first-generation centrifuges, there will be a practical reduction in capacity, the imposition of specific constraints in all dimensions, including research and development, and a slowing down of progress in achieving Iran's industrial enrichment program. This will inevitably lead to the disruption of the supply chain and component manufacturers in the country for at least ten years.

5-Regarding the Arak heavy-water reactor, the commission's summary is that, although the redesigned reactor will meet the definition of a heavy-water reactor, it will lose the advantages of using natural uranium as raw natural fuel. However, due to political considerations and resistance to baseless claims by US officials, the commission regards preserving the heavy-water nature of this reactor as a positive outcome of the JCPOA, despite incurring additional costs. Moreover, with modernization and an increase in neutron flux, the reactor's increased power is seen as providing benefits such as producing radiopharmaceuticals and offering more services to the public. It should be noted that the current design of the Arak reactor, with the implementation of the JCPOA, has been modified under the pretext of a dubious claim by the United States to prevent misuse and access to plutonium, and its foreseeable future is uncertain. The commission also considers the long-term commitment to not storing heavy water in Iran, which is supposed to be exported, as a negative point, while allowing the justification of exporting and selling heavy water due to its strategic importance for the country. Additionally, the commission finds the commitment that Iran will not build additional heavy-water reactors in the future as a serious weakness and an unacceptable limitation.

6-Regarding Fordow, the commission has positively evaluated the preservation efforts for these facilities while two of its cascades are in operation, and four cascades are awaiting operation. The commission believes that the nuclear negotiation team has made commendable efforts in this regard. However, the commission asserts that the destruction of the foundations and infrastructure of the Fordow facility, using some of its machines for stable isotope production, in case of a violation of the United States' commitment and that of its allies and the country's decision for immediate uranium enrichment, would render it unusable. Additionally, the commission is not convinced that the transformation of Fordow's nature from a non-threatening enrichment center, safeguarded against enemies and ensuring non-aggression to Natanz, into merely a research center is justified. Considering the opportunity cost incurred the commission is not satisfied with the logical reasoning behind this decision. It is emphasized in the Atomic Energy Organization's official letter to the commission that a final decision has not been made on establishing an advanced atomic physics center in Fordow.

7-Regarding the strategic issue of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, the commission considers the assignment determined in the JCPOA as a serious weakness. During the agreement's implementation, Iran will only be allowed to maintain up to 300 kilograms of enriched uranium in the form of UF-6 out of its nearly 10-ton existing reserves. According to various technical expert opinions received by the commission, this limitation could hinder Iran's nuclear program, depriving the

Islamic Republic of one of its essential assets for developing this industry, all under the pretext of U.S. and its allies' baseless accusations and excuses.

8-After numerous examinations and listening to various opinions, the commission concluded that, based on the JCPOA text, Iran's enrichment research and development program will continue, which is a positive aspect. However, the commission finds the widespread use of enrichment machines and the timing of the program to be slower than logically reasonable. While government representatives acknowledged this implicitly, emphasizing that it was part of the necessity for reconciliation with negotiation parties to achieve an agreement, the commission believes that there could have been further improvements in the JCPOA regarding the enrichment program.

9-In summary, the commission's conclusion is that the technical changes introduced in Iran's industrial enrichment program and its research and development program have made the country's nuclear program more reversible in case of partial or complete violations of the agreement by Iran. Although the commission could not find independent criteria to confirm the Atomic Energy Organization's estimate regarding Iran's commitment's reversibility, The commission concluded in such a way that the statements of officials from the Atomic Energy Organization, made in official sessions and based on the written responses to the commission's inquiries, indicating the reversibility of enrichment centers such as Shahid Ahmadi Roshan (Natanz) and Shahid Ali-Mohammadi (Fordow) within one year, and the Arak heavy-water reactor within three years, should be considered as the basis. . Moreover, despite the acknowledgment that returning to over 9,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, which took approximately eight years to accumulate, will be achieved with an increased enrichment capacity in less time than before, everyone agreed that the specific timeframe for Iran's commitment's reversibility should be based on the official statements of the Atomic Energy Organization.

10-The commission has reached the conclusion that, in accordance with the restrictions related to dual-use items (items, materials, equipment, goods and technologies) outlined in the paragraph 22 resolution, with detailed limitations provided in Annex 4, Section 6, of the JCPOA, Iran will be required to obtain a unanimous license from the Procurement Working Group, the Joint Commission, and the UN Security Council for the purchase, transfer, use, receipt of technical assistance or training, capital absorption, and receipt of services related to dual-use items that have extensive applications in various industries in the country. The list of these dual-use items is subject to updating and adding new items by the Security Council. Each country party to the deal with Iran can also add new items to its list of prohibited (dual-use) items. According to written reports from highly experienced

academic and practical experts from universities in various disciplines, including electrical engineering, mechanics, computer science, software, and aerospace, submitted to the commission, considering the vast range of items and equipment mentioned in the list of dual-use items, the commission believes that multiple problems, including threats and challenges for various industries, hindrance to research and development (especially industries at the forefront of knowledge), and preventing Iran's progress in various sciences, as well as exposing information related to the supply chain and the country's needs and capabilities in various areas, will arise. Moreover, the bureaucracy associated with presenting, reviewing, and approving this massive amount of information, granting final verification approval to the selling country of dual-use items to Iran (as specified in document 254 INFCIRC, inspecting all facilities in the country as per Section 6.7 of Annex 4 of the JCPOA regarding dual-use items mentioned in document 254 INFCIRC, and evaluating the risk of spies gaining access to non-nuclear facilities in Iran as outlined in Section 6.8 of Annex 4 of the JCPOA are considered challenging and risky.

11-The commission believes that the acceptance of some long-term commitments for which no endpoint is specified, such as sending the spent fuel of all current and future nuclear power plants for electricity generation outside the country, prohibiting activities related to reprocessing, research and development on reprocessing, developing future light-water reactors, enhancing the efficiency of monitoring based on advanced technologies, and the extensive presence of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are among the negative aspects of the JCPOA. These aspects are considered to deprive the country of its future rights

Analysis of Defense Security Aspect of the JCPOA

1-All the reviews conducted in the commission, including statements from the current and former negotiating teams and remarks from high-ranking military and security officials, indicate that the leadership's measures, the resilience of the people, the country's strong defense capabilities, and Iran's strategic depth in the region and the world have caused concern for the United States and its regional and global allies. Essentially, relying on divine assistance and strengthening these capabilities renders the threat of invasion and military confrontation with Iran baseless and overtly deceptive.

2-Based on consultations and opinions gathered from responsible and authoritative figures in military and security matters, the commission concludes that the JCPOA has fundamental gaps and weaknesses in the military and security domain. Without a reconsideration of inspections at military, defense, and security facilities and

careful attention during implementation, the agreement could pose problems for the country.

3-The commission emphasizes that based on the JCPOA text, Iran has granted access to its military facilities, according to the published text, Iran is obligated to provide requested access to any facility, including military and security installations, within a maximum of 24 days. If accesses provided by Iran based on document 254 INFCIRC are also taken into account – which Iran is obliged to provide to the IAEA and other countries – this conclusion will firmly establish that the inspection and access regime agreed upon in the JCPOA is a highly specific and far-reaching regime beyond the Additional Protocol. The commission is convinced that the implementation of this inspection regime in Iran, if realized, could lead to an unprecedented collection of information from Iran, putting Iran's infrastructure, information, and human, scientific, military, and security assets at a significantly concerning risk. Therefore, the commission explicitly calls for the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to prohibit any unauthorized entry by foreigners into the country's security, defense, and military perimeter, emphasizing this prohibition under any pretext.

4-The evaluation of the commission is that Resolution 2231, by granting extensive powers to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has asked Iran to respond unconditionally to any ambiguities raised by the agency and fulfill all of its demands. This goes even beyond the authorities outlined in the JCPOA and may serve as a basis for excessive requests from the agency in the present and future.

5-According to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2231, the ban on ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads is stipulated. The commission positively evaluates the negotiating team's action in including the phrase "designed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads" in this paragraph and asserts that since Iran has not undertaken such designs and will not do so in the future, Iran's missile program will continue without any restrictions based on the country's needs. The commission acknowledges the preservation of some of the UN Security Council sanctions related to the nuclear issue in Resolution 2231. It emphasizes that the arms and missile sanctions against Iran, though less severe and with a shorter duration compared to past resolutions that were never accepted by Iran, are still in effect. Nevertheless, the commission appreciates the government's interpretation and the statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizing the need to continue missile and arms activities based on Iran's defense needs without any restrictions.

6- The commission believes that imposing a 5-year restriction on Iran's arms imports and exports, along with the significant responsibility we bear in the face of the resistance front and our resilience against state-sponsored terrorism and organized

networks by the United States and regional allies, will lead to the growth of terrorism in West Asia and North Africa and weaken the resistance front in this region if such restrictions are accepted. Therefore, the commission emphasizes the non-implementation of this provision of the resolution based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement.

Examining the economic issue, especially the sanctions in the JCPOA

1-The Economic Commission believes that the oppressive and illegal sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States have led to various problems for the country, including the intensified devaluation of the national currency, difficulties in crude oil sales, increased systematic risk in the economy, rising transaction costs, blockage of certain assets of the country abroad, and a decrease in investment in the oil and gas sector. Lifting these sanctions, if done in line with the resilient economic model, can rapidly contribute to the country's economic progress. Therefore, the commission has placed special emphasis on reviewing the text of the JCPOA regarding the lifting of sanctions, considering that the "lifting of sanctions" was the main goal of the nuclear negotiations and the most important mission of the nuclear negotiation team. The commission has been meticulously examining this issue since its inception.

2-Despite the economic challenges arising from sanctions, the commission firmly believes that external sanctions, if managed through domestic initiatives and commitment to the resilient economic model, will never lead to the paralysis of the country's economy. The possibility of sustained progress remains achievable by adhering to an economic resistance model. The major portion of the adverse economic effects experienced during years of sanctions resulted from domestic negligence. The performance of certain sectors during the peak years of sanctions (from 2011 to 2013) illustrates that, with an emphasis on economic resilience and prudent management of international transactions, the country can continue to engage in global crude oil supply, obtain revenues from its sales, and conduct other international trade, especially with friendly neighboring countries and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Furthermore, by enhancing economic resilience through structural reforms and fostering an economic culture, the country can mitigate the impact of economic sanctions. This approach aims to reduce the economic burden borne by the nation and ultimately bring an end to the sanctions by thwarting the intentions of the enemies through the implementation of comprehensive economic policies in line with the principles of economic resistance

3-The commission, emphasizing the imperative need for the removal of oppressive sanctions in any nuclear agreement, believes that despite grandiose displays both domestically and abroad, the mentioned sanctions have not had and will not have the power to cripple Iran's economy. For instance, examining the issue of oil sales as one of the serious repercussions of the sanctions, official statistics from foreign and international institutions, including the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency, reveal that despite U.S. oil sanctions in October 2011 and EU oil sanctions in July 2012, Iran's crude oil sales averaged between 1.1 to 1.2 million barrels per day continued. Even with the gradual reduction in purchases by countries from Iran, as emphasized by U.S. oil sanctions, this average did not decrease for about 1.5 years until the Geneva Agreement in January 2014. This indicates that the enemies of the nation, contrary to their claims, did not have the capability to eliminate Iran's crude oil from global markets. Moreover, official statistics from the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrate that even beyond international figures, the average daily sales of Iran's crude oil in 2013 were approximately 1.6 million barrels and reached 1.8 million barrels during 2012, the peak years of oil sanctions. This includes both official and unofficial sales, evading sanctions. Therefore, in recent years, the President of the United States and the U.S. Secretary of State have repeatedly declared that the sanctions have lost their effectiveness, and the possibility of exerting pressure through their enforcement is ruled out.

4- After thorough examination within the commission it has been clarified that Swift sanctions regarding entities removed from the list of asset freeze have been lifted. This includes major institutions such as the Central Bank, Bank Melli, Bank Tejarat and several other banks, which will be removed from restrictions on the day of implementation, a highly positive assessment. However, the legal infrastructure of Swift sanctions will remain in place until eight years after the adoption of Resolution 2231 and will be merely suspended, not lifted, on that specific date. This implies that adding any natural or legal person to the asset freeze list automatically subjects them to Swift sanctions. Additionally, some of the mentioned entities in the asset freeze list, including Sepah, Saderat, Ansar, and Mehr banks, will remain under Swift sanctions for another eight years.

5- The commission has received a report indicating that significant barriers related to the export of crude oil and petroleum products have been lifted in connection with oil sanctions. This is highly positively assessed as a commendable action. However, there is no reference in the report to the cancellation, suspension, or cessation of Section 1245, paragraph 4-D of the NDAA law, as well as Section D of Article 1247

of the IFCA law, regarding financial transactions related to the transfer of funds from the sale of oil. Based on this, foreign financial institutions will only be excluded from the scope of secondary U.S. financial sanctions if the continuous purchase of crude oil from Iran is decreasing. This would act as an impediment to the transfer of funds resulting from the sale of Iranian crude oil. While it is argued that by suspending Section 1-D of Article 1245 of the NDAA law, disputed clauses will also be halted as its provisions, the inclusion of similar provisions, such as 3-D, and the absence of these clauses in the JCPOA text, could provide grounds for the U.S. to use as a pretext to cancel a significant portion of sanctions related to the transfer and transportation of oil funds.

6- After hearing the opinions of the negotiating team and reviewing various texts, the commission has not reached an assessment that the concept of lifting sanctions implies a complex legal framework in the JCPOA. Except in very few and minor cases, in all instances, sanctions have been suspended or halted in implementation, and their legal infrastructure is preserved. This situation does not fulfill Iran's inherent goal in the negotiations.

7-The commission concludes that the principle of reciprocity in fulfilling commitments by both parties in the JCPOA has not been fully observed. The actual action by the 5+1 group in terms of lifting sanctions has been deferred, placing the verification of Iran's compliance and its confirmation by the Agency at risk. The commission believes that this is based on trust in the Agency, carrying a very high risk as a result. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly in the fifth annex of the JCPOA, is designated as an international arbiter responsible for overseeing Iran's compliance. Therefore, if the Agency does not confirm the first step of Iran's compliance, the opposite party will not be obliged to lift sanctions. In the next step, if the Agency publishes a report on Iran's non-compliance with its commitments or the denial of inspection permits for specified locations, sanctions will be reimposed. However, regarding monitoring the implementation of commitments by the opposite party, i.e. overseeing the lifting of sanctions, no third-party arbiter or international body has been designated. In this design, without observing temporal reciprocity in fulfilling commitments by both parties, Iran's actions take precedence over the opposite party's commitments. Iran must first fulfill its commitments entirely before the opposite party takes action and implements its commitments. On the other hand, various inspections and verifications will be conducted on Iran's actions, but surprisingly, no overseer has been considered for monitoring the opposite party's compliance.

8-The commission has found that, in the face of Iran's fundamental actions based on the JCPOA, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Congress and the European Union have not been lifted but merely suspended. Considering that the revocation of U.S. congressional sanctions is not within the purview of the U.S. government, the commission finds the suspension of these sanctions acceptable within the framework of the president's powers. However, according to the JCPOA, the European Union, as a negotiating party with Iran, has refrained from revoking its sanctions and has only suspended them, which is deemed unacceptable. The suspension of sanctions implies preserving their structure, allowing for immediate reversibility.

9-The commission has scrutinized the U.S. commitments under the JCPOA and concluded that, despite having the authority to suspend sanctions imposed by Congress on Iran, the U.S. government has refrained from taking such action. The U.S. government has only encouraged officials at the state level to consider a change in U.S. policy regarding sanctions, as explicitly stated in JCPOA Article 25. Considering the explicit opposition of state officials to the JCPOA, there is a serious possibility of effectively maintaining state-level sanctions without violating the JCPOA. Consequently, the utilization and benefits for Iran from the suspended sanctions by the U.S. President might be disrupted due to the presence of other sanction laws at both the national and state levels in the United States.

10 - The commission's analysis of the JCPOA text, particularly considering Articles 36 and 37 (Trigger mechanism), leads to the inference that any negotiating party can reinstate its sanctions against Iran by claiming Iran's non-compliance with its JCPOA commitments. This can be done without requiring confirmation of such claims. Moreover, within 30 days of filing a complaint with the UN Security Council, the complaining party can trigger the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions.

Investigation of political and general aspects

1- The commission believes that the rational and legal logic of the Islamic Republic of Iran's system, along with the support, resistance, and the valor of the noble Iranian people, has forced the ruling regime to engage in negotiations, abandoning its baseless claims of war-mongering options. This has isolated the oppressive Zionist regime more than ever, discrediting the false claims of global consensus against the noble people of Iran and removing the intimidation factor posed by Iran.

2- The commission, acknowledging the resistance of the Iranian people, refutes the false claims of the ruling regime regarding a nuclear weapons program, affirming the accuracy of the continued discourse of resistance against imperialism. Furthermore, the commission believes that Hezbollah in Lebanon, as part of the resistance front, will intensify its confrontation with Israel with the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The security of Israel, as a symbol of state terrorism, will decrease day by day.

3- The commission believes that the official statements from American authorities indicate the American side's intention to continue sanctions under non-nuclear and political pretexts, which will by no means be acceptable.

4- Since the JCPOA is based on the Geneva Agreement and has been acknowledged as such, considering the published text of the Geneva Agreement, which explicitly stated that the final outcome of the negotiations (the JCPOA) should lead to the complete lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran (Comprehensive Lifting), this commitment of the Geneva Agreement is not fully reflected in the JCPOA text.

5- The commission has definitively concluded that, according to Section "k" of the preamble and general provisions of the JCPOA, Iran is exempted from various areas, including nuclear rights and obligations, the foundations and mechanisms of nuclear supervision and inspection, and the Additional Protocol and the dispute resolution mechanism, in contrast to other countries.

6- The commission has assessed, based on the set of documents, that the JCPOA is not fundamentally built on a lack of trust in the United States in certain key provisions. The text of the JCPOA is essentially based on the premise that the United States will not have the will for hostile actions against Iran, or apparent acts in this regard will incur political costs for the U.S. government, thus deterring such actions. However, historically, the U.S. has demonstrated a propensity to act unilaterally based on its interests in global decisions. According to this agreement, Iran has been exempted from the NPT treaty until it gains the international community's confidence in its program. The commission believes that excluding this agreement implies a lack of confidence-building, meaning redirecting Western parties to deviate the agreement from its inherent goals and conditioning the implementation of agreed-upon steps with a broadly interpretable, ambiguous, and subjective concept named trust. This is while U.S. officials, including the President, have explicitly acknowledged that they structured this agreement with the assumption of enmity towards Iran. They have explicitly highlighted the restrictive, depriving, and condemning mechanisms present in the JCPOA against Iran.

7- Considering that the JCPOA accepted the model of reaching bilateral definitions regarding the nuclear program, the commission finds the extension of this model to other areas of Iran's national security highly risky. The repeated statements by U.S. officials and their allies emphasizing the use of this model in non-nuclear matters, including resolving other conflicts between Iran and the West, pose a significant threat. Essentially, achieving the JCPOA is considered the first step in their series of actions.

8- The commission believes that the increase referral ways Of Iran's nuclear issue to the UN Security Council through the IAEA, to the set of ways of the agency, the Joint Commission, the procurement working group which confirmed by the Security Council, and each of the negotiating parties with Iran are among the measures that consistently place the Islamic Republic of Iran under the threat of referral to the UN Security Council.

Suggestions:

1-It would have been appropriate for the esteemed government to presenting the bill for the implementation of the JCPOA and the removal of its legal obstacles. However, given the lack of legal action by the government, the Islamic Consultative Assembly should present a comprehensive bill, addressing the precise requirements for the implementation of the JCPOA. This bill should focus on removing obstacles, aligning and proportionating the activities of countries around the JCPOA, ensuring the fulfillment of commitments by the other party, and blocking infiltration routes while reducing vulnerability, especially in political and cultural domains.

2-The esteemed government should continue to assert Iran's fundamental rights as a nuclear technology owner actively within the IAEA, demanding maximum benefits from the JCPOA. It should pursue the expansion of the country's indigenous research and development program to pave the way for extensive future activities.

3-The logical path to lifting sanctions involves proportional, qualitative, and timely counteractions, which have been overlooked. Therefore, careful planning is needed to respond effectively to the specified steps until the implementation of the IAEA's report on addressing past and present issues. Necessary preparations should be made to counteract the cancellation of European and American sanctions and the removal of US congressional sanctions. If the sanctions are not lifted, action should be taken to suspend the intended nuclear activities under the JCPOA against the suspension of sanctions.

4-In order to ensure the country's security and leverage one of the most significant deterrents in the defense arena, special attention must be given to the missile capabilities and their qualitative and quantitative development in alignment with the

country's needs and future threats. It is necessary to emphasize the non-negotiable nature of the government's policies in this regard, showing optimism about progress and intensifying efforts in the security and defense sector.

5-Considering the Islamic Republic of Iran's resolute policy against state-sponsored terrorism globally, especially in West Asia and North Africa, the government should take proactive measures by assisting countries fighting terrorism and meeting the arms requirements of friendly nations.

6-The high sensitivity of military and security centers in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the vital principle of preserving the country's military and security secrets necessitate a strict prohibition of foreign entities accessing these facilities and confronting the country's scientists under any pretext.

7-Given the extensive presence of foreign delegations during the implementation of the JCPOA and the increased openness of the country to outsiders, there is a higher risk of potential enemy infiltration into security, economic, and cultural domains. Therefore, it is essential to design appropriate measures to prevent such potential infiltrations in response to these new developments.

8-Countries surrounding the JCPOA, considering the provisions of Article 28, have committed to mutual respect and refraining from any actions contrary to the letter, spirit, and purpose of the JCPOA. Therefore, governmental authorities must strive to respond appropriately to the baseless statements of American and European officials. They should not leave any of their exaggerations unanswered and take urgent and necessary legal actions against any violations of the JCPOA by them

9-To confront the growing threats from enemies of the Islamic Revolution, the right to nuclear defense is pursued without any limitations to protect and prevent damages against nuclear attacks and terrorism. Practical measures should be taken to enhance this capability.

10-With the political opportunity provided for the Islamic Republic of Iran, revolutionary defense among regional allies should continue. Developing relations with Muslim and neighboring countries and expanding ties with nations that do not have a history of betrayal towards Iran should be pursued

Chapter 6

General approval of the JCPOA plan in the Islamic Council of Iran

On the morning of October 11, 2015, with 133 affirmative votes and after some controversies, the urgent motion corresponding to the Islamic Republic of Iran's action regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan (JCPOA) between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group became a priority on the agenda of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of our country, and Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, the senior nuclear negotiator, attended the session to review and approve the report of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission regarding the JCPOA. The urgency of this motion had been approved in an open session on October 4, 2015.

Gathering of concerned representatives in front of the Ninth Parliament Presidium Committee

On the ninth session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), lawmakers associated with the **Delvapasani** faction and representatives of the Endurance Movement gathered in front of the presiding board. During the public session of the same day, while discussing the reciprocal action plan of Iran in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Delvapasani representatives, led by Hosseiniyan and Karimi Ghodusi, gathered in front of the presiding board. Among the demonstrators, the more active presence was observed from representatives such as Karimi Ghodusi, Nabavian, Rasaei, Hosseiniyan, and Mr. Tehrani, with Rasaei frequently engaging with the presiding board and the session chair in discussions. However, within this group, some representatives, with a more cautious approach, separated temporarily and then rejoined, which Rasaei was one of these individuals.

Statements of Bazarpash, a member of the Presidium of the Parliament, in opposition to the JCPOA implementation plan

Mehrdad Bazrpash, a representative of the Fundamentalist faction in the parliament, opposed the generalities of the plan for the implementation of the JCPOA and stated

that no one is waiting for the parliament, and the agreement has been in effect since October 17, 2015. Bazrpash criticized the presiding board of the parliament, asking why it has led to such division within the parliament. He added, "The National Security and Foreign Policy Commission reviewed this plan in less than two hours and rejected 200 proposals altogether. Is this review correct and professional? Is it wrong to ask the government to present a bill? Is it extremism, and are we profiting from sanctions?" Bazrpash continued, questioning the credibility of the statistics indicating public support for the JCPOA and highlighting the misleading nature of such claims. He argued that if we were seeking votes and political gain, we would align with the other side. Bazrpash claimed, "No one is waiting for us. They've started a line saying that every day of delay results in billions of losses. This is a lie. Anyone making such statements aims to pressure you." He also mentioned the confrontation with the United States, emphasizing that both houses of the U.S. Congress are against the JCPOA, and their president has not been in office for over a year. He criticized the notion that the U.S. Congress has approved the JCPOA and argued that they are not waiting for the parliament's approval. Bazrpash questioned the authenticity of such claims, suggesting that if the situation were different, they would have presented a bill. Bazrpash also addressed the statements of Wendy Sherman and called on the negotiating team members to respond to his remarks. According to Bazrpash, Sherman stated that none of the provisions of the Expediency Council's plan contradicts the implementation of the JCPOA, which should be in line with our current needs and White House emphasis. Rouhani very much wants the day of implementing the JCPOA to be before the parliamentary elections so that the Iranian people witness the lifting of sanctions. Even if the sanctions are lifted, apart from limited sanctions like air sanctions, pistachios, and caviar, US economic actors will not allow other sanctions to be lifted. Bazrpash added, "Wendy Sherman, who is a member of the negotiating team, makes such statements, and her words are not denied. Shouldn't we be sensitive to how much of the sanctions will remain after the JCPOA is implemented? What is our duty if the other party reintroduces sanctions on pretexts such as supporting terrorism and human rights violations? A few years later, neither the government nor the negotiating team will be the same, this is a document. They reviewed this plan in less than two hours. Is it not necessary to find a solution if it is claimed that the JCPOA has security holes.

In response to Bazarpash's statements

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a representative, responded to Mehrdad Bazrpash's remarks against the JCPOA implementation plan, stating, "He is part of the team that prepared the plan, of course not in the sense of drafting the main plan. Four members

from the Fundamentalist faction and three others from the Followers' faction gathered, discussing all aspects of the issue. We spent a few hours, but Rasaei presented an alternative plan. He was given a few minutes to explain their plan, but it did not receive enough votes. If the criterion is voting, and we are in the parliament to vote, why object?" Following these words, Bazarpash raised her objection, which the speaker of the parliament reminded her: "Like everyone else, you must get permission to be able to speak." Elias Naderan, another Tehran representative, in a note, citing Notes 3 and 5 of Article 145 of the Parliament's Internal Regulations expressed his concerns about the internal parliamentary procedures, referring to specific articles and regulations. He emphasized the need for subcommittees to review bills, share their opinions, and integrate them into the main committee's final report. And then the final report of the main commission should be prepared, which unfortunately did not happen. Naderan, citing Article 150 of the internal regulations of the parliament, continued: The procedure for dealing with bills and proposals, in terms of urgency or non-urgency, has been determined. Proposing representatives can attend the main commission and express their opinions, and the commission is obligated to consult them 24 hours before proposing representatives, who have submitted their proposals in writing. However, the National Security Committee did not adhere to such procedures. He urged clarification on which of the 200 proposals by representatives were discussed in the committee. In response, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani argued that the JCPOA plan is not an ordinary bill, justifying the deviation from regular parliamentary procedures.

Larijani, the Speaker of the Ninth Parliament, responded to the objections:

Following the objection of Mehrdad Lahooti, another representative, regarding the obligation of the parliamentary regulations for addressing important bills and proposals for a period of 3 hours in the parliament, Larijani the Speaker considered this objection and sought the opinion of the parliament. Out of 245 present representatives, 146 representatives acknowledged this objection. Therefore, the Ninth Parliament addressed the JCPOA proposal in three hours. Based on the voting conducted, 4 representatives were in favor and 4 representatives were against the JCPOA in the open session of the parliament on the same day. Alongside the spokesperson of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Ninth Parliament and the representative of President Rouhani's government, in the form of a three-hour session, they presented their opinions. Lahooti, in his objection, referring to clause (d) of Article 112 of the internal regulations of the parliament, stated: According to this article, the parliament must allocate 3 hours to address the JCPOA, and for each representative, both in favor and against, 15 minutes should be provided to examine the JCPOA proposal. Representative of Langaroud

emphasized: Today, we should tell the government where it has gone wrong, not to pass a new proposal for it. In response to Lahooti's objection, Larijani stated: The speaking time for important bills and proposals, including international agreements and treaties, is 3 hours. On the other hand, Article 176 also envisages 2 in favor and 2 against for the declaration of representatives' opinions. He continued: The JCPOA proposal is not like international contracts, but it is among the important proposals. Therefore, we need to make a decision on this matter. He added: Either the number of supporters and opponents should be equal, or from now on, when 2 supporters and 2 opponents have spoken, another 2 supporters and 2 opponents should also speak so that, after the statements of the government representative and the spokesperson of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament, a total of 3 hours is allocated for the JCPOA proposal. Then Larijani put the second proposal to a vote, and out of the 245 representatives present in the session, 146 voted in favor, 33 voted against, and 10 abstained from this request. In this way, the parliament, with the opinions of 4 representatives in favor, 4 representatives against, along with the opinion of the Security Commission and the government representative, gave a positive vote.

Statements of Nadran, the representative of the people of Tehran, in opposition to the general terms of JCPOA:

The representative and member of the Sacrificers' Faction in the parliament stated, "Today is a day when officials have been defending the country for many years, enduring the hardships and responsibilities of the government." Elias Naderan, in opposition to the generalities of the JCPOA implementation plan, said, "I am not a follower of parliamentary factions or even the Supreme National Security Council; instead, I am a follower of the constitution and the internal regulations of the parliament. The parliament should have addressed this important plan in a dual-track manner according to the law, but unfortunately, it turned it into a one-track process." Critiquing the economic performance of the government, he asked, "Why have the government and ministers in the economic sector been idle for the past two and a half years, allowing economic ministers to escape responsibility for their inefficiency and lack of performance?" Addressing government officials, the representative of Tehran asked, "Do you accept responsibility for the economic pressure until before October 18, 2015 constantly raising the issue of economic damages due to the delay in implementing the JCPOA after this date? Do you accept your economic inefficiency? We confirm the Leader's fatwa with this plan. Is this not contrary to the Leader's views and the constitution? He stated that the footprint of the JCPOA report is not seen in this plan, saying, "The parliament revokes its own resolution from three months ago with the JCPOA plan. This resolution has been

prepared to humiliate and undermine all the ideals of the nation." Ali Larijani, the head of the legislative branch, responded to the claims of Zakani and Shamkhani, who expressed support for the parliament's plan on the JCPOA. Larijani emphasized, "The Supreme National Security Council and Amir Shamkhani support the Action Plan against the JCPOA's implementation. Zakani's statement that they agree with this matter is not true, and these statements in the parliament are incorrect." Alireza Zakani, during an open session in parliament, mentioned the plan for proportional and reciprocal action by the Islamic Republic of Iran in implementing the JCPOA. He said, "Referring this plan to the specialized commission, namely the JCPOA Commission, is against the law. While this commission spent 40 days reviewing the nuclear agreement and drafting a report, it was set aside in the parliamentary review of the JCPOA-related plan. Meanwhile, Mr. Larijani handed over a plan that they had prepared two months ago to the faction. We remained silent. But today, when Larijani spent on two factions, we express our protest."

Ghavami's statements in agreement with the general plan of JCPOA

Hadi Ghavami, the representative of the people from Esfarayen city, explained the most important effects of the approval of the JCPOA and said, "Improvement in the investment environment and improvement in the opening of credit documents are among the positive effects of the approval of the JCPOA plan." Ghavami defended the overall plan of the JCPOA, stating, "As the esteemed Leader has said, we should not involve the country in tension-inducing and marginal discussions." He continued, "Does opposition to this plan bring better conditions for the country? If fundamental actions were taken for economic issues and youth unemployment, there would be no need for this plan. We must pursue the work with unity and common purpose." This member of the presiding board of the Budget and Planning Commission of the parliament considered the most important effects of the approval of the JCPOA to be increased profitability of production companies, reduction of the cost of importing technology and industrial equipment, improvement of LC opening, increased attraction of new investments, elimination of unconventional import methods, and the government's intervention to defend the national interests of the people. He recalled that during the sanctions period, with unconventional methods, we imported machinery worth \$100 million for \$115 million or even more, which led to increased production costs and the non-economical nature of domestic production. According to the announcement of the government representative, the ministers are in favor of the JCPOA

Ali Larijani stated, "According to the statement of the government representative, ministers, and the esteemed government delegation, they are in favor of the comprehensive cooperation plan between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1

group." In today's public session of the parliament, during the discussion of the reciprocal and proportional action plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran in implementing the JCPOA, Larijani said, "During the discussions, some representatives claimed that some government officials and ministers are opposed to the JCPOA, which is not true based on a letter submitted by the esteemed parliamentary deputy of the government to the presiding board of the parliament." He emphasized that all members of the government are in favor of the JCPOA.

Larijani's explanation about the JCPOA drafting process

Zakani claimed, "They told us that, the National Security Secretariat opposes this plan and asked us to remove it from the agenda. But again, with Larijani's insistence, this plan was raised in the parliament." In response to these claims, Ali Larijani clarified, "It is incorrect to say that the plan has been formulated and submitted to the leadership two months ago. The Leader himself stated that he will not interfere in the matter of reviewing the JCPOA in the parliament and only emphasized that the parliament should not neglect the JCPOA, and certainly, they should express their opinion. But did the Leader only mean the report of the JCPOA Commission? Apparently not." He added, "We examined the plan with the National Security Commission Secretariat based on the law and our own judgment. Mr. Zakani, along with Mr. Jalali, was assigned by the parliament to review this plan at the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, and the claim that the Secretariat's opinions on this plan have not been considered, is false." Larijani, the head of the legislative branch, emphasized, "This plan was reviewed line by line with the presence of Mr. Shamkhani, and he had no ambiguities. I am surprised that some statements are made in the parliament." In another part of his speech, Ali Larijani, referring to the formation of a joint commission from both factions to review the JCPOA plan, stated, "I had previously spoken in a meeting with Mr. Haddad Adel, and he expressed, 'What do you think should be done about the JCPOA?' I presented my proposal, and Haddad Adel also had the same opinion. Based on this, a special group consisting of members from both factions, with a majority in the parliament was formed to review the counteractive plan. We informed Zakani about this issue and said that there should be a plan that will be reviewed in the parliament after the JCPOA commission, so the implementation of the JCPOA would be determined. Representatives, including Tavakkoli, Zarei, Bazpash, Haghighatpour, and Boroujerdi, members of both factions, examined it in their sessions, and the opinions of all these friends were considered." Larijani clarified, "Only one issue in the JCPOA plan faced opposition from some members of its working group, which was determined not to be in the interest of the system. In the current situation, this clause

cannot be included in the main plan. I had the same opinion in the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, and all these efforts were made for convergence in the path of the country's interests." He added, "I am against rejecting the JCPOA in the parliament. There are different opinions about the JCPOA, and some representatives have explicitly stated that the JCPOA should be rejected in the parliament, which I disagree with it." "Some friends believe that the JCPOA should be rejected, while others think it should be returned to the government. The government should reintroduce considerations in negotiations with the P5+1, which, in my opinion, it is a shot in the dark, and perhaps the conditions for intense nuclear negotiations may not arise again. Another opinion is to allow the government to implement within the framework of the resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council, which are approved and confirmed by the Leader. The parliament's considerations should also be taken into account during the implementation," Larijani stated. He added, "One of our most important considerations is the issue of sanctions, which must be lifted correctly and completely with a well-thought-out plan. Another issue is the military aspect, which has special sensitivity. In this plan, we have brought up the issue that nuclear defense is not negotiable, and our missile capabilities and military strength should be addressed. Rasaei also presented a plan in this regard in the same documents." The Speaker of the Legislature responded to the allegation that, "The National Security Committee is the same committee that has discussed nuclear issues and plans several times, and it has stated in the parliament that it is a specialized committee. In the past, Mr. Jalali also objected that the review of the JCPOA was taken out of the specialized National Security Committee and referred to another committee. Regarding the main JCPOA issue, they believed that it should be examined in this specialized committee. How can friends say that the National Security Committee is irrelevant? However, the decision to refer a plan to another committee is made by the presiding board, and in this matter, we decided that the JCPOA committee should not review this plan due to its workload and conflicts. This decision is also based on the law, and ultimately, I confirm that everything that has been said is based on honesty and truth, and we should not create conflicts among ourselves," said the head of the legislative branch in response to allegations that the National Security Committee unilaterally and non-expertly reviewed the Counteraction Plan.

Hosseinian's warning and Larijani's answers

In response to the concerns raised by the Fundamentalist representative, Ruhollah Hosseinian, during the introduction of the generalities of the JCPOA referral plan, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, faced several challenges. Hosseinian stated, "Article 53 of the Constitution explicitly states that any contract that leads to

foreign dominance is prohibited. If we have accepted the Additional Protocol, then we have accepted oversight. But there is a difference between oversight and foreign dominance. Oversight means that whenever a country deviates, the necessary institutions identify and address it, but foreign interference and dominance are something else. In the JCPOA, we have allowed foreigners to interfere with us in several places." Larijani was asked to clarify where in the JCPOA foreign interference was emphasized. In response, Hosseini clarified, "The fact that we have deprived ourselves of development and research for 10, 15, or 25 years is a form of dominance over our science and economy. Many of the issues raised about ballistic missiles involve foreign dominance." This exchange highlights concerns about the perceived concessions and limitations imposed by the JCPOA, particularly in terms of oversight and potential foreign influence on Iran's scientific and economic activities.

Zakani's statements in opposition to the general plan of JCPOA

Representative Alireza Zakani, a member of the fundamentalist faction in the parliament, stated that the claims regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran Nuclear Deal) are inaccurate. Zakani criticized the overall plan for the implementation of the JCPOA, and asserted that we find ourselves today in a critical juncture in the history of the parliament, especially the ninth parliament. Today, the discussion revolves around the JCPOA, which, considering its various dimensions, should be presented to the parliament for approval." But the government of "Hope and Prudence" has not taken the first step in submitting the JCPOA plan to the parliament. He mentioned that in the course of reviewing the JCPOA, certain red lines have been crossed, and the reviews we conducted with the JCPOA Commission led us to the conclusion that the laws established by the parliament, including the law of 1384(2005), considered among the top laws of the past century, have been overlooked by the negotiating team." and has deviated from the laws established by the parliament. Zakani continued, stating, "In the JCPOA commission, we followed a path that resulted in a realistic report, and we presented it to the awareness and judgment of the people. In this report, it became clear that all the claims are baseless without any flaw." He addressed criticisms that the JCPOA removed the shadow of war from the country, attributing this outcome to Iran's power. Moreover, Zakani discussed claims suggesting that if the Geneva agreement had not been reached, Iran's oil sales would have dropped to zero. He pointed out that, based on statistics and international documents, such claims are unfounded. Those who want to portray the country in crisis should ask themselves what their intentions are. At the height of sanctions, we sold 1.8 million barrels of oil. Zakani also stated: They announced that the sanctions would be lifted, but no sanctions other than the four and a half are

to be lifted at the order of the US president. US unilateral sanctions will not be lifted. Of course, Congress sanctions are the only ones allowed to be lifted. Zakani continued: They announced that the negotiating team was coordinated with the country's authorities in general, but not in detail. The Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council stated that the nuclear committee did not have many sessions, and in these two years, they only held 20 sessions. Zakani also said: After the Leader's agreement, in a meeting with the Leader's experts, it was stated that if the cancellation does not take place, it should be suspension against suspension. My question is, where in the presented plan has considered the Leader's statement? If the JCPOA is based on this plan, it will pose significant risks to the country." They announced that it doesn't bring security problems for us, but what is said is merely a slogan, and the statements made by Mr. Zarif, Mr. Salehi, Araqchi, and Shamkhani contradict each other. This representative of the parliament, in the final part of his remarks, referring to the documents related to the JCPOA and the resolution, said: They announced that there is another document that has been established between the US and Iran. If we go according to what is mentioned in the JCPOA, it will take 31 years to have 90,000 SWUs. In addition, the path of presenting our complaints and our right to sue is blocked. We asked Araqchi if we have a complaint, who should we complain to? He said to God. If we were supposed to complain to God, why did we negotiate so much? We don't accuse the negotiating team of betrayal, but they couldn't secure the rights of the nation from the American and European wolves. If a team cannot assert the rights of the people, there is no need for the people to bear the burden. We demand fundamental changes.

Breaking the silence of the head of the Atomic Energy Organization forever

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, who was speaking as the government's representative during the public discussion of the JCPOA implementation plan in the parliament, added: Some friends today expressed a wish for my death and placed themselves in God's position, disregarding ethics. Therefore, I am forced to break my silence today once and for all and speak about some matters so that this humility does not prevent me from fulfilling my duty. I regret to say that some of the behaviors of friends are beyond fairness, ethics, and scientific principles. Salehi added: If we negotiated, it was based on science and ideological concepts, and we negotiated within the frameworks that were defined for us, and we adhered to them until the last day. Therefore, we categorically reject some statements. He emphasized: I have never intended to insult, and I do not intend to, and I never say anything against my principles and beliefs. But today, some friends, swearing by the Almighty, told me that we will pour cement on you and bury you." And on television, they wished for my death, saying this gentleman, who is 66 years

old, may not live until the end of the JCPOA, as the useful life for Iranians is 72 years. Is this ethical? He added: Some statements are not based on science and knowledge, and I don't know what topic is being raised. Are these statements correct? How is it ethical to accuse and condemn each other like this? In the face of all these accusations and insults, I remained silent, and they accuse me of taking advantage of public sentiments. They cry out that plutonium is important, which is deeply non-specialized. Salehi continued: As someone who has spent 40 years of my life on nuclear issues and has never sought anything other than for God and the interests of my country, and I have never boasted about what I am doing, and I believe that God sees and knows, I say, pay attention and listen to my explanations, and don't scream. If our facility in Arak works well, we produce 8 kilograms of plutonium annually, and in 30 years, this amount of 8 kilograms will become 240 kilograms. That is, after 30 years, we will only have 240 kilograms of plutonium, and out of 60 fuel complexes, only 5 to 6 complexes will receive their own fuel from our produced plutonium. Now it is intended to pour cement on me and bury me, let me say some of my words so that future generations know and judge how we negotiated at the peak of dignity. Salehi emphasized: My character is such that I never insult, and I have remained silent until now. I kindly ask Speaker to manage in a way that I can speak my words once and for all. Then let my friends scream. I want to announce only one specialized issue. Everyone should know that scientific issues are being presented in a distorted way, but people should know what the realities are." This plutonium that friends are shouting about, saying it's important and disappearing in Arak, we will have 240 kilograms of it produced from the Arak facilities after 30 years. And friends also say that we can use this plutonium in power plants. However, this amount 240 kilograms will be obtained for us after 30 years. Meanwhile, the fuel for each power plant is 500 kilograms, and 7% of it becomes 35 kilograms, and after 30 years, we can feed 5 to 6 complexes. He emphasized: Another person says, "Do not export heavy water, dear ones". Ask that person how much deuterium is needed for gilding? For every 1000 megawatts, 100 kilograms of deuterium is needed, and today we produce 20 tons of heavy water, one-fourth of which is deuterium, meaning about 4 tons of deuterium per year, which is 4000 kilograms we produce right now. And from now until the next 40 years, we need 160,000 kilograms. All of this is a specialized calculation, and I don't know why some friends talk like this. Ali Akbar Salehi, in another part of his remarks, emphasized the dignity and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stating: I bear witness, and future generations will judge, and history will prove that I have spent 40 years of my life on responsibilities and scientific matters, while I never wanted to shout about what I did. He said: If something has been done and an action has been taken that is for the sake of God, and we have tried, I must say that in the nuclear issue, we will neither face slowness nor stoppage. Our heavy water will

remain. Our research will remain in its place. Our enrichment will continue, and you, who are knowledgeable, see what the Americans wanted and what achievements we have reached today. They wanted Fordow and no enrichment; they wanted us not to have heavy water, but all of this has remained thanks to the divine grace, and we will continue on the path of development." The head of the Atomic Energy Organization recalled: Because, according to the regulations, only one person from the government can speak, I have taken Mr. Zarif's time, and today I say that what they wanted did not come true. They wanted us not to be a country on the nuclear technology map, but by divine grace, we are, and we have imposed our will on them. The esteemed Leader had clarified all our duties, and we had to negotiate in a way that both the dignity and the power of our nation, as well as our nuclear industry, would remain intact, and that's what happened. Our nuclear negotiations ultimately took place with dignity and power, even in the face of the five global powers, and I testify and bear witness that history will later prove what we have achieved and how we held the upper hand in these negotiations. In these negotiations, the only constraints we accepted were restrictions related to the path of building nuclear bombs. Never, following the orders of the esteemed Leader, were we seeking to build nuclear weapons. We allow them to impose any restrictions they want on this path and please themselves, but we will continue our enrichment activities, research, and development. We will produce heavy water, be sellers of enriched uranium, and heavy water. Thanks to divine mercy, grace, and will, and with the support of the leadership and the resilience of the people who played a truly influential role, we have reached this peak of honor. I assure you, representatives, that with this JCPOA, the document of this country's honor will be realized. Know with certainty that with this JCPOA, you will preserve national interests and national sovereignty.

Seizure in the parliament during Salehi's speech

The parliament became tense during Salehi's remarks, a member of the negotiating team. As the framework of the JCPOA implementation plan was being discussed, Ali Akbar Salehi, representing the government, took the podium to express his views. However, opposing members prevented his voice from reaching other representatives. At that moment, Salehi repeatedly requested, amid shouts from representatives, to listen to his statements and allow him to speak. This incident led to a tumultuous situation, with some opposing representatives, including Ebrahim Karkhaneh, Abbas Zareizadeh, and Farajollah Arefi, rushing towards the parliament's platform. This action was accompanied by the support of other representatives. Some members, such as Kazem Jalali, Abid Fattahi, and

Kamaleddin Pirmoazen, attempted to calm the atmosphere in the parliament and prevent harm to Salehi. The atmosphere in the parliament continued for a few more minutes before ultimately calming down, following the intervention of the parliament's speaker, who urged the representatives to take their seats. Nevertheless, some representatives persisted with their outcries.

JCPOA member's opinion on sanctions:

Masoud Pezeshkian, a member of the JCPOA Commission and the representative of East Azerbaijan Province in the ninth Islamic Consultative Assembly, addressed opponents of the JCPOA on the mentioned date. He questioned them, saying, "Didn't you say five years ago that resolutions are mere scraps of paper? So why have you now seized on why they don't cancel all resolutions? You didn't cancel the scraps of paper!" Pezeshkian emphasized that everyone witnessed that sanctions were not scraps of paper; they inflicted damage from our time onwards. He stated that the JCPOA has many valuable achievements for the Islamic Republic, serving as a kind of guarantee for both Iran and the world. Pezeshkian added that the most important and best achievement of the JCPOA is the removal of all Western sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Despite pressures on American authorities, they were drawn to the negotiation table, and despite the mismanagement of some officials in past years, Iran was able to break the sanctions imposed on the oppressed people of Iran. Unfortunately, in the past government, in most international forums and tribunals, they openly spoke ill of some countries, but they expected these countries to have a more appropriate attitude towards us. He considered the instability in the region as the most important priority for the current enemies and global arrogance. He stated that the enemy is attempting to make the region insecure and wants to undermine the unity of Muslims by creating discussions between Shia and Sunni. Furthermore, the enemy aims to exploit issues related to ethnicity to create discord among our compatriots. Emphasizing the necessity of avoiding divisive discussions and activities among different segments of society, he stated that the enemy would use these factors more than before to weaken us, and efforts should be made to preserve our unity more than ever. Pezeshkian explained the impacts and results of the JCPOA in the world and the role of the Islamic Republic in the region. He said, "The achievements of the JCPOA are so valuable and effective in global security that the head of EU security says, 'This agreement also ensures the security of Europe.'" Stressing the need to increase unity among Islamic communities, he added that, like Europe, we should quickly form a union for Islamic countries and play a more influential role in enhancing unity among Muslims. If this happens, the enemy cannot easily speak against us, and our unity remains unharmed.

The opposition of parliamentarians to voting on the plan to implement the JCPOA with ballot Paper

Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly referring to the request of some representatives, including Hamid Rezaei, for voting on the implementation of the JCPOA with ballot papers, stated: "Whenever at least 10 representatives request it, instead of using the public voting machine, the request will be put to vote with ballot papers according to the regulations." He continued, "Mr. Rezaei and a few others requested this. The difference with this type of voting compared to voting with the machine is that the names of individuals are published in newspapers." Finally, the members of the ninth parliament declared their opposition to this proposal with 149 in favor, 70 against, and 16 abstentions.

Motives of destructive attack on JCPOA achievements

A member of the Expediency Discernment Council stated: Before asking what is the critics' goal in undermining the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), we should ask them what the situation of the country would be if there were no nuclear agreement and JCPOA. This member of the Expediency Discernment Council pointed out that according to the Sanctions planners, Iran's oil sales had dropped from 5.2 million barrels per day to 800,000 barrels per day, and this trend continued until Iran's oil exports were completely cut off. He emphasized: Although oil exports were not completely halted, our shipping insurance and banking relationships with global banks were severed, and SWIFT was not in operation. Therefore, critics should respond to the question of what the country's conditions would have been if there were no JCPOA. If they judge fairly, they will see that the JCPOA has solved many significant problems for the country. It should not be forgotten that the other party has also violated agreements or taken certain actions, and these violations are a result of the complexities in Iran-U.S. relations, although it is possible to minimize these consequences through some initiatives. This political activist, referring to the opponents' argument about Iran's access to dollar transactions, pointed out: The previous government cut off dollar transactions and replaced them with the euro to, according to their claim, confront the dollar. If you refer to the media of that time, you will see that some media outlets proudly reported that we defeated America or removed the dollar from our transactions. However, today the same media outlets criticize the fact that Iran has returned to dollar transactions, even though it was not

part of the JCPOA negotiations. Motaheri, a representative in the parliament, also stated: "The root of opposition to the JCPOA is economic. The representative of Tehran in the parliament considered the main cause of opposition to the JCPOA and the eleventh government is not political but economical and said: "The main reason for the attacks against the JCPOA and the eleventh government is fact that, the scope of activities of some individuals has been limited. Because with the full implementation of the JCPOA, economic conditions, especially trade, will return to normal, and in this case, there will be no room for some monopolies and privileges in the economy." This representative emphasized that a specific spectrum of government critics is concerned about the disappearance of pre-JCPOA conditions and pointed out: "You know that in the past eight years, some, under the pretext of evading sanctions, received oil from the Ministry of Oil and sold it in the global markets themselves, and much of the money from these sales did not go to the government treasury." However, it is natural that the JCPOA, like any agreement, has negative aspects, but its positive aspects are much greater than its negatives, and the entire system has accepted it. He also mentioned that some of the opposition to the JCPOA is an attempt to send a message to the world that investing in Iran is not secure. He added: "Because the presence of foreign investors leads to prosperity and diversity in economic activities in the country, and this, in turn, will undermine some monopolies and privileges." However, it is possible that some of the opposition's targeting is related to the presidential elections in June 2017. He believes that the main approach of the opposition is economic rather than political. The elected representative of the people of Tehran emphasized that the government should enhance its communication with the people by providing more information about its achievements and the JCPOA. It should share the content with the people and explain what achievements the JCPOA had and compare the conditions before and after the JCPOA because people accept logical reasoning. In general, the question should be raised in society whether those who oppose the implementation of the JCPOA have a better alternative. They had eight years to implement their plan.

point of view:

A destructive attack on the achievements of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) may arise from various motivations:

1. **Security Concerns:** Some individuals and groups might be concerned that the JCPOA guidelines and the easing of sanctions could lead to a decrease in regional and national security. They may oppose the JCPOA achievements by escalating destructive activities.
2. **Unmet Expectations:** Individuals or groups expecting a quicker economic improvement through the JCPOA might resort to complaining and protesting if their expectations are not met. Attacking the achievements of the JCPOA could be a way of expressing dissatisfaction.
3. **Economic Effects of Sanctions:** Some individuals and groups may criticize the JCPOA achievements as a justification for maintaining sanctions and increasing pressure on Iran. This motivation could stem from resolutions or decisions by certain countries at the international level.
4. **Disagreement with Foreign Policy:** Individuals opposed to their country's foreign policy or Iran's policies in various domains might use attacks on the JCPOA achievements to express their objections. They may emphasize that these policies not only fail to serve national interests but also cause harm to the nation.

In general, these motivations can originate from various issues such as security, economics, foreign policy, and ideological considerations. Understanding these motivations can contribute to a better comprehension of the behaviors and actions of different individuals or groups.

Chapter 7

Coordination of the JCPOA plan at the macro level

The subject matter discusses remarks made by Ali Larijani regarding the nuclear deal (JCPOA) and the reactions to it. Larijani denies any involvement in the JCPOA case, stating that it is not his file but rather a matter for the leadership. (The JCPOA plan was coordinated at the highest level of the country; I have no involvement in this case. This case is not mine; rather, it belongs to the leadership." These were the words of Ali Larijani, expressed on the October 18, 2015, in response to a critic. Opponents of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) did not spare criticism of Larijani. They believed that the approval of the implementation plan for the nuclear agreement in Baharestan (the parliament building) was orchestrated by the Speaker of the Parliament himself. In the past few days, they have not hesitated to express any criticism or, at times, insults towards him. The flood of accusations and suspicions regarding the management of the parliament speaker began on the Same day of that historic event October 11, 2015, and despite all efforts by opponents, they ultimately could not prevent the approval of the general outlines of the plan titled "Proportional and Reciprocal Action by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Implementation of the JCPOA."

Alireza Zakani, the head of the special parliamentary commission leading the opposition, accused Larijani of being a trunk defender of the JCPOA. He also questioned the parliament speaker's narrative about coordination between factions and the Supreme National Security Council in drafting the JCPOA implementation plan, claiming that the council's secretariat is opposed to the representatives' plan. These claims contributed to tensions and debates within the parliament, According to Kazem Jalali, The head of the RahrawanVelayat faction, Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, was the intended audience for these discussions and has confirmed the narrative presented by the Speaker of the Parliament. Although there were indications and evidence of coordination between entities outside the parliament and representatives of major factions, the opponents did not find these convincing and dismissed them. They presented their own narrative, stating that on the night of October 12, 2015, before the session to review the details of the plan, a meeting was held with the presence of Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, and Hojatoleslam Hejazi, a member of the office of the Supreme Leader. However, they took an unusual step by suggesting a new line of thought, implying

that the opinions of the members of the Supreme Leader's office differed from their expressed views. Based on this, they loudly proclaimed in the public arena, lifting handwritten signs that read, "The parliament followed Larijani, Shamkhani, and Hejazi in the JCPOA, but we did not follow. Everyone should know that this plan is not the parliament's plan; it's Larijani, Shamkhani, and Hejazi's plan." When the opposition found themselves confronted with the majority's blockade and couldn't prevent the approval of their plan, they later challenged the parliament's vote and its legitimacy through their own media outlets, questioning the credibility of both the parliament's vote and its underlying principles. The organization of the "Stability Front" called its headline as "Machdush" (confused), while another opposing newspaper referred to the representatives' plan as "Abolbaqaa." Rouhollah Hosseini, a prominent figure in the Stability Front and opponent of the government, declared that he would not accept the parliament's vote, and if he comes to power, he will overthrow it. They criticized the parliament speaker, asking why he did not allow the examination of over 200 proposed amendments to prolong the approval of the plan and delay its implementation for the JCPOA beyond the date of October 18, 2015. Referring an emergency plan to the National Security Commission and not sending it to the special commission was also criticized by opponents. Despite all these actions and fundamental movements of opponents of the JCPOA and Larijani were overlooking the fact that the JCPOA plan was prepared in coordination with factions and external entities such as the Supreme National Security Council. Nevertheless, 161 representatives in the parliament, in contrast to 59 opposing votes, gave their positive vote to the plan. According to "Khaneye Mellat" report, it had been about 3 years since the JCPOA was at the forefront of the country's affairs. Approximately one year of negotiations took place in the previous government (tenth administration), and the remaining two years occurred in the current government (eleventh administration). The Speaker of the Parliament mentioned that the approval of the JCPOA in the parliament was not an immediate and urgent matter. He stated that a path was taken, and the Supreme National Security Council was involved in it. Eventually, an agreement was reached, leading to differing opinions about it. Some believed that the approved document was detrimental to the system, while others thought it should be fully implemented. A third perspective suggested establishing a framework for determining tasks and operational conditions alongside the agreement to strengthen it. A representative from Qom city in the parliament stated that the final opinion was thoroughly examined in various forums, such as the Supreme National Security Council. Ultimately, the secretariat also agreed with it. I raised this matter in the Supreme National Security Council, and ultimately the Supreme Leader publicly declared that the parliament should not be sidelined in this matter. Larijani described, the coordination at two levels within and outside the parliament, emphasizing, "There were external coordination efforts,

which were directive in nature and resembled paternal advice, so that the parliament could make informed decisions. Therefore, comprehensive coordination was carried out at all levels." He explained the internal coordination within the parliament, mentioning the sessions of the majority factions attended by three of their members. He added, "In these sessions, an agreement was reached, and in the last session that I attended, opinions were expressed from start to finish, and even the text of the final article was modified according to their views." They also stated that the report of the special JCPOA commission should be presented before the plan, which we accepted. Larijani referred to the agreements of the majority factions before the session to review the plan on October 4, 2015, where, contrary to the agreed-upon coordination, members of the minority faction, in the absence of Gholamali Haddad-Adel, the head of this faction, did not vote in favor of the agreed-upon plan. According to Jalali's interpretation, the majority faction broke their commitment.

A 180-degree change in the opinion of some representatives:

Continuing the discussion on the generalities of the JCPOA plan in the session on October 11, 2015, Larijani pointed out the incorrect rhetoric of some representatives. After four hours of detailed debate in the open session, the single-article of the JCPOA plan was put to a vote. Even after that, some gentlemen in the parliament, who initially insisted on the definite approval of the plan, changed their stance, saying, "Why should the parliament make decisions about it?" This change of opinion was considered indifference. The member of the Supreme National Security Council then referred to the coordination that took place between the two factions regarding the examination of the plan's details on October 12, 2015. He continued, stating that multiple sessions were held with the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council, and the factions provided four amendments in these sessions for coordination to align the principles of the system behind this law. *Based on the same foundations, on the morning of Tuesday October 13, 2015, proposals were presented during the consideration of the JCPOA, which received approval. It was previously decided that this process would take place, and there was no intention to change people's opinions about this plan. Earlier, in response to the objections of opponents, Larijani had criticized the changing opinions of those who had previously agreed to the agreements between the two factions. According to ISNA, Larijani emphasized that he personally gains no benefit from this matter and reminded everyone, saying, "This case is not my file; rather, it is the leadership's file." There are concerns about the country's economic situation and vigilance over the nuclear industry. Coordination has taken place based on duty, but some individuals have not fulfilled their commitments in this regard.

Approval of JCPOA implementation

The response of the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) to the opponents plans to delay the implementation of the nuclear agreement is reflected in the approved text of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission for the implementation of the JCPOA. On the 20th of Mehr 1394 (October 12, 2015), the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly discussed a motion for a proportional and reciprocal response to the Islamic Republic of Iran's government in implementing the JCPOA. This motion, with a modification, passed the approval of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament. According to IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency), the complete text of the resolution by the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament is as follows:

"Article 1 – Within the framework of the resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council, the government can voluntarily implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and comply with the following provisions and obligations in the execution process:

1- Based on the fetwa of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, no government in Iran has the right to develop or use nuclear weapons. The government is obliged to actively pursue the global policy of nuclear disarmament in all international, legal, and diplomatic efforts to save humanity from the danger of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. This includes creating zones free of weapons of mass destruction, especially through the establishment of a regional coalition in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons."

2 - The foundation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is based on cooperation and mutual respect, and any action based on coercion or threat towards any party, as determined by the Supreme National Security Council, may lead to a reconsideration of this collaboration. In such a case, reciprocal actions should be considered in accordance with the decisions of this Council.

3- The government is obligated to closely monitor any non-compliance by the opposing party in terms of effective lifting of sanctions or the reinstatement of lifted sanctions or the imposition of sanctions under any other title. It should take reciprocal measures to uphold the rights of the Iranian people, cease voluntary cooperation, and rapidly develop the peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a way that the country's enrichment capacity increases by

190,000 SWUs within two years. The Supreme National Security Council is the authority to address this matter.

4- The government is obliged to pursue the long-term plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program in the commercial-industrial sector, including enrichment and research and development, in line with the long-term plan of the country, as defined by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran must submit the country's 15-year long-term plan in the field of enrichment and research and development to the Supreme National Security Council for approval within a maximum of two months after the announcement of this law. It should also present it to the International Atomic Energy Agency in a manner that addresses the country's needs for the fuel of power reactors and research.

5- Redesigning the heavy-water reactor in Arak and, if necessary, the exchange of enriched reserves is subject to the conclusion of definitive and secure contracts and assurance of their implementation.

6- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections should be carried out within the framework of international regulations and in accordance with the national security interests defined by the Supreme National Security Council. The government must ensure complete protection of classified information, especially in the military and security domains, during the implementation of the JCPOA and afterward. The level of cooperation with the IAEA is subject to necessary precautionary measures to guarantee this, as determined by the Agency. Furthermore, any IAEA access to military facilities and individuals, under the pretext of the JCPOA, is only authorized if approved separately and in detail by the Supreme National Security Council.

7- The government and the armed forces of the country are obliged, for the purpose of safeguarding the security and national interests of the country and supporting the challengers in the fight against terrorism, to take necessary measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in all areas of defense, including aerial, maritime, terrestrial, missile, and create defenses against nuclear attacks and build propellants with nuclear weapons, nuclear medical neutron imaging and nuclear batteries. This should be done with strong and serious planning.

8 - The government and other governmental institutions are obligated to consider necessary measures within the framework of the decisions of the Supreme National Security Council to ensure that the implementation of the JCPOA does not provide any opportunity for opportunism or abuse within the country by the United States or other foreign governments. No opportunity for political, economic, cultural, or security infiltration and abuse should be granted to global hegemony.

9-The government is obliged to allocate the freed national resources towards achieving economic resilience, promoting production, essential investments, and prioritizing the needs of the private sector, as well as strengthening the National Development Fund.

Note 1- The Minister of Foreign Affairs is obligated to report the progress of the implementation of the agreement to the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Islamic Consultative Assembly every three months. The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is required to present a report on the implementation of the JCPOA to the public session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months.

Note 2: With the implementation of this law, the law obligating the government to suspend voluntary actions in case of referral or reporting of the nuclear issue to the Supreme National Security Council, enacted on November 22, 2005, The law obligating the government to enhance cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, approved on December 27, 2006, is part of the law protecting the peaceful nuclear achievements of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved on July 20, 2010. And the law of obligating the government to preserve the nuclear achievements and rights of the Iranian people, approved on June 23, 2015, is to be revoked.

At the end, members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) approved the details of the "Proportional and Reciprocal Action by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Implementing the JCPOA" in an open parliamentary session. The representatives, with 161 in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions out of a total of 250 present members, also endorsed the single article and clauses of this plan. Additionally, the lawmakers specified that the government could voluntarily implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) within the framework of the resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council, provided that it adheres to the provisions and obligations mentioned during the implementation process.

Issuance of an order to prepare removal of sanctions against Iran by Obama

On October 18, 2015, the President of the United States issued an order for the preparedness of the government of the country to lift sanctions on Iran in line with the implementation of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

While, according to reports in the media, Sunday, October 18, 2015, was supposed to be the "Adoption Day" of the JCPOA, news from the United States indicates that the President has issued an order for the readiness to lift sanctions in the implementation of the JCPOA. According to the provisions of the JCPOA, its implementation was divided into three stages. As stated in the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), these three stages include the finalization day (July 14, 2015, in Vienna), Adoption Day and Implementation Day. Regarding the "Adoption Day" in the JCPOA, it is mentioned that "The day on which the JCPOA is adopted, is 90 days after the endorsement of the JCPOA by the United Nations Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, on which date the JCPOA and all commitments in the JCPOA will come into effect. On this day, JCPOA participants will begin making the necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments." The "Implementation Day" is the stage where the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), approved by both parties, enters the execution phase, and the necessary preparations for it have been completed. Until this point, there will be no change in the status of Iran's sanctions, and the Geneva agreement, as extended by the United States and the European Union, will remain in effect. Regarding the "Implementation Day," the JCPOA states: "The Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying the implementation of nuclear-related measures by Iran, as stated in sections 14.1 to 14.12 of Appendix 5, and detailed in Annex V, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 15 and 16 of Annex V, and Iran will perform the actions specified in Section 17 of Annex V at the UN level in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution." In this regard, on Sunday, October 18, 2015, in President Obama's order addressed to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, and the Federal Reserve of the United States, it is stated: "I ask that you take all necessary measures to ensure that U.S. commitments on sanctions are fulfilled." Certainly, in the President's order, it is emphasized that the implementation of decisions related to lifting sanctions on Iran will only happen when the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, confirms that Iran has fulfilled its commitments under the JCPOA. According to Obama's order: "Implementation Day

is October 18, 2015, the day when JCPOA becomes operational, and all participants, including the United States, must make the necessary legal arrangements and preparations to fulfill their commitments under JCPOA. Based on paragraph 11 of Annex V of JCPOA, the Secretary of State (U.S.) takes action regarding the lifting of relevant sanctions, and this action is taken after the Secretary of State confirms that Iran has taken specific nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 and 15.11 of Annex V of JCPOA, which the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies. The order further states: "I instruct you to take additional measures to ensure the swift and effective implementation of the United States' commitments under JCPOA in accordance with U.S. laws." In particular, and based on the legal requirements of the United States, I command you to take all necessary actions to implement the U.S. commitments regarding the sanctions described in Section 17 of Annex V of the JCPOA. This includes being prepared to terminate the executive orders specified in Section 17.4 and allowing the activities outlined in Section 17.5. These actions will be taken with the approval of the Secretary of State regarding the implementation of nuclear-related activities specified in paragraphs 15.1 and 15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, once the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies them. The President of the United States also adds: "To carry out these responsibilities, you are hereby instructed to consult with other heads of executive departments and agencies that may be appropriate and advisable. The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register."

How to remove sanctions : The sanctions imposed on Iran, from the perspective of the sanctioning entities, are divided into three categories: United Nations Security Council sanctions, U.S. sanctions, and European Union sanctions. Each of these categories has its own process and timeline for removal, as detailed in the text of the JCPOA and related resolutions. The process of lifting sanctions practically begins with entering the "Implementation Day," at which point the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the United States, based on a specified timetable, suspend or lift the specified sanctions.

According to JCPOA, the process of removing sanctions is divided into three stages

1. Adoption Day: This stage took place on October 18, 2015, in Vienna. On this day, the parties to the JCPOA, namely Iran and the P5+1 group (Germany and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, Russia, France, Britain, and the United States), committed to implementing their obligations. This date was set as the starting point for counting the time for the lifting of sanctions.

2. **Implementation Day:** This stage in the process of lifting sanctions is the day when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is confirmed by the parties, and the necessary preparations have been made, entering the implementation phase. During this stage, sanctions are either suspended or lifted.
3. **Transition Day:** This stage is scheduled for October 20, 2023, or whenever the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran continues its nuclear activities under the supervision of the JCPOA. At this point, all sanctions are completely lifted.

Obligations of the United States of America

On Implementation Day, the United States is also required to fulfill commitments. Accordingly, after the confirmation of Iran's compliance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Washington takes action to "suspend the specified sanctions in Sections 4.1 to 4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, except for Section (a) of Section 211 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act." According to this provision, the implementation of the following sanctions is "suspended." The details of the sanctions, including the names listed in Annex 3 and Annex 4 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), are provided in pages 77 to 95 of the second translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These sanctions cover individuals and legal entities, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian financial institutions listed in Annex 3, the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, individuals and legal entities identified by the Treasury as entities associated with the Iranian government, and certain individuals and legal entities listed in the sanctioned entities or the list of individuals whose assets are subject to seizure.

Details of the sanctions are as follows:

1-Sanction on Iranian Rial:

- Restriction on the purchase and sale of U.S. banknotes to the Iranian government.

- Bilateral trade restrictions on Iran's external income, including limitations on the transfer of income.

-Sanction on Government Debt Transactions:

Prohibition on the purchase, underwriting, or facilitation of transactions related to Iranian government debt securities.

-Financial Messaging Services Sanctions:

-Sanctions on providing financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions listed in Annex 3 of the JCPOA.

2-Insurance Services Sanctions:

-Prohibition on providing insurance services or reinsurance related to activities consistent with the JCPOA and involving individuals and entities listed in Annex 3 of the JCPOA.

3-Oil Sales Reduction Efforts:

-Efforts to reduce Iran's oil sales, including restrictions on the quantity of Iranian crude oil sales and countries able to purchase Iranian crude oil.

4-Investment Sanctions:

-Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology, and technical assistance for the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors.

5- Sanctions on Petroleum and Petrochemical Products:

-Prohibition on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of oil, petrochemical products, and natural gas from Iran.

-Sanction on Export, Sale, or Supply of Refined Petroleum Products and Petrochemical Products to Iran:

-Prohibition on dealing with Iran's energy sector, including transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and the Iranian Oil Trading Company (NIKCO).

6-Sanction on Shipbuilding and Ports:

-Prohibition on dealing with Iran's shipbuilding and shipping sectors, including companies such as the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, South Shipping Lines, and the Iranian Oil Ports and Shipping Company (NIKCO), and operators of the Bandar Abbas port.

7-Sanction on Gold and Precious Metals Trade:

-Sanctions on the trade of gold and other precious metals by Iran.

-Secondary Services Related to the Above:

-Prohibition on secondary services related to the aforementioned items.

This provision also allows the U.S. President, with the exception specified, to sanction any individual who knowingly sells, provides permission, or makes available a vessel, insurance, or any transportation-related services to Iran for the transport of items that may assist Iran's government in activities related to mass killings or terrorist acts. Such actions can lead to the inclusion of that individual in the sanctions list.

According to the next provision of the agreement, the United States also "takes action to cease the implementation of sanctions specified in Annex II, Section 4.6,

regarding activities consistent with this JCPOA, including transactions with individuals and entities listed in Annex II, Addendum III" of the JCPOA. Under this provision, the following sanctions are suspended based on the JCPOA: According to this paragraph, the implementation of the following sanctions based on the JCPOA will be stopped:

Sanctions on trade with Iran regarding graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and industrial process control software, concerning activities consistent with this JCPOA and the mentioned legal entities in Addendum III. Additionally, the United States has committed, on the Implementation Day, "take steps to remove the names of individuals and entities specified in Addendum III of Annex II from the list of designated individuals and the list of entities whose property is blocked." This means that the names of all individuals and entities in Addendum III of Annex II of the JCPOA will be removed from the blocked property list. However, U.S. citizens and companies are still prohibited from engaging in trade and cooperation with individuals and legal entities listed in the sanctioned list.

Furthermore, Washington, through the revocation of four different executive orders and sections 5 to 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, removes individuals and legal entities listed in Addendum III. 3 and 4 of Attachment 2, as well as the "List of Sanction Evasion Actors or the non-SDN List related to the Iran Sanctions Act" from the blocked property and non-issuance of visas list.

In addition, Washington issues licenses for the following purposes:

1-Permission for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran will be granted by granting licenses in the following cases: a) Exclusively exporting, selling, leasing, or transferring commercial passenger aircraft for non-military use, b) Exporting, selling, leasing, or transferring spare parts and major components for commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, and c) Providing related services, including warranty, maintenance, and safety inspection services for all the mentioned items, provided that the licensed parts and services are exclusively used for commercial passenger aviation.

2-Through the issuance of licenses, non-U.S. legal entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons will be allowed to engage in transactions with Iran in accordance with this JCPOA.

3-Granting a license for the import of carpets and food items, including pistachios and caviar, of Iranian origin into the United States.

Finally, the 12-year-old nuclear case reached the final station and entered the implementation phase:

On October 19, 2015, an unprecedented operational order was issued simultaneously in Washington, Brussels, and Tehran, marking the implementation of the nuclear deal. The outcome of protracted and intricate negotiations by diplomats from both sides yielded tangible results. On the same date, the 90-day window for reviewing the nuclear agreement by the negotiating parties, especially Iran and the United States, was initiated. With the passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) through the challenging channels of the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament, both sides formally declared their readiness to implement their commitments by issuing separate orders by the U.S. President, the Council of Ministers of the European Union, and a joint statement by Zarif and Mogherini. The first statement was released by the European Union, and shortly thereafter, the order of the President of the United States was featured in the international media. Following that, a joint statement by Zarif and Mogherini was published. According to the French news agency, Obama, in his directive, addressed the officials of the Treasury, State, Commerce, and Energy departments, urging them to take necessary steps for the implementation of U.S. commitments in the "JCPOA" and to conclude the sanctions on Iran after the confirmation of the U.S. Secretary of State. The European Union, in a statement, has lifted all economic and financial sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. The EU statement indicates that the lifting of sanctions will take place simultaneously with the International Atomic Energy Agency's announcement confirming Iran's fulfillment of its commitments. Shortly before the issuance of the joint statement and Obama's executive order, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran had informed the agency's authorities that it would provisionally implement the Additional Protocol from the day the agreement is executed until the approval by the Iranian Parliament. This news was confirmed by Iran's representative to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, emphasizing that Iran would temporarily implement the Additional Protocol to build confidence.

Mogherini and Zarif's joint statement for the approval of JCPOA

Hours after the separate statements of the United States and Europe regarding the lifting of Iran's sanctions, the Foreign Minister of Iran, along with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, issued a joint statement affirming both parties' commitment to their obligations for the implementation of the JCPOA. According to this statement, the Joint Commission of Iran and the P5+1 group will convene on Monday October 19, 2015 based on the previous agreement to take the necessary actions within this framework. Additionally, the statement mentioned that the agency (IAEA) considers necessary measures for verification and testing. The text of the joint statement by Mogherini and Zarif is as follows.

Today October 19, 2015, marks the "Approval Day" for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's nuclear program. This milestone comes as a successful completion of the examination of the JCPOA by the legislative bodies of our countries. It is another turning point that reaffirms our commitment to bring us one step closer to the strong implementation of the JCPOA. We have adhered to the timeline specified in the JCPOA, reflecting our collective intention to abide by its provisions. Now, Iran will initiate the full and effective implementation of its commitments in the nuclear field. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will also take the necessary measures for monitoring and verifying these steps. Today, the European Union has approved the necessary legal framework for lifting all economic and financial sanctions related to the nuclear program. These laws will take effect on the "Implementation Day," concurrently with the execution of nuclear measures agreed upon by Iran and their verification by the IAEA.

Today, the United States continues to take steps to halt the implementation of nuclear-related sanctions, as outlined in the JCPOA. This action will take effect on the Implementation Day, which occurs when the IAEA verifies Iran's nuclear measures as agreed upon, and the directives for taking all necessary measures to cease sanctions, including the issuance of executive orders and licenses for activities, will be issued as specified in the JCPOA. To facilitate the necessary conditions for the implementation of the JCPOA, the Joint Commission, envisaged in the JCPOA,

will hold its inaugural meeting at the level of political directors on October 19, 2015. in Vienna. All parties remain strongly committed to ensuring the swiftest possible implementation of the JCPOA. To this end, we will make all necessary preparations.

British statement:

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Secretary, in a statement, considered the operationalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a milestone in the implementation of this historic agreement. According to Bloomberg, Philip Hammond added in his statement that, despite baseless protests from the West and the United States against Iran's nuclear program, this nuclear agreement will guarantee that Iran remains non-nuclear armed. This will contribute to making the region safer while creating opportunities for Iran to engage with the international community.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also, in response to the official implementation of the JCPOA, expressed its commitment to continue efforts for the implementation of the nuclear agreement.

Salehi's explanation about the steps to cancel the sanctions:

"We are waiting for President Rouhani's orders to implement the commitments." With the operationalization of the commitments under the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), the head of the Atomic Energy Organization has announced the complete readiness of this organization to implement Iran's commitments under the JCPOA. Salehi stated, "We will start the necessary actions within the framework of the JCPOA when the President issues the necessary order." Salehi added, "Iran must take actions in the nuclear field, and the Atomic Energy Organization is ready for this. The final assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will take place when Iran fulfills its commitments, and it will report officially to the 5+1 group." He continued, "These countries also announce that the sanctions are lifted, but the date of their implementation is postponed until the IAEA presents its report. Fortunately, there are not many problems left, and, hopefully, by late December 2015 or early January 2016, we will witness the JCPOA coming to fruition."

Araghchi's explanation about the stages of lifting sanctions

"At the same time, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, referring to Iran's readiness to implement its commitments within the framework of the JCPOA and the lifting of sanctions, stated: The lifting of sanctions has two stages. The first stage will be formally carried out by the Council of Ministers, and the infrastructure for lifting sanctions will be established. The implementation will take place in the second stage, a stage in which both parties take their actions, and the execution of this 'Sanctions Lifting Law' will be recognized as the day it becomes operational. The Deputy Legal and International Affairs Minister, pointing to the actions that both sides must take, said: We will take certain actions individually in Ferdow, Natanz and Arak, and they will be busy preparing a series of drafts, guidelines for companies, as well as the necessary correspondence in this regard."

Chapter 8

International Agency and Statistic for conditional implementation of the Protocol by Iran

A little before the joint statement by the United States and Europe on the lifting of Iran's sanctions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also announced in a statement on its official website: The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on October 18, 2015, that it would provisionally implement the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement from the day the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is operational until its approval by the Executive Council, and it will fully implement the subsidiary arrangements Code 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement. According to Amendment Code 3.1, a country that decides to establish a nuclear program is obliged to inform the Agency. Iran's representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's decision to implement the Additional Protocol said: Iran, as a confidence-building measure, will temporarily implement the Additional Protocol. It is recalled that Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement on the JCPOA in July 2015, under which Iran would limit its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. According to this agreement, Iran is also supposed to implement the Additional Protocol, which it had voluntarily suspended before this. Now, with the end of the 90-day period since the United Nations Security Council approved the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 through a resolution and the operationalization of this agreement, once again, the Additional Protocol has been temporarily and voluntarily implemented. Previously, the Additional Protocol was temporarily and voluntarily implemented for two and a half years during the reformist government and under the responsibility of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's nuclear chief. This protocol was signed by Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Agency's statement regarding the implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran has been issued while Iranian authorities, within the framework of their new cooperation with this international organization and defining the assignment related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, which has been on the Agency's agenda for years, allowed Amano, along with his deputy, to visit a military site during his trip to Tehran. Also, with the presence of Iranian experts, samples were taken from this site, and currently, these samples are being examined in the laboratories of the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to Agency

officials, the examination of these samples takes about two months. On Thursday, October 15, 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced in a statement that it has completed the clarification of issues related to Iran's nuclear program, as outlined in the roadmap. Additionally, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that by December 15, 2015, he will present his final assessment of all remaining issues, as mentioned in the annex of the 2011 report, to the Board of Governors.

Duration of the implementation on the measures of Iran and the P5+1 group

The second phase of the implementation of the nuclear agreement is set to begin as Iran and the P5+1 countries, following the approval by the legislative bodies of Iran and the United States, initiate actions that should ultimately lead to the simultaneous lifting of nuclear-related sanctions with the execution of Iran's commitments within the framework of the nuclear agreement. According to statements by Iranian technical authorities, Iran's nuclear actions, officially commencing approximately 45 days after the issuance of directives by high-ranking officials, will likely undergo verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within a two-month period. These actions include reducing the number of centrifuges in Natanz and making changes to the Arak reactor, such as removing the reactor's core. Upon confirmation of the completion of all specified actions in the agreement, the readiness for the implementation of the agreement will be declared. Simultaneously, Iran and negotiating parties in the P5+1 group (the United States and the European Union) are required to take practical and legal steps for the removal of Iran's sanctions in all dimensions related to its nuclear activities. This process is expected to unfold in early January of the upcoming Gregorian year (mid-Dey month of the Iranian calendar), allowing both sides to simultaneously exchange sanctions for Iran's nuclear commitments.

Order of America and Europe to cancel the sanctions on Iran

At last, the 12-year-long nuclear dossier has reached its final stage and entered the implementation phase. On October 18, 2015 an unprecedented event unfolded simultaneously in Washington, Brussels, and Tehran as the operational command for the nuclear agreement was issued. The European Union, through a joint statement lifted all economic and financial sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. Shortly after separate statements by the United States and Europe regarding the lifting of Iran's sanctions, the foreign minister of Iran, along with the foreign policy official of the European Union, announced in a joint statement that both sides are committed

to their obligations under the JCPOA. President Obama of the United States, in his directive, addressed officials from the Treasury, State, Commerce, and Energy departments, instructing them to take necessary steps for the implementation of U.S. commitments in the JCPOA. Obama's directive on October 18, 2015, was considered the most significant political event and received extensive coverage in Western media. Most American and European news networks interrupted their regular programming to broadcast this decision as urgent news. Concurrently with the initiation of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA, the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States were lifted or suspended. According to IRNA, the list of some of the sanctions set to be lifted or suspended on this day is as follows:"

Financial, banking and insurance measures of the European Union

Following are the sanctions related to Iran's nuclear activities:

System of prohibition and licensing for the transfer and receipt of funds to and from Iran - Sanctions related to banking activities - Sanctions related to insurance activities - Sanctions related to financial messaging services - Sanctions related to financial support for trade with Iran - Sanctions related to gratuitous assistance - Financial aid and preferential loans - Sanctions related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors - Sanctions related to the import of oil and gas from Iran - Sanctions related to the import of petrochemical products from Iran - Sanctions related to shipping, shipbuilding, and maritime transport sectors - Sanctions related to gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes, and coins - Measures related to nuclear proliferation - Sanctions related to sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment, and specialized training).

Banking and financial policies of the United States of America

Sanctions imposed on individuals and legal entities, including: the Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Tanker Company and other legal entities identified by the Treasury as part of the Iranian government in this annex. Some individuals and legal entities are listed in the sanctioned nationals or the list of individuals whose assets are subject to seizure - Sanctions on the Iranian rial - Sanctions on the purchase and sale of U.S. banknotes to the Iranian government - Bilateral trade restrictions on Iran's revenues earned outside the country, including restrictions on the transfer and movement of revenues.

Measures of oil, gas and petrochemical sectors

Efforts to reduce Iran's oil sales include restrictions on the amount of crude oil Iran can sell and restrictions on countries that can buy Iranian crude oil. Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint investments, goods, services, information, technology, and knowledge, and technical assistance for the oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors - Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of oil, petrochemical products, and natural gas from Iran. Sanctions on exports and sales, including transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the National Iranian Tanker Company, the National Iranian Oil Trading Company (NICO) - Sanctions on activities related to oil and gas, including drilling, extraction, refining, transportation, storage, production, development, sale, marketing, and consumption - Sanctions on the supply of equipment and technologies related to the oil and gas industry to Iran - Sanctions on financial transactions related to the oil and gas industry in Iran.

Shipping sector, shipbuilding and ports

Sanctions include restrictions on dealing with Iran's shipbuilding and shipping sectors and port operators, including the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), South Shipping Lines, and the National Iranian Oil Trading Company (NICO), as well as individuals associated with the Bandar Abbas port.

Other banned lists

Sanctions include restrictions on participation in activities related to the extraction of minerals, production, or transportation of uranium. There are also sanctions preventing Iranian citizens from studying at higher education levels in fields related to nuclear sciences, nuclear engineering, or the energy sector. Additionally, there are sanctions on gold and other precious metals trade imposed by Iran. Sanctions also cover related services for each category of the above-mentioned sanctions.

Other measures related to aircraft trade

Permission to sell commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran will be granted through licensing for exclusively non-military use. This includes the export, sale, lease, or transfer of commercial passenger aircraft, as well as major components and spare parts. Additionally, the provision of associated services, such as warranties, maintenance, and safety inspections, will be allowed, provided that the components and services are exclusively licensed for use in commercial passenger aviation.

Financial and banking measures Engaging in financial and banking activities with the Iranian government, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions, and other Iranian individuals is inclusive of actions such as providing loans, transfers, establishing bank accounts (including opening accounts and creating broker relationships, and payments through interbank accounts), investing in non-U.S. financial institutions (PTA), buying and selling securities, issuing guarantees, foreign exchange transactions (including transfers related to the Iranian rial), issuing documentary credits, and transactions in commodity futures markets. This also covers providing specialized financial messaging services and facilitating direct or indirect access to them, as well as purchasing or obtaining U.S. banknotes by the Iranian government and buying, underwriting, or providing services related to the issuance of Iranian government debt securities.

Energy and petrochemical sectors

Individuals who are part of Iran's energy sector or engage in buying, studying, selling, transporting, or marketing oil and oil products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products, or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas), indebtedness to Iran, providing assistance, and investing, including through participation, goods, and services, including financial services and technology that can be used in relation to Iran's energy sector or the development of its oil resources or the domestic production of refined oil products and petrochemical products, or activities in Iran's energy sector, including the National Iranian Oil Company, the Iranian Commercial Company of Oil (NICO) and National Iranian Tanker Company.

Shipping, shipbuilding, and port administration departments

Individuals who are part of Iran's shipping or shipbuilding sector, or who own, manage, control, or insure vessels used for transporting crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products, or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas), either from or to Iran, or are involved in port management in Iran (including the management of Bandar Abbas), cooperation with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors under the management of Iranian ports, providing financial services and other goods and services related to Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including port services such as fuel supply and inspection, classification, financial provision, sale, lease, and the provision of vessels to Iran, including to the shipping lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and the South Shipping Lines and their subsidiaries.

Removal of European and American sanctions

The European Union announced the lifting of economic and financial sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program through a statement, stating that its implementation is conditional on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the fulfillment of commitments. Federica Mogherini, the head of the EU's foreign policy apparatus, issued a statement regarding the "Implementation Day" of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, saying: "Today is the day of the JCPOA's implementation. Today is an important milestone that brings us one step closer to the JCPOA, to which we are strongly committed. We have adhered to the agreed-upon timetable, demonstrating collective determination to fulfill the terms of the agreement. The statement continues: "Iran is now commencing the full, timely, and effective implementation of commitments related to the nuclear agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency will take necessary measures for monitoring and verifying these steps." Mogherini also noted that the United States is taking necessary steps to lift nuclear-related sanctions against Iran on Implementation Day, consistent with the provisions of the JCPOA, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In conclusion, the European Union's statement mentions that the Joint Commission, envisioned in the JCPOA, is scheduled to hold its first political-level session on October 9, 2015, in Vienna, with the participation of political directors. The purpose of this commission is to take necessary measures for advancing the implementation of the JCPOA. All involved parties are strongly committed to ensuring the prompt implementation of the JCPOA. To this end, they are committed to providing all necessary actions. The sanctions imposed on Iran are categorized into three groups based on the sanctioning entities: UN Security Council sanctions, U.S. sanctions, and EU sanctions. Each of these has its own specific process and timeline for removal, as outlined in the JCPOA and related resolutions. The process of lifting sanctions practically begins with entering the "Implementation Day," during which the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States suspend or lift specified sanctions based on a defined timetable. The day of implementation is determined by the verification of Iran's commitments by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to the statements of the parties involved.

Order to lift sanctions of America and Canada

The White House announced that President Barack Obama has signed an executive order to lift sanctions against Iran. According to "Tasnim," citing "Sputnik," the White House stated that President Obama, through the signing of an executive order, has directed the removal of sanctions against Iran. Previously, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister of Iran, and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, officially commenced the "Implementation Day" of the JCPOA by reading a joint statement. President Obama informed Congress of the implementation of the JCPOA, including the lifting of sanctions. Additionally, as part of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries, Canada's Foreign Minister officially announced that Canada would lift its sanctions against Iran in line with the actions taken by the United States and European countries. According to "IRNA" and "Etemad," Stephen Dion, the Canadian Foreign Minister, stated in the country's parliament that Ottawa would lift its sanctions against Iran, aligning with the international community's approach. Dion did not provide details on the timing and specifics of this decision, but analysts predicted that the removal of Canadian sanctions could facilitate the resumption of trade agreements between Iran and the prominent Canadian aerospace company. In the aftermath of Canada's decision, officials in the U.S. government responsible for implementing the JCPOA stated that if a European company wishes to engage in economic activities in Iran, the nuclear agreement undoubtedly allows for such actions.

Statement of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

Statement by the spokesperson of the U.S. Department of State: Collaboration between Tehran, Washington, and Beijing for the redesign of the Arak reactor. The first session of the Joint Commission between Iran and the P5+1 countries concluded with the participation of political directors from all seven nations involved in nuclear negotiations in Vienna. The session was characterized by a positive and constructive atmosphere. In a statement, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced joint cooperation between Iran, the United States, and China for the redesign of the Arak reactor. According to the statement, the management of the Arak reactor will be carried out with Iran's participation and joint supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and representatives from both negotiating parties. The United States and China will co-chair a special working group tasked with managing the "modernization of the Arak reactor" project under Iran's leadership. In this regard, the China Atomic Energy Authority, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran emphasized that, according to the annex of a

comprehensive joint action plan, Iran, as the owner and project manager of the Arak modernization project, will take on a leadership role with the support of its program partners. Additionally, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, committed to establishing a working group for oversight before the implementation day. Meanwhile, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, referring to the statement of the Atomic Energy Organization regarding the Arak reactor, stated, "The redesign of the Arak reactor has been concluded conclusively, and now the fundamental redesign has begun, and we are trying to complete the detailed design as quickly as possible." Ali Akbar Salehi, in an interview with the news network, added, "Fortunately, Iranian experts are knowledgeable about the redesign process and are progressing through these stages. This joint cooperation of the three countries is taking place in the implementation of commitments under the JCPOA, while the Arak heavy-water reactor had become one of the controversial issues in nuclear negotiations. After several rounds of negotiations between our country's officials and the negotiating parties, the two sides reached an agreement that the Arak reactor should be redesigned while preserving its heavy-water nature to address the Western countries' concerns about its plutonium output leading to nuclear bomb production. Based on this, according to technical experts at the Atomic Energy Organization, it is planned to add one or two percent enriched uranium to the fuel in the Arak reactor's redesign to reduce the production of plutonium in the reactor cycle. Earlier, Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister, had said, "This reactor will not be converted to light water, but we believe that by using modern technologies and techniques, we can minimize these concerns, and the Arak reactor will continue its work."

Uranium exchange between Iran and Russia

At the same time, Russian officials have announced the commencement of necessary actions to implement the agreement on Iran's enriched uranium exit to Russia, which took place during nuclear negotiations. Vladimir Voronkov, Russia's permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, predicted in an interview with Interfax news agency, "The exit of low-enriched uranium from Iran to Russia may begin in the next two or three months." Earlier, Araghchi had also announced that Tehran is negotiating with several countries for the sale of enriched uranium in exchange for receiving natural uranium.

U.S. State Department announced that "all parties adhere to their commitments.

The implementation of mutual agreements between Iran and the P5+1 countries is underway, with officials from the United States and Europe welcoming the first session of the Joint Commission of the nuclear negotiations in Vienna. According to the U.S. Department of State's information website, senior officials from the department issued a statement after the conclusion of the first meeting of the Joint Commission on the JCPOA, emphasizing that all parties to this agreement are committed to their obligations in the course of its implementation. A portion of the statement reads: Shannon (the new Deputy Secretary of State) affirmed, in bilateral and separate meetings with his Iranian counterparts, the commitment to the Iranian side's obligations. The European Union also noted in a statement that the Arak reactor renovation project was one of the topics discussed between the parties in this session.

Status of JCPOA implementation after Iran's official approval

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, made the following statements regarding the PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) file:

"What we wanted in the JCPOA, as previously anticipated and observed, is the complete lifting of economic and financial sanctions on the day of JCPOA implementation. Our demand in the JCPOA is that the Council of Ministers of the European Union must have a resolution on the lifting of sanctions on the day of approving the JCPOA, and the President of the United States must also endorse and sign this matter. This has happened. Until the PMD file is closed, we will not touch the Arak reactor. The issue of Arak and how actions are taken around it has been a major concern for all of us. With the capabilities of the Atomic Energy Organization's experts, we will even reach beyond 190,000 SWUs by the end of the year." (Note: SWU stands for Separative Work Unit, a measure of the effort needed to separate isotopes in uranium enrichment.) The report by Yukiya Amano, who oversees the conclusion of the investigation into the disputed issues with Iran, has been warmly received by US officials and members of the P5+1 group. Amano emphasized that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has no valid document indicating deviation of nuclear materials related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated that the closure of the PMD file, a long-standing issue, was expected, and he highlighted the commitment of Iran in implementing the JCPOA. Abbas Araghchi, the deputy foreign minister and the official in charge of

the JCPOA's implementation, mentioned that it is now the turn of the P5+1 group to make decisions in their Council, which is scheduled to convene on December 15, 2015. He further added that To put an end to the massive file of unproven allegations against Iran, which has never been substantiated, is, in my opinion, what we expected, and it seems that Amano's report is in line with those expectations. Ali Akbar Salehi added that with this report, the fabricated case that has plagued Iran for years will be closed once and for all. Hamid Baeidinejad the deputy foreign minister, stated that this report leaves only one option for the Board of Governors, which is to conclude the case, and the result is final. Regarding the ongoing developments, Ernest Moniz, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, mentioned that if the IAEA confirms Iran's nuclear actions in January, nuclear-related sanctions will be lifted. However, Reza Najafi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, highlighted that the most crucial point in the report is the absence of any diversion of nuclear materials in Iran, and Amano's report indicates that the IAEA's roadmap has concluded and is updated, requiring no new actions or roadmaps.

Approval of final report of IAEA on absence of deviation in Iran's nuclear activity

Spokesperson of the U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: The "consequence" case is closed. The Amano report, which signifies the conclusion of the investigation into contentious issues with Iran, has prompted the spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to announce that the United States is now prepared to close the file on the "possible military dimensions" based on the Director-General's report. Mark Toner expressed a positive stance towards Amano's new assessment, stating, "This report means that the agency can declare a 'closed file'". Mark Toner noted that Amano addressed the remaining questions regarding Iran's nuclear program effectively in the agency's report. He further mentioned that the United States and the other five countries involved in the nuclear negotiations with Iran would agree in the Board of Governors meeting on December 15, 2015, to close this file, allowing them to focus on the comprehensive nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, who was one of the members of the negotiating team, emphasized, in reference to Amano's report and the P5+1 group present in the final negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group, there is currently no observation of any worrisome activities related to nuclear weapons or activities in the fuel cycle inconsistent with the requirements of the nuclear agreement in Iran's activities. He stated, "In January 2016, with the confirmation of Iran's nuclear actions by the agency, nuclear sanctions will be lifted." Ernest Moniz, a member of the negotiating team, added, "Our agreement is for them to significantly limit their nuclear program and, in return, receive relief from nuclear sanctions."

Reaction of international officials and personalities to closing of the PMD case

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in its meeting on the December 16, 2015, unanimously approved a resolution proposed by the P5+1 countries, bringing an end to a file that had been open for over a decade, marked by pressures, threats, and sanctions against Iran. By virtue of this resolution, the file known as PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) is closed, and the agency's agenda will shift from examining Iran's past and present issues to focusing on its future. The closure of the file related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program means that this matter is no longer part of the agency's mandate. Henceforth, the international monitoring body will oversee the proper implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In this regard, on the December 16, 2015, John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, welcomed the decision of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the closure of the PMD file related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Kerry, who was in Russia at the time, stated in a released statement in Moscow that he appreciates the consensus among the members of the IAEA's Board of Governors on adopting a resolution regarding the final assessment of December 2, 2015, by the Director-General of the IAEA on the past possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. In this statement, he added: This decision provides the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the opportunity to focus on implementing the July 14, 2015 agreement, under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. On the same day, Philip Hammond, the UK Foreign Secretary, also welcomed the closure of the PMD file by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hammond stated that it is an important day for our interaction with Iran. The UK Foreign Secretary added: A four-year investigation into the possibility of the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program has come to an end, and the agency can now focus on verifying and monitoring the implementation of Iran's historic nuclear agreement, which took place in July 2015. Hammond added: "Full implementation of the agreement, coupled with Iran's commitment to increased inspections and verification of activities, is the most effective way to ensure that Iran is not pursuing a military nuclear program. As a result, this contributes to regional security and allows Iran to re-engage with the international community. We look forward to observing the completion of the remaining necessary activities by Iran

before the day of the agreement's implementation, which can lead to the lifting of sanctions. Vladimir Voronkov, Russia's Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna, also welcomed the closure of the PMD file regarding Iran's nuclear program. He stated: "The resolution of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran's nuclear program is balanced, serious, and comprehensive." On that day, Voronkov commented on the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution, saying: "This document aligns with the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 for the resolution of the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program." He added: "Russia proposed the preparation of such a resolution to the (P5+1) group a few months ago, and extensive diplomatic efforts were made to advance this decision." Russia's Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna said: "Undoubtedly, one of the elements of this document was the report of Yukiya Amano, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which he announced his final assessment of unresolved issues in Iran's nuclear program. He emphasized that Tehran has acted in line with all its commitments within the framework of the roadmap agreed between Iran and the Agency in Vienna, parallel to the JCPOA." Voronkov added: "In his report, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency emphasized that no evidence of nuclear material has been found during inspections in Iran." In this way, suspicions about Iran violating its commitments regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were not confirmed, and the case known as "Possible Military Dimensions" (PMD) regarding Tehran's claims about the military aspects of Iran's nuclear program was finally closed. Voronkov emphasized that the approved resolution by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reinstates the agency's guarantees in Iran to a normal state, fully in line with the powers of this international organization. He said: "In this way, Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency is based on the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, and the voluntary measures of this country for transparency in its nuclear program are being implemented." Yukiya Amano, the Director-General of the IAEA, also stated in a press conference after the conclusion of the Board of Governors meeting that despite the approval of this resolution, there are still gray areas with Iran. Amano continued, stating that Iran is rapidly and seriously taking preliminary steps to implement the JCPOA, but reaching this stage is not solely dependent on the speed of Iran's actions; the agency also needs time to verify Iran's actions accurately. All of this is happening while the foreign ministry

of the Zionist regime, even after the approval of the proposed resolution by the P5+1 group of countries to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, continued to criticize the agency's decision not to declare the closure of the case regarding the potential military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. The Zionist regime's foreign ministry claimed that doubts about Iran's nuclear program are still valid. On the 9th of January 2016, a day when the U.S. Secretary of State expressed satisfaction with the implementation of Iran's commitments and announced that the U.S. was preparing to lift sanctions, hardliners in the U.S. Congress took action to challenge the implementation process of the nuclear agreement with Iran. They endeavored to pass a new bill aimed at impeding the execution of U.S. commitments, alleging that it was related to Iran's missile program. This effort was supposedly meant to maintain U.S. sanctions against individuals and officials from Iran, who, according to supporters of this bill, were involved in expanding Iran's missile programs. This happened while U.S. Congress representatives, who had been unsuccessful in implementing various bills against Iran until that date, sought to intervene in the implementation of the JCPOA for the first time. They intended to disrupt the process and tarnish U.S. commitments to lifting all sanctions against Iran by passing this bill. However, White House officials did not welcome this move and emphasized their readiness to lift sanctions against Iran. As the U.S. Secretary of State had stated when announcing the imminent implementation of the JCPOA: "Mohammad Javad Zarif had confirmed in a telephone conversation that Iran is committed to fulfilling its obligations within the framework of the nuclear agreement." John Kerry, based on Iran's adherence to its commitments within the framework of the JCPOA, had stated in a conversation with reporters that "if Iran remains committed and follows through on its commitments, the U.S. is ready to lift nuclear sanctions against the country." The U.S. Secretary of State also mentioned, "If everything goes well, the implementation of another part of the nuclear agreement will begin in the coming days." Kerry, at the same time, reiterated and confirmed his country's claim about putting pressure on Iran regarding the development of its missile programs. He stated that the U.S. would continue to monitor Iran's behavior in other matters, such as Iran's ballistic missile program or the fate of Americans imprisoned in Iran. Additionally, he mentioned that the U.S. would scrutinize Iran's conduct in areas beyond the nuclear deal.

In another telephone conversation with his Chinese counterpart, Kerry discussed the latest developments related to the nuclear negotiations, the newest stages of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as developments in the Middle East. The foreign ministers of China and the U.S. and the P5+1 countries, in this discussion, expressed satisfaction with the precise realization of the nuclear deal's provisions and emphasized that conditions were favorable for the agreement's implementation. They appreciated Iran's efforts in executing the agreements and urged other relevant countries to continue their cooperation to achieve a final result. The U.S.'s readiness to implement the JCPOA comes as Iran is completing actions such as reducing its enriched uranium stockpiles, modifying the Arak heavy-water reactor, decreasing enrichment capacity and levels, and reducing the number of installed centrifuges in its nuclear facilities. These are among the preliminary commitments of Iran according to the JCPOA. Iran is in the process of completing these actions, and the lifting of sanctions is expected to take place in the coming days.

New anti-Iranian plan of American representatives

The expression of readiness by White House officials to lift sanctions against Iran and the implementation of the JCPOA came at a time when hardliners in the U.S. Congress, who had repeatedly failed in their attempts to thwart the implementation of the JCPOA, had introduced a new plan that could potentially undermine the nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States. According to Reuters, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, which was then under the control of Republicans, had approved a draft resolution that, according to the White House, could take a step toward weakening the international agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. This draft resolution had been endorsed in the Foreign Relations Committee to be discussed and reviewed in the U.S. House of Representatives. The title of this plan was the "Iran Terrorism Financing Transparency Act," proposed and presented by Steve Russell, a Republican representative from Oklahoma. According to this plan, some individuals and entities in Iran would only be exempt from sanctions if it could be proven that they had no role in Iran's missile program. If the plan was finally approved in the U.S. Congress, it would prevent the removal of certain individuals and specific financial entities from the list subject to restrictions by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. However, this would only happen if the President of the United States assured Congress that these individuals and entities had not participated in Iran's ballistic missile program or terrorist activities. Royce, the Republican chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, repeated baseless accusations of Iran supporting terrorism in her

explanation of the new plan. She specifically mentioned two Iranian financial institutions, Bank Melli and Sepah (IRGC-owned bank), which were expecting the lifting of sanctions. Royce had requested the continuation of sanctions on these two banks, arguing that Bank Melli had benefited the IRGC financially, and Sepah had received resources for Iran's missile projects. The Republicans claimed that with this plan, the Obama administration had not put enough pressure on Iran regarding its support for terrorism or the implementation of ballistic missile programs, and they sought to address these issues.

Advance opposition to new plan of hardliners in the Iranian parliament

The new push to break the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) faced opposition from some members of the Democratic Congress and also officials from the White House. The Obama administration, just before the approval of this plan in the Foreign Affairs Committee, had announced to the media that it "strongly opposes this plan." American officials had informed the German magazine *Almanitor* that this transparent effort aimed to undermine the comprehensive nuclear agreement signed in July 2015 between Iran and the world powers. Some Democratic members of the Foreign Relations Committee, including those strongly opposed to the agreements with Iran, had vehemently objected to the new plan for monitoring Iran's sanctions. Eliot Engel, the senior Democratic representative on this committee, had stated, "Such plans that aim to destroy the nuclear agreement serve no purpose." If this plan were to be approved in the House and then in the U.S. Senate, it would require the signature of the President of the United States for implementation. However, prior to this effort, U.S. officials' attempt to list new sanctions against Iran, citing Iran's missile programs, was halted with a diplomatic warning to high-ranking Iranian officials.

Russia's criticism of creating controversy against Iran's missile program

The pursuit of anti-Iranian plans by U.S. representatives was underway as Russia, being one of the parties to the agreement with Iran, expressed opposition to this new directive. A Russian Foreign Ministry official considered the statements of American officials and some members of the U.S. Congress regarding Iran's missile program as a political uproar. In a conversation with the Interfax news agency, the Russian official commented on the remarks of American officials who had spoken about the possibility of new sanctions against Iran due to its missile program, stating, "We believe there is no reason to create a fuss about Iran's missile program." While emphasizing Moscow's opposition to any tension that would hinder the

implementation of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), the Russian official added, "The implementation of the JCPOA has been ongoing since the third week of January 2016."

Collapse of sanctions After 13 years, Iran's nuclear crisis led to the victory of diplomacy

Quoting from widely circulated media, on January 17, 2016 (27 Dey 1394 in the Iranian calendar), a joint statement was issued by Zarif and Mogherini. The statement highlighted that this achievement clearly demonstrates that with political will, perseverance, and through multilateral diplomacy, we can address and resolve the most challenging issues and find realistic solutions that are capable of effective implementation. This is a decisive and hopeful message that the international community should consider in our efforts to build a safer world.

“On this date, the United States officially ceased the implementation of sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. This includes the revocation of relevant executive orders and the issuance of licenses for certain activities. The European Union and the United States have provided the necessary regulations regarding the details of the lifted sanctions, thus facilitating international participation in Iran's economic advancement. On the same date, within the framework of global attention, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister of the moderate government, signed the document implementing the JCPOA, marking the greatest diplomatic success for the Iranian people. Simultaneously, Federica Mogherini, at this time as the representative of the P5+1 powers negotiating with Iran, engaged in a conversation with Zarif. Mogherini also expressed her satisfaction with this historic agreement in a series of consecutive tweets”.

Amano congratulated all parties involved in achieving the implementation of the JCPOA, especially the P5+1 group of countries, Iran, and the Board of Governors of the IAEA. Additionally, John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, with the authorization of President Barack Obama, had appeared in the final rounds of JCPOA negotiations to lift sanctions, especially the sale of aircraft to Iran. Ali Akbar Salehi, as Iran's top nuclear official, played a significant role in fulfilling Iran's technical commitments under the JCPOA framework until the last moment, guiding the diplomatic team. The understanding between Tehran and Washington opened the file on prisoners, leading to the unprecedented simultaneous release of 5 American prisoners in Iran and 7 Iranian prisoners in the United States. Furthermore, Washington revoked the extradition order for another 14 Iranians.

Text of the joint statement of Zarif and Mogherini for the implementation of JCPOA

On January 17, 2016 (27 Dey 1394), we have reached the day of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Since its approval day, we have earnestly endeavored and demonstrated our collective commitment and will to ultimately facilitate the execution of the JCPOA. Today, six months after the finalization of this historic agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that Iran has fulfilled its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. As Iran has adhered to its commitments, today the national and multilateral financial and economic sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, in line with the JCPOA, have been lifted. The European Union, the P5+1 countries consisting of the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with Iran, will also cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of the JCPOA. Today on January 17, 2016, the United Nations sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program have been lifted. Resolution Number 2231(2015) of the Security Council which endorsed the JCPOA now alongside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) constitutes the sole legal framework for Iran's nuclear activities and concludes all provisions of resolutions numbers 1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015). The European Union has confirmed that, within the necessary legal framework, the lifting of EU financial and economic sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program has been implemented. The United States, too, will cease the enforcement of approved sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program on January 17, 2016, including the revocation of relevant executive orders and the issuance of licenses for certain activities, as specified in the JCPOA. The European Union and the United States have exported the relevant regulations regarding the details of the lifted sanctions, thus facilitating international participation in Iran's economic advancement. As agreed on July 14, 2015, we will continue our vigilant oversight and monitoring of the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA through the Joint Commission composed of the P5+1 countries and Iran, coordinated by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. International Atomic Energy Agency, in its role, is responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the JCPOA and Iran's commitments as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement and the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol. We would like to take this opportunity

to express our gratitude to the Austrian government for hosting and to all countries that supported the negotiation process and assisted in implementing some of the commitments under the JCPOA. We also appreciate all the personalities who, since 2003, have led the negotiations representing Iran and the P5+1 group, and all parties firmly believe that this historic agreement is robust and equitable. It addresses the aspirations of all and its proper implementation will be a key step in helping to improve regional and international peace, stability, and security. This achievement clearly demonstrates that with political will, perseverance, and through multilateral diplomacy, we can address and resolve the most challenging issues and find realistic solutions that are capable of effective implementation. This is a decisive and hopeful message that the international community should consider in our efforts to build a safer world.

Approval of International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's commitments to start the JCPOA


In the early hours of Sunday, January 17, 2016, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaffirmed Iran's commitment to its nuclear obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Yukiya Amano, in his statement, emphasized that 'IAEA inspectors have determined that Iran has taken all necessary actions for the implementation of the JCPOA.' The JCPOA paves the way for the IAEA to begin its verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear program in line with the agreements set by the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors. The relationship between Iran and the IAEA has now entered a new phase, marking a significant day for the international community. Amano congratulated all parties involved in turning this into a reality, especially the P5+1 countries and Iran. Furthermore, the Director-General of the IAEA stated, 'In line with Iran's commitments under the JCPOA, the country will start implementing the Additional Protocol in accordance with the agency's security measures. Alongside other nuclear-related actions under Iran's commitments in the JCPOA, this will enhance the agency's capability to monitor Iran's nuclear activities and verify the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.'

Rereading the diplomatic achievements of the Rouhani's government

On January 17, 2016, Iran and the P5+1 group of six countries reached the conclusion of their path, entering the implementation phase of the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This marks nearly 13 years since the commencement of the fabricated case against Iran by the West. The comprehensive nuclear agreement, registered on July 14, 2015, stands as an unprecedented event in the history of global diplomacy. Iran and six countries—United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and China—accepted a logical give-and-take to achieve widespread tension reduction and allow the world to benefit from the fruits of resolving the nuclear dispute. The efforts to address the challenges between Iran and the world began 22 months after the new Iranian government took office. These rigorous negotiations took place in Vienna, Geneva, and New York, laying the groundwork for the agreement on July 14, 2015. This negotiating process ultimately resulted in the document titled 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,' leading to the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions against Iran. The negotiation process, which concluded with the removal of sanctions, underwent a rollercoaster ride in the history of diplomacy. Since the claim of Iran's secret nuclear activities in Natanz and Arak on August 14, 2002, a massive wave of extensive anti-Iran propaganda began. These advertisements aimed to propagate the allegations of Iran's danger and create a basis for threatening Iran. Western media framed Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy as the 'Iranian nuclear case' to portray these activities as a threat to international peace and security." It took almost 11 months for Iran to officially announce its readiness for discussions on peaceful nuclear activities in the meeting between the former Iranian president and Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on July 9, 2003. Hassan Rouhani was appointed as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from October 5, 2003, assumed responsibility for resolving Iran's nuclear case and placed negotiations with European countries on his agenda. During this period, which lasted nearly two years until August 15, 2005, Dr. Rouhani took two significant steps by adopting an interactive approach with three European countries: Germany, England, and France. Firstly, by voluntarily accepting the Additional Protocol and implementing it even before the final approval of the Iranian Parliament, he eased the heated atmosphere that had arisen against Iran. Secondly, by organizing intensive negotiations with European parties, he practically demonstrated that Iran seeks interaction and understanding regarding its peaceful nuclear program. However, it was the American and Israeli sides that obstructed any agreement through various sabotages.

chart of financial and banking achievements of JCPOA



Chapter 9

Changing the file of nuclear negotiations at the Ahmadinejad government

The change in the Iranian government and the efficiency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005 led to a shift in Iran's approach to nuclear negotiations. These political transformations occurred at a time when The opposition group does not take advantage of the opportunity to suspend enrichment in Iran, which had been carried out for over two years to build confidence. Iran was practically compelled to choose a different path to address this issue. Initially, Ali Larijani, came to work as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stated on the same day of August 15, 2005, that due to Western excesses, Iran was no longer willing to continue its voluntary actions regarding the implementation of the additional Protocol to the NPT agreement. With determination, Iran would continue its actions under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to secure its nuclear rights, particularly acquiring the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Larijani, during his tenure until October 21, 2007, managed to reach an agreement with the IAEA under a joint work plan with six clauses, which the Agency ultimately confirmed. Based on this plan, Iran responded to doubts and questions raised by the Agency about its activities. This achievement was the most significant for Iran during Larijani's tenure as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Meanwhile, Iran faced three resolutions from the Supreme National Security Council, two of which had sanction aspects. Despite this, Iran managed to enhance its nuclear capabilities during Larijani's term.

Unsuccessful Jalili's negotiations with the West

With the resignation of Larijani, Saeed Jalili assumed the position of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council on October 21, 2007, appointed by Ahmadinejad. In his first round of negotiations with Solana, Jalili focused on exchanging nuclear packages, which were presented by the European parties on June 14, 2008, in response to Iran's previously proposed package. During this period, the negotiations upgraded from the European side to talks involving six countries for the first time. The issuance of two more Security Council resolutions against Iran during this period, the lack of results in negotiations with Solana, and the change in the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2009 complicated the negotiation situation. The arrival of Yukiya Amano as the new

Director-General led to increased pressure from the Agency's reports against Iran. The second phase of Jalili's activities entered a new stage with the beginning of Catherine Ashton's term in December 2009. However, since the main topic of the negotiations, namely Iran's nuclear activities had not concluded from the opposing side's perspective, the nuclear issues entered an invalid round of unproductive talks through six rounds until the last round held in Almaty on April 5-6, 2013. Four Security Council resolutions were passed during Jalili's tenure with the numbers 1803, 1835, 1887, and 1929. It is noteworthy that the most severe sanctions resulting from Security Council resolutions or the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States were imposed on Iran during Jalili's term.

Ahmadinejad's nuclear policy

Here, we review Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear policy as narrated by Mohammad Javad Larijani, ranging from attempts at personal negotiations with Obama to the proposal for the transfer of all enriched materials.

In his last appearance in New York, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a statement that many found surprising: "Iran recognizes the position of the United States and believes that we can have a relationship with each other." However, this statement did not shock government officials of both countries and some European intermediaries much. Ahmadinejad had been seeking a channel to normalize relations with Americans for several years. During these years, numerous messages were exchanged between the two sides directly or indirectly. Now, Mohammad Javad Larijani, the deputy of human rights at the Expediency Council, states that the scope of the government's efforts to approach the United States was more than what was publicly disclosed. According to Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Ahmadinejad had proposed to negotiate with Obama himself and give all enriched materials at once." Although this narrative tells new aspects of the foreign policy of the previous government towards the nuclear issue and also the relationship with the United States, but in its generality, it is a subject whose signs have already been observed. In his interview with Tasnim News Agency, Mohammad Javad Larijani criticizes various groups and provides his narrative of Ahmadinejad's era, mentioning that some were only seeking to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and criticizing its supporters. Javad Larijani states, "There are other groups of friends who were simply looking to damage a part of the JCPOA. Those who work with Mr. Ahmadinejad and the websites close to them are among this group. They speak in a way that surprises me because they, themselves, proposed something worse than the JCPOA in the last years of his presidency." He continues, "Ahmadinejad had suggested giving all enriched materials at once and negotiating

with Obama to resolve the issue! It is clear that this kind of criticism is not constructive and productive." Mohammad Javad Larijani, however, does not provide specific evidence or documents supporting the claim but suggests that there are narratives and accounts of events during Ahmadinejad's presidency. For a more detailed answer to where and when Ahmadinejad pursued this policy, one can refer to the book "Iran and America: Shattered Past and the Path to Peace" written by Hossein Mousavian. The documents and narratives published in this book present a different perspective of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad compared to the public address of the President in year 2006 to George W. Bush, the former President of the United States. In that address, Ahmadinejad wrote, "Individuals with insight can already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems." The book also mentions Barbara Slavin, a prominent Iranian-American journalist, who claimed that Condoleezza Rice, the former U.S. Secretary of State, had told her (less than a year after Ahmadinejad took office), "We constantly hear unpleasant messages from many places, from the United Nations to Baghdad and Kabul, saying that the Iranians want negotiations." The author refers to conversations with a former member of his "Level Two Contact Group" in other parts of the book, stating that he had told this former Iranian diplomat, "Iran has, through its ambassador at the United Nations, asked the U.S. State Department for the introduction of a representative for new and comprehensive negotiations." This conversation is attributed to the January 2011. Two months later, in March 2011, another American official disclosed additional details about Iran's desire for renewed talks. (Please note that this information is based on the narrative provided by Mohammad Javad Larijani in the book, and specific details or corroborating evidence may not be explicitly mentioned in the available text.) The American official stated, "The United States repeatedly receives messages from Rahim Mashaei that, Tehran is eager for negotiations and establishing relations with America." Mosavian also quotes the diplomat, saying, "The Ahmadinejad's government sends messages to the United States, and the channels through which these messages sent to United States are so numerous that we don't know which one to choose. We are genuinely confused because we don't know whether these messages have the support and backing of Ayatollah Khamenei or not; we can't respond to them." Another member of the "Level Two Contact Group" told Mosavian, "I have met with Mashaei eight times before, in all our meetings, he told me that Iran is in the mood for talks and establishing relations with the United States." These efforts continued until year 2012. An American member of the "Level Two Contact Group" talked to Mosavian in year 2012, about efforts by Rahim Mashaei to open the door to direct negotiations with the United States. According to this information, one of Iran's ambassadors in Europe informed a member of the "Level Two Contact Group," who was also a member of the U.S. government, that

"everything is ready on Iran's side, and Mashaei and Samareh Hashemi for participating in this meeting, which will be held in Berlin, are coming. (These details provide insights into the behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts and signals related to potential negotiations between Iran and the United States during this period). Another account, parallel to the narratives of Mosavian and other opposition figures, highlights Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's efforts to establish relations with the United States. Mohammad Al-Baradei, in his memoir, titles this account as follows: "In year 2009, Ahmadinejad, through a letter, expressed Iran's readiness for bilateral negotiations with Obama, without preconditions and based on mutual respect." However, Obama, disregarding Ahmadinejad's request to address the Supreme Leader in his letter, conveyed a message implying that he understands Iran's political structure well. However, official documents from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government clearly show two instances of backtracking on the agreement to transfer 20% enriched fuel. The first instance was related to the trilateral agreement with Iran, Turkey, and Brazil. The second instance was during the Almaty 2 negotiations, where Iran was supposed to receive reactor fuel for Tehran in exchange for transferring its enriched uranium to Turkey. The issue of sanctions was also discussed, with a precondition for reducing enrichment levels to over 3.5%. This proposal was left on the negotiating table at that time. Two years ago, in April 9, 2014, the Supreme Leader, indirectly referring to the Tehran agreement with the P5+1 group stated, "At that time, a formula was devised for producing fuel, but the Americans, contrary to what was stated to our friends in the region and in one of the South American countries, and some domestic officials believed, disrupted this process, imagining that they had put Iran in complete distress." The issue of whether some domestic officials believed in promises made by the United States at that time is still a subject of dispute, a dispute that recent statements by Mohammad Javad Larijani could shed light on, potentially providing more clarity and expanding the scope of the discussion.

Sixteen days of negotiations during the 2146 days of Jalili's responsibility

The widening gap in the nuclear challenge between Iran and the West prevented the negotiations from reaching a stage of mutual understanding and a shared motivation to unravel the nuclear deadlock. Jalili conducted nine rounds of talks with the P5+1 group members between the years 2008 and 2013. He engaged in a total of short-term talks (lasting one to two days), with the final negotiations taking place in "Almaty 2" on the 5th and 6th of April 2013. Jalili spent a total of 16 days in negotiations over 71 months, covering 2146 days during his term. In other words, on average, he participated in one negotiation every 238 days. This occurred while, during his tenure, the negotiations experienced significant interruptions. The most

prolonged delay in holding negotiations was 450 days between February 2011 and March 2012. The shortest gap occurred between the negotiations of "Almaty 1" (March 2013) and "Almaty 2" (April 2013), as the final round of talks took place with a 37-day interval, 158 days after the conclusion of the "Almaty 2" talks on September 12, 2013, marking the end of Jalili's mission.

Progress of Iran's nuclear program

During the lengthy nuclear dispute and the decade-long accusations against Iran, with nuclear negotiations repeatedly failing in various stages, Iran achieved significant successes in advancing its nuclear capabilities. The enrichment of uranium to 20%, the production of nuclear fuel plates using precise and sophisticated technology, increasing the stockpile of enriched uranium to over seven thousand kilograms, and ultimately, the production of second-generation centrifuges known as P2, which, in terms of enrichment speed and volume, were several times greater than the old P1 type. The increase in the number of Iran's centrifuges to approximately 19,000 was among the measures taken by Iranian nuclear scientists during the period of highs and lows in the nuclear challenge between Iran and the West. These efforts, however, led to a massive wave of sanctions, compelling Western officials to sit at the negotiating table with Iran.

First nuclear agreement in the Rouhani period

With the inauguration of the eleventh government, Iran's approach to pursuing the nuclear dossier underwent a transformation. In this new approach, Iran, by setting a new red line that focused on continuing enrichment under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and without sanctions, initiated serious negotiations with the countries of the P5+1 group, led by the United States. During this period, the responsibility for the nuclear dossier was transferred from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Zarif, overseeing this dossier from the same first day of undertaking this important mission, designed the approach of the new team in line with the policies announced by the new president and implemented them. The presence of the head of the eleventh government in the United Nations General Assembly, the telephone conversation between Obama and Rouhani, the first meeting with the P5+1 members in New York, and the trilateral talks in Geneva in December 2013, all within less than a hundred days of the eleventh government taking office, led to the Iran nuclear deal with the six major countries, making headlines worldwide. A significant point in this event was that, for the first time, Iran's nuclear rights and enrichment rights were acknowledged by global powers, which had always been referred to as the system's red line in nuclear negotiations. Following the 6-month Geneva Agreement, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group countries began towards achieving a comprehensive and final agreement. In this regard, numerous meetings between Iran and the P5+1 group were held in Vienna to find a comprehensive nuclear solution. After 9 days of expert and diplomatic efforts, the two sides reached an understanding in Lausanne, Switzerland, on the basis of which the final nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group was formed. This understanding brought the Iranian nuclear dossier to a conclusion in Vienna on July 14, 2015, marking the first time both sides were able to reach a common roadmap. Shortly after reaching this agreement, the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council, in an unprecedented event, unanimously adopted Resolution 2231, confirming the Iran nuclear agreement with the P5+1 group and lifting global sanctions against Tehran. This event was the basis for the country, for the first time in the history of the United Nations Security Council, coming under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the approval of the Security Council, but then exiting the scope of this chapter with the adoption of the resolution.

Zarif's negotiations record breaking

Nuclear negotiations, following the delegation of responsibility for pursuit and conduct of the talks to Zarif and his team, gained momentum due to the seriousness of Iran's negotiators and their professional approach during the negotiations.

Deep-rooted Western pessimism towards Iran and its diplomats diminished, and a strong inclination towards negotiations became evident in the increasing number and hours of talks. The new round of negotiations lasted approximately 22 months, with long days and hours devoted to historic negotiations. Finally, the official announcement of the nuclear agreement was made on July 14, 2015, and the issuance of Resolution 2231 confirmed the outcome of the negotiations. During this round of negotiations, diplomatic history witnessed new records. During Zarif's tenure as the head of the nuclear file, which began on August 17, 2013, 52 rounds of negotiations were held over 189 days, both collectively and separately with the P5+1 group countries. Additionally, during this period, the parties set interesting records in the conduct of some negotiation sessions. Among the achievements was the breaking of the record for the longest uninterrupted presence outside their respective capitals by both the Iranian and American foreign ministers. John Kerry during the final stages of the negotiations that led to an agreement between the parties, spent 18 days in Vienna. The negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, began at midnight and continued until the morning of the next day when the Lausanne understanding was announced. The American network "Fox News" described the nuclear negotiations as the "longest negotiations" between Iran and the P5+1 group during which, for at least the past 37 years, senior American diplomats had not spent such a long time with a focused discussion on a specific issue at the negotiation table. As a result of Zarif's negotiations with his American counterpart, it was agreed for the first time to lift all sanctions related to the nuclear program, and even some previous sanctions. In the United Nations, Iran's name was registered as the first country to exit the Chapter 7 provisions of the UN Charter without war or conflict, and by invalidating previous resolutions through the credibility of Security Council member votes.

Official announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United States on the scope of the lifting of sanctions

In April 2016, the Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State acknowledged that providing guidance and consultation to foreign countries and companies regarding the lifting of sanctions and commercial interactions with Iran was part of Washington's responsibilities. Mark Toner, in a press briefing held on April 7, 2016, referred to Secretary of State John Kerry's statement about the

commitment of the United States to its obligations under the JCPOA, especially in financial matters, saying that foreign banks are authorized to engage in transactions with Iran. Toner stated that, just as Iran has adhered to the Iran nuclear agreement, according to the JCPOA, the United States has the responsibility to provide guidance to governments, banks, and foreign companies regarding the scope of lifting sanctions. In response to an Associated Press reporter's question about whether showing the way around the sanctions to foreign companies and governments is also among the duties of the U.S. State Department, Toner mentioned that providing guidance to foreign companies and governments in this regard is part of the United States' efforts to clarify the scope of sanctions relief against Iran following the JCPOA.

Supporting the JCPOA in policy document of American Democratic Party

In July 28, 2016, the "Time" magazine published parts of the official policy document of the Democratic Party of the United States during the party's convention for nominating a presidential candidate for the upcoming election. According to the report, the document outlined the party's positions toward various countries, including Iran and Syria. Regarding Iran, the document expressed support for the nuclear deal, stating, "We support the nuclear deal with Iran because, as it is vigorously enforced and implemented, it verifiably cuts off all of Iran's pathways to a bomb without taking any options off the table." The policy document emphasized disagreement with the views of Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, who advocated for leaving the negotiation table that resulted in the peaceful resolution of Iran's nuclear program. The document stated, "We are opposed to Donald Trump's reckless view on Iran, which calls for tearing up the nuclear deal." This indicates the Democratic Party's stance in favor of the Iran nuclear deal and opposition to Donald Trump's position of abandoning the agreement.

Statements of political deputy office of the U. S. President about the confrontation between Iran and United States in early April, 2017

The challenge between the United States and Iran in the Middle East is theoretically rooted and revolves around the concepts of stability and democracy. The author argues that the U.S. has historically been a supporter of stability, while Iran advocates for democracy. The narrative highlights how the U.S., which has traditionally relied on wealthy Arab nations to maintain stability, is currently facing challenges and unable to meet the needs of Arabs in preserving their regimes. The Riyadh meeting, which shifted paradigms from stability-oriented policies to

democracy opposition, is mentioned as an example. The U.S. is now demanding Iran to confront people and democracy as a means of maintaining stability. The author contends that the fundamental challenge lies in whether armed stability or democracy with stability is more effective. Iran asserts that democracy leads to stability, while the U.S. seeks armed stability. The historical animosity of the U.S. towards people's rule in Iran is emphasized, and it is argued that with increased people's participation in recent elections, democracy in Iran has strengthened. In the recent elections in Iran and the U.S., the author asks which one was more crisis-inducing. He suggests that the U.S. has made the world and peace hopeless and desperate, while people's rule in Iran will endure.

Hamid Baidinejad the Iran's ambassador in England, stated in a new note in the spring of 2017. The article by Hamid Baeidinejad, the Iranian ambassador in UK, discusses the challenges between the United States and Iran in the Middle East. The author explores theoretical and deep-rooted aspects of these challenges. Specifically, it is mentioned that the U.S. is perceived as a supporter of stability in the region, while Iran is seen as a supporter of democracy. According to Baeidinejad's explanations, the U.S., which has traditionally supported stability at the expense of wealthy Arabs, is now facing a failure and cannot meet the needs of the Arabs in preserving their regimes. He points out America's shift in the Riyadh meeting from stability-oriented policies to democracy opposition, stating that the U.S. is now demanding Iran to confront people and democracy on the path to maintaining stability. Baeidinejad believes that the main challenge in the region is whether armed stability or democracy with stability is different. Iran claims that democracy leads to stability, while the U.S. seeks armed stability. He emphasizes the past animosities of the U.S. towards people's rule in Iran and how these animosities affect America's policies and views on democracy in Iran. The author argues that with the increased participation of people in recent elections, democracy in Iran has strengthened, and the people have a more effective role as a governing entity. He concludes that in the recent elections, the crisis-generating challenge was more in the U.S.: "You made the world and peace hopeless and desperate, but people's rule in Iran will remain eternal." This perspective is presented by Hamid Baeidinejad, Iran's ambassador in UK, in a recent note in the spring of 2017, discussing various political aspects of the U.S. Senate's legislation as:

1- My previous note did not seek to answer whether the provisions of this bill violate the JCPOA or not. It is evident that, given the sensitivity and complexity of the matter, proving the compliance or non-compliance of the provisions of this bill with the JCPOA requires meticulous expert examinations conducted under the supervision and guidance of relevant authorities and institutions. These expert

reviews, especially when the sponsoring and drafting senators claim to have removed all potential conflicts with the JCPOA from the bill's text and, in their view, aligned it with America's commitments in the JCPOA, gain more significance. It is obvious that upon completion of expert reviews, the Joint Commission overseeing the implementation of the JCPOA will make the final decision on the compatibility of the new sanctions with the JCPOA.

2- In the current circumstances, the text of the new sanctions is only a bill passed by the U.S. Senate and still needs to go through two stages to become law. First, it must be approved by the U.S. House of Representatives, which, according to what is mentioned in the U.S., may take a few weeks. Second, after the approval of the House of Representatives, it must be signed by the President. Therefore, it is necessary to refrain from any haste in making official statements by legal institutions during these days, and official reactions should be postponed until the legal stages of this bill are completed.

3- For reasons explained in the previous note, the domestic political conditions in the United States have significantly delayed the approval of this bill. The anti-Russia sentiment in America, especially within the U.S. Congress, where senior officials have been summoned to testify about their involvement in the alleged Russian interference in the U.S. elections, has reached its peak. Ultimately, this led to the incorporation of extensive sanctions against Russia, which originally were supposed to be passed under a separate bill, into the same bill containing sanctions against Iran, which was indeed peculiar. In such an atmosphere, the signing of the bill imposing sanctions on Iran, which initially enjoyed full support from the Trump administration, would have been easily signed by Trump. However, now this bill has taken a new turn due to the fact that it will significantly impact U.S.-Russia relations. Consequently, the signing of the bill may face complexities. Although President Trump is currently seriously discussing a veto of this bill, due to the broad support of senators for this bill, they could potentially override Trump's veto with a two-thirds majority vote.

Trump's attack on Iran through the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council channel:

The implementation of the JCPOA is currently under threat from the United States, and U.S. officials have simultaneously initiated extensive negotiations with Arab officials against Iran in the region. The White House announced that the U.S. President has separately held talks with Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, the Crown

Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and Tamim bin Hamad, the Amir of Qatar. During these discussions, the emphasis was placed on the necessity of Arab partners' unity with Washington to counter what was labeled as a threat from Iran. A day before that, Trump, in a joint press conference with the Emir of Kuwait, urged Middle Eastern countries to confront nations like Iran. The regional stance of Trump against Iran was later revealed when Qatar's news agency reported that Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Amir of Qatar, had contacted Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. The agency stated that the Amir of Qatar expressed willingness for negotiations regarding the demands of the four sanctioning Arab countries and that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia welcomed this proposal. Simultaneously, Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, in a joint press conference with Kuwait's Foreign Minister, supported Kuwait's initiative to resolve disputes among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and stated, "The United States and Kuwait emphasize the important role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in confronting regional challenges we all face, including countering the threats from Iran." The U.S. government is currently attempting to unite the Arab countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council against Iran. Previously, Qatar's membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council was threatened due to its efforts to maintain relations with Iran, leading to potential withdrawal from the council and the risk of losing its privileged relationships with other member countries. This incident had widened the rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council over relations and cooperation with Iran, turning it into a serious and undeniable issue, seen as one of the possible reasons for the council's potential collapse. Now, it appears that the U.S. government, observing signs such as Riyadh's silence regarding the appointment of a new Qatari ambassador to Tehran and the willingness of Saudi and Qatari officials to engage in dialogue, is working to exploit these indicators to minimize the differences among Gulf Cooperation Council members and further isolate Tehran in the region.

Trump's claims in Davos against Iran

On January 26, 2018, Donald Trump, the President of the United States, during his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, reiterated his claims about Iran. He stated, "We ask the world to work towards preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. We urge our partners to prevent Iran's support for terrorism and to counteract the destabilizing policies of this country in the region." According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) news agency, Trump claimed that the United States is committed to continuing its fight against terrorism and ISIS, pledging to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

Congress and the White House's dialogue against the JCPOA

The spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, referring to President Trump's recent statement on the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), said, "The President has extended the suspension of Iran's sanctions for another 120 days. This is an opportunity for the government and members of Congress to achieve a law that helps to better enforce Iran's commitment to the nuclear agreement and makes it tougher for Iran." According to the reports on the official website of the U.S. Department of State, Heather Nauert stated, "The discussions between Congress and the government to achieve a law amending the JCPOA have made good progress."

Survival of the JCPOA even with the withdrawal of the United States

After Rouhani's victory in the twelfth presidential election, despite internal opposition from fundamentalist groups, anti-Iran actions continued following the inauguration ceremony. The newly elected US president, Trump, took actions against Iran, announcing in several speeches that he would not remain committed to the JCPOA and would reimpose certain financial sanctions, including targeting some Iranian government entities, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), still active in economic enterprises. Additionally, he banned the entry of Iranian immigrants to the United States. From the spring of 2017, the famous American immigration program known as the lottery rejected Iranian applications, and also Since year 2017, Iranians residing in the US who had left for any reason were also prohibited from returning. This ban faced dissatisfaction and opposition from some US courts and a majority of Congress members. Eventually, Congress approved the return and entry of temporary residents who were temporarily outside the US, including many Iranian students and individuals of Iranian descent. However, citizens of six Middle Eastern countries, including Iranians, were still unable to immigrate to the United States. In the context of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated in the winter of 2018: "If the United States withdraws from the JCPOA but Europe remains committed, Iran will likely adhere to the JCPOA."

The presentation of contrasting proposals by officials close to the White House outlining how the U.S. would exit the nuclear deal has drawn attention to the challenge to the JCPOA. While opponents of the deal within the U.S. have brought it into question, the positions of other 5+1 parties regarding this matter indicate that they are indifferent to Trump's disruptive actions in supporting the JCPOA. The murmurs about the remaining European commitment to their obligations despite the U.S. withdrawal suggest a potential new turning point in the implementation of the

JCPOA, introducing fresh perspectives on the issue. A few days ago, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, emphasized in an interview with the German magazine Spiegel: "Even if the U.S. withdraws from the nuclear deal but the Europeans remain committed, Iran will likely still adhere to it." Salehi considered the consequences of Europe following the U.S. lead as the collapse of the JCPOA and stated that in such a situation, Iran would strive to elevate its nuclear program beyond previous levels. Regardless of Salehi's position, previous speculations on the survival of the JCPOA without the U.S. have gained renewed attention. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued serious warnings to Trump. Several months ago, during her meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Oslo, Mogherini stressed the necessity of preserving the nuclear deal and stated: "Europe will implement the JCPOA with or without the U.S." Mogherini reiterated the European Union's position on preserving the JCPOA during her visit to Tehran to attend President Hassan Rouhani's inauguration ceremony. She asserted Europe's commitment to the nuclear deal, emphasizing that Europe would ensure its implementation. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, echoed this sentiment shortly after, stating that "Europeans will continue the JCPOA under any circumstances, even if the U.S. withdraws." While Zarif did not explicitly reveal Iran's stance in response to such conditions, it was implicit that Iran seeks to consistently work on maintaining and improving its political relations with the European Union. This occurs in the context of the Trump administration proposing unreasonable demands, such as inspecting Iran's military facilities and accusing Iran of supporting terrorism, as part of an attempt to undermine the agreement. Iran remains engaged in efforts to sustain and enhance its political ties with the European Union, despite the challenges posed by Trump's administration and its disruptive claims regarding Iran's compliance with the agreement.

A three-pronged strategy to withdraw from the JCPOA

While many analysts consider it unlikely that Trump would overtly abandon an international multilateral agreement based on a UN Security Council resolution, some informed sources within the U.S. political scene suggest a new White House strategy regarding the JCPOA. Bloomberg, in a report titled "The Art of Renegotiating the Iran Nuclear Deal," outlines three Axis of Trump's strategy: "Issuing Sanctions Waivers for Iran - Declaring Iran's Non-Compliance - Renegotiating the JCPOA." According to this approach, the nuclear deal is placed on a spectrum between "canceling the JCPOA" and preserving it. Although Trump's move to declare Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA does not eliminate the

nuclear deal, observers argue that the responsibility for maintaining or violating the JCPOA falls on Congress. Henceforth, Congress must choose between re-imposing sanctions or not. Crafting such a strategy comes at a time when Trump is required to suspend oil and banking sanctions against Iran in a few days, in accordance with the provisions of the JCPOA. He had previously issued these sanctions waivers for Iran in the Month of May, 2017. Bloomberg further claims that Trump will use the opportunity of the UN General Assembly, where many high-ranking officials from various countries will gather in New York, to express his concerns about the JCPOA during meetings with the leaders of France and the UK. The report suggests that the European leaders' positive reception of the proposal for renegotiating the JCPOA may be revealed during these interactions. As two American diplomats have reportedly told Bloomberg, their counterparts in London and Paris have shown signs indicating readiness to consider exerting pressure on Iran to address some of the shortcomings of the JCPOA. Bloomberg has corroborated its claim about Paris and London's inclination toward renegotiating the JCPOA by referring to statements made a few days ago by the French Foreign Ministry spokesperson. According to the spokesperson, quoting the French President, they mentioned, "The nuclear agreement with Iran can be completed through cooperation for the post-2025 period and necessary collaboration regarding ballistic missiles." Although the French official explicitly emphasized that there is no valid substitute for the JCPOA and Paris is not seeking to reopen the JCPOA's file or negotiate it again, the claim of European willingness for renegotiation has prompted France's Ambassador to the United States to reiterate his country's position, emphasizing the need to preserve the JCPOA. Gerard Araud, in response to Bloomberg's report, stated, "France does not support any reopening of the JCPOA file. This agreement should be implemented as it is." He added that any interaction with the JCPOA should be based on its inherent characteristics, and discussions on other aspects of Iran's foreign policy outside the JCPOA are possible.

Chapter 10

New US sanctions against Iran

The subject of the report by Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat, is as follows:

John Bolton, the National Security Advisor of the United States, who currently plays a key role in the Iran issue at the White House, presented a plan last year for "U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA" and implementing a "regime change policy" to Trump and the National Security Council. This plan includes key strategies on how the U.S. should unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA, collaboration and cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia, intense diplomatic efforts against Europe, and necessary actions for regime change in Iran. Some of the anticipated operational actions in this plan are as follows:

The reported subject by Mousavian outlines the following:

1. Imposing a broad spectrum of new sanctions.
2. Centralizing the missile issue, terrorism, and Iran's role in the region.
3. Engaging in talks with Israel for military operations against Iran.
4. Collaborating with Gulf Arab countries to counter Iran's regional role.
5. Launching an extensive propaganda campaign on Iran's violation of the spirit and letter of the JCPOA.
6. Diplomatic activities involving U.S. embassies abroad against Iran.
7. Developing a comprehensive plan to guide public opinion in the U.S. and globally.
8. A dual tactic of applying pressure and then supporting dialogue with Russia and China to limit Iran's regional role.
9. Compiling a complete list of foreign companies operating in Iran and planning actions to cut their ties with Iran.
10. Broad dialogue with members of Congress to involve them in new anti-Iran actions.
11. Restricting the role of Iranians, including entry to the U.S., through visa suspension, including academic and scientific visas.
12. Activating U.S. judicial authorities to issue judgments blocking Iranian assets.
13. Supporting Kurds and independence-seeking Arab groups.

- 14.Exposing economic activities of IRGC commanders and other Iranian figures.
- 15.Supporting protests by students, workers, women, and anti-revolutionary groups inside Iran. The actions of Mr. Trump's administration over the past year align precisely with operationalizing these focal points.

The discussion on each of the mentioned axes in this note is not feasible; however, three points are highlighted:

1-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's speech to Iranian-Americans in Los Angeles and the allegation of financial corruption by Iranian officials, including specific individuals, is part of the "companion and restricting scenario" targeting Iranian-Americans with dual citizenship residing in the U.S. A few months ago, unidentified forces raided the office of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), seizing documents, records, and computers. Shortly afterward, Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi, two key directors of this council who had written numerous articles against the scenario of war and sanctions on Iran and in defense of the JCPOA, resigned from their positions. The NIAC had been heavily pressured by Zionist circles, the opposition, and American neoconservatives, despite receiving minimal support or attention from Iran. It is said that the unknown forces that raided the NIAC office were from the same Blackwater company, which, on the orders of Mohammed bin Salman, detained and subjected dozens of Saudi princes to imprisonment and torture in the Ritz-Carlton hotel.

2- John Bolton, in his plan, wanted the U.S. to release information about Iran's continued pursuit of building a nuclear bomb before formally announcing the withdrawal from the JCPOA. We witnessed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a widely broadcast press conference, claimed that the Israeli foreign intelligence service Mossad had obtained one hundred thousand documents, photos, and evidence of Iran's nuclear program, proving that Iran is still seeking to build a nuclear bomb. A few days later, Trump officially announced the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, citing Netanyahu's allegations in his speech. It becomes evident that U.S. intelligence agencies did not bear the burden of presenting such claims, and Netanyahu took the initiative himself.

3- Regarding negotiations with Iran, John Bolton stated in his plan: "After Iran's withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. government must raise the slogan of negotiations with Iran because the Iranians will no longer negotiate with the U.S. Therefore, this possibility will be given to the U.S. to use this scenario as evidence of Iran's bad intentions to pursue a nuclear bomb program. When Trump proposed unconditional negotiations with Iran a few days ago, I had no doubt that Iran would reject it. Therefore, in an article published in the Etemad newspaper titled 'If I Were

Rouhani,' I wrote that the president should offer Trump a trip to Tehran in response. Some inside the country were surprised by my proposal, some considered it satire, and some wrote to me, saying that in recent interviews, I emphasized my opposition to negotiations with the U.S. under the current circumstances, so what changed in your opinion now?"

I have previously explained my five reasons for the impracticality of negotiations under current conditions, and I do not intend to repeat them. However, to me, it was evident that Trump's insistence on readiness for talks with Tehran is part of a pre-designed White House public diplomacy scenario against Iran. It is better for Iran to thwart this scenario by proposing Trump's visit to Tehran. However, since Mr. Trump is an unpredictable figure, he may respond positively to Iran's offer for a visit to Tehran. In that case, the Israel lobby, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. neoconservatives will be prevented by launching a political earthquake in the United States. In any case, the ball will remain in Washington's court. We saw that after Iran rejected Trump's offer for "unconditional talks with Iran," within three days, Trump again raised the proposal for talks with Tehran, and Tel Aviv and Riyadh remained silent. I hope Tehran understands the situation. Now, the first part of U.S. sanctions includes buying and selling banknotes or documents based on the dollar, buying and selling precious metals and raw materials, opening rial accounts abroad, foreign finance, buying foreign securities, and purchasing aircraft and automotive components. The second part of sanctions in the energy sector will begin in the next three months. Trump may express readiness for negotiations with Iran multiple times, and after a while, suspend the proposal again. This allows him to present Tehran as the culprit simultaneously with increasing pressures and sanctions while portraying himself as a man of peace and dialogue in the global public opinion and domestic Iranian public opinion.

By carefully examining the practical actions of the United States over the past year, adopting effective measures, particularly in five vital axes, is now crucial for Tehran:

1. Minimizing the impact of new sanctions.
2. Addressing internal issues (economic instability, unemployment, corruption, inflation, the collapse of the national currency's value, high prices, etc.).
3. Focused and effective diplomacy.
4. Public awareness on a global scale.
5. Neutralizing anti-Iranian lobbies in the United States and the West.

Achieving these goals requires a correct understanding of domestic, regional, and global conditions, followed by a comprehensive yet pragmatic plan with national

will, cohesion, and coordination. Unfortunately, there seems to be little evidence of such efforts in the current circumstances.

Simultaneously with the start of U.S. sanctions against Iran, Europe implements the sanctions blocking law from August 8, 2018

United States has officially reimposed the first part of the nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, as per the nuclear agreement. The White House released a picture of the President signing the executive order to reinstate nuclear sanctions on Iran, along with his statement on the matter. In the statement, Trump mentioned that, starting from August 7, 2018, sanctions on Iran's automotive industry, gold, and the Iranian rial would be implemented. He emphasized monitoring the financial transactions of other countries with Iran and warned individuals or entities not reducing their dealings with Iran would face severe consequences. The President stated, "While we are reimposing maximum economic pressure, I remain open to reaching a more comprehensive deal with Iran. As part of this, the United States is targeting Iran's automotive industry, aerospace sector, and precious metals in the first step, with plans to impose sanctions on Iran's oil sales in November 2018. Donald Trump, the President of the United States, gave other countries between 90 to 180 days to comply with the sanctions after withdrawing from the nuclear deal in May 2018. As the United States resumed nuclear sanctions, the expected breach of promise by America occurred. European Union member countries, in a statement, expressed their objection to the anti-Iranian measures taken by the U.S., reinstating sanctions. The EU officials announced the activation of the Blocking Statute to counter the extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the U.S. and to maintain communication channels for trade between Iran and Europe. The Blocking Statute was enacted by European countries in year 1996 to safeguard European trade with Cuba and China, and now it is being pursued as a serious and effective solution by European countries. However, Europeans are trying to protect the Iran nuclear deal, while U.S. officials express their determination to enforce sanctions against Iran rigorously and effectively. While European officials negotiate individually with Tehran's trading partners to persuade them not to back away from economic dealings due to U.S. sanctions, Americans are conducting a psychological warfare against Tehran with contradictory positions.

European protest against the return of sanctions

Federica Mogherini, the head of foreign policy for the European Union, along with Jean-Yves Le Drian, Heiko Maas, and Jeremy Hunt, the foreign ministers of France,

Germany, and the UK, respectively, expressed deep regret in a joint statement over the reinstatement of US sanctions against Iran. They emphasized that the EU and other signatories of the nuclear deal are working to maintain investment channels in Iran and continue the export of oil and gas. European officials, in their released statement, committed themselves to protecting European economic operators based on EU laws and UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Europeans also highlighted the updating of restrictive regulations aimed at protecting European companies involved in trade with Iran as constructive solutions against US extraterritorial sanctions. The EU's efforts to operationalize measures to safeguard the Iran nuclear deal come at a time when the German Ministry of Economy announced that Germany will continue to provide guarantees for investment and exports to Iranian partner companies despite US sanctions. The German Ministry of Economy stated that it is negotiating the possibility of exemptions for German companies from U.S. sanctions. The ministry's statement reads as: "Export and investment guarantees from the Ministry of Economy are still available to companies." The limitations imposed by the United States also include secondary sanctions, punishing foreign companies engaging in transactions with Iran. Simultaneously, Natalie Tocci, a special advisor on foreign policy for the European Union, welcomed China's opposition to the U.S. request to cut oil imports from Iran in a tweet. She referred to this move as an effective step to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. China, as the world's largest oil buyer and the first importer of oil from Iran, had previously declared its opposition to unilateral sanctions against Iran. In July 2018, Beijing increased its oil purchases from Iran from 26% to 35%. Despite European support for the Iran nuclear deal, Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, considered the reinstatement of these sanctions as a tool to counter Tehran's approach and claimed that the United States intends to precisely enforce these sanctions.

Blocking provisions and the hope of preserving the

Activating laws blocking sanctions is a strategy that Europeans are using to prevent the realization of America's demands against Iran. This plan creates a barrier against a law imposed by a foreign entity and is widely seen as an attempt to exert pressure on Washington, ensuring that European companies engaging in trade with other countries are not penalized under the pretext of U.S. sanctions. The origin of such regulations dates back to a time when the United States used secondary sanctions as a tool to pressure certain governments, including China and Cuba. In 1996, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions against Cuba, compelling other countries to adhere to the U.S. sanctions, refrain from trade and financial dealings with Cuba, and abide by the imposed sanctions. European countries, concerned about their legitimate trade interests with Cuba and other nations, argued that the U.S. punitive sanctions were

disrupting Europe's commercial relations and challenging the political and diplomatic independence of these countries in pursuit of their foreign policy interests. It was during this period that Europe adopted and implemented blocking regulations. These regulations were created as a response to the US secondary sanctions against Cuba and allowed European companies to continue their trade relations with Cuba without fear of legal repercussions from the US. European countries have now activated these regulations with the aim of preserving the Iran nuclear deal and protecting the financial transactions between European and Iranian economic entities.

What sanctions did America return?

The reimposed sanctions following the violation of the nuclear agreement by the United States include measures related to gold, automobile manufacturing, and the use of the dollar. These sanctions, outlined in the "INARA" law, exemptions under other US laws, executive orders by US presidents, and the text of the JCPOA, encompass various aspects. The activated sanctions include:

1. The buying and selling of banknotes or documents based on the US dollar by the Iranian government.
2. The buying and selling of gold and other precious metals, as well as the purchase, supply, or transfer of metals such as graphite.
3. Raw or semi-processed metals like aluminum and iron, coal, and software used by Iranian industries.
4. Opening rial accounts abroad and engaging in significant rial transactions.
5. Foreign financing and buying government-issued securities by the Iranian government.
6. Iranian automotive industry.
7. The buying and selling and supplying aircraft parts.
8. Carpets and food products produced in Iran.

The next phase of sanctions, scheduled for November 4, 2018, included dealings with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors, transactions related to Iran's oil with the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and the Iranian Oil Company. It also involved financial institutions' dealings with the Central Bank of Iran and other specified financial institutions, offering underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance for transactions with Iran, and the energy sector.

Effects and consequences of Iran's complaint against America

According to the theory of Aghaie, a university professor and expert in international law, in August 8, 2018, Iran filed a complaint against the United States with the International Court of Justice, the primary judicial organ of the United Nations, as the main legal forum for disputes between states. The subject of this complaint is the violation of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (referred to as the 1955 Treaty) signed by representatives of both parties on August 15, 1955. This complaint was initiated following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018. In this complaint, Iran asserts that the U.S. by imposing a series of sanctions and restrictions directly and indirectly against Iran, its companies and citizens, has violated the provisions of the 1955 Treaty, which the U.S. had previously agreed to preserve by removing those measures within the framework of the JCPOA. Iran argues that the U.S. should immediately cease the sanctions imposed since May 8, 2018, and refrain from its threats to implement new sanctions, as detailed in this complaint. Additionally, in this complaint, it is emphasized that "the United States must ensure that no action will be taken to circumvent the decisions of the court in this case and guarantee not to repeat the violation of the 1955 Treaty. Moreover, the United States must fully compensate for the damages due to its violation of international legal commitments towards Iran, and the amount of damages will be determined by the court." Iran also reserves the right to assess the damages incurred by the U.S. for the breach of commitments and present it to the court at the appropriate time. Iran refers to Article 21, Paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty, which states: "In case of a dispute between the parties to the Treaty regarding the interpretation or execution of this Treaty of Amity, if the dispute cannot be resolved through diplomatic means, the matter shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree on the use of other peaceful means of dispute resolution." On the same day of filing this complaint, Iran submitted another request outlining provisional measures to protect its rights under the 1955 Treaty, until the International Court of Justice issues its judgment.

Following Iran's filing of the complaint, which also mentioned the necessity of provisional measures, the President of the International Court of Justice, in a letter addressed to the U.S. Secretary of State, specified the time for addressing Iran's complaint regarding the unilateral reimposition of sanctions. The President emphasized that the White House should refrain from any new actions. Regarding the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court, it should be noted that the

Statute of the Court emphasizes that, the parties, especially the condemned state, are obligated to enforce the court's judgment. It is also stipulated that if the condemned state fails to implement the judgment, the state in whose favor the judgment is issued can complain to the UN Security Council, and the Council's decision in such a situation will guarantee the enforcement of the court's judgment in the secondary phase. As for Iran's complaint against the United States and whether Iran expects its demands to be met as outlined in the complaint, it is undoubtedly desirable for Iran to seek its demands as stated in the complaint. However, beyond material interests and specific demands, there are psychological and publicity effects that may be left by this complaint and possibly the expected judgment. In fact, Iran, in filing this complaint and resorting to the legal mechanism of the International Court of Justice, sought to pretend that it is committed to observing legal norms and standards. It is the United States that, despite its continuous claims of seeking compliance with international regulations and urging others to adhere to these laws, has acted contrary to international rules and regulations. In reality, Iran is seeking to shift the management of psychological pressure to the decision-making arenas in the United States before expecting a fair judgment to be issued and implemented by the United States.

Decision of Hague International Court President regarding Iran's complaint
against America

Mehr media report dated on October 3,2018 is as below:

According to the provisions of the Friendship Treaty between Iran and the United States, in case of a disagreement between the parties that cannot be resolved diplomatically, they can refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Based on several clauses of the treaty, the parties are prohibited from imposing trade and financial restrictions on each other. Therefore, some actions taken by the United States, such as revoking licenses for commercial transactions with Iran and imposing restrictions on the transfer of goods to Iran, may be in contradiction with certain provisions of the treaty. The court believes that it has the jurisdiction to handle this case. The United States' decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement and revive some of the restrictions, including canceling licenses for imports from Iran and financial transactions with the country, may limit some of Iran's rights under the Friendship Treaty. The court believes that a portion of the rights requested by Iran based on the Friendship Treaty and Iran's interim measures request from the United States, especially regarding trade freedom and human, civil, and aviation rights, are relevant. As Iran argues, sanctions can lead to "irreparable

harm," and temporary measures should be taken. The court agrees that these sanctions, particularly in the pharmaceutical, food, aviation, and agricultural sectors, can result in irreparable harm. The verbal assurances from the United States that it seeks to minimize the humanitarian impact of sanctions are deemed "insufficient," and the court believes there is still a risk of such negative effects.

External evaluation of the effect of the new sanctions in the Autumn of 2018

The International Institute of Finance (IIF) has predicted the trajectory of key macroeconomic variables in Iran for the next three years, focusing on the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions in a report. According to the report, "oil exports" are the first variable directly affected by the sanctions that will penetrate the real economic variables. Despite the expected reduction in oil exports in the next two years, the intensity of its impact is not significant enough to bring the economic growth rate to near zero. The IIF anticipates an average reduction of around 300,000 barrels per day in Iran's oil exports in year 2018. Despite the decline in oil exports, an economic growth rate of about 1.1% is projected for the year 2018. This means that positive growth in the non-oil sector will outweigh the negative growth in the oil sector, maintaining economic growth in positive territory. According to the report, an increase in the growth of the non-oil sector in year 2019 will lead to an economic growth rate of approximately 5.1% in that year. Regarding nominal variables, IIF's predictions indicate that the impact of sanctions will cease in the coming years. Based on the report, a 50% increase in the exchange rate in the summer months of 2018 and its continued upward trend will result in an inflation rate of around 17% in the fall of 2018. However, the reduction in nominal sector vulnerability will lead to an estimated inflation rate of 15% in 2019.

List of biggest U.S. sanctions against Iran was announced

On November 5, 2018, Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, emphasized in a press conference that the new sanctions against Iran are "the toughest ever" and stated that they target Iran's oil industry, banking system, and finances. This list includes sanctions on dozens of banks, insurance companies, oil and gas companies, petrochemical companies, shipping companies, and Iran Air airline, along with numerous aircraft of this company, as well as a large number of individuals. In this press conference held in Washington, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin was also present. He emphasized that "today's sanctions will give more impetus to the collapse of Iran's economy." Pompeo stated that the Iranian government must "change its position 180 degrees."

The U.S. Secretary of State emphasized that, this is part of the United States' maximum pressure efforts against the "biggest sponsor of terrorism" in the world and added that "we are putting back hundreds of individuals and groups that were removed from sanctions because of the JCPOA." Pompeo also tweeted in Persian that the sanctions do not include "food, agricultural products, medicine, and medical equipment." In a list published by the U.S. Treasury Department detailing sanctions against Iran, the name of the airline of the Islamic Republic (Iran Air) is notable. Over 60 aircraft belonging to Iran Air, with specific details including serial numbers, are mentioned in the sanctions list. Additionally, the names of dozens of banks, including almost all active banks in Iran, can be found in the U.S. Treasury Department's list. National, Sepah , Tejarat, Mellat, and Keshavarzi banks are among the sanctioned banks. In another part of his remarks, the U.S. Secretary of State, referring to the arrest of an individual suspected of planning an assassination plot in Denmark, stated, "Iran must either stop these behaviors or its economy will be destroyed." The U.S. Secretary of State mentioned that Iran's behavior in the region has changed since the signing of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA). He stated that the United States wants Iran to change its behavior to continue its actions.

Demands of the U.S. Secretary of State are given below

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a total of 12 US demands from Iran

(1) Shutting down heavy water reactors, stopping enrichment and not resuming plutonium reprocessing

(2) Allowing free access to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit all sites [points of Iran

(3) Announcing the list of all military aspects of your nuclear program to the Agency

(4) Stopping the development and launch of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads

5) The release of all American citizens imprisoned in Iran

jihad

Islamic economic (6) Stop supporting Hezbollah, Hamas.

(7) withdrawal of all forces under the command of Iran from Syria

(8) Respecting the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and supporting the disarmament and dissolution of the Hashd al-Shaabi forces

(9) Stopping military support for Houthi militias and cooperation towards a political solution in Yemen

(10) Ending support for the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and the region

(11) Stopping the support of the Quds Force from "terrorists" and its paramilitary partners

(12) Stop threatening behavior against your neighbors. (Many of them are US allies, including

The threat is to destroy Israel and shoot its missiles at Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Names of foreign companies that remain in Iran or leave Iran after the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA can be seen in the table below.

He has not declared a position in the new situation	The company's stay in Iran is conditional or likely to stay	After the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, it will leave Iran	After the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, it will remain in Iran	Activity	Company
	✓			Oil and Gas	Total
✓				Oil and Gas	loose
✓				Oil and Gas	Daewoo South Korea
✓				Oil and Gas	Aker Solutions Norway
			✓	Oil and Gas	Oam V Austria
✓				Oil and Gas	Saipem Italy
		✓		Oil and Gas	basf winter shawl
		✓		Oil and Gas	Annie Italy
✓				Oil and Gas	Oil and Natural Gas Company of India
✓				Oil and Gas	Zarubzhneft Russia
	✓			Oil and Gas	Pertamina Indonesia
		✓		Oil and Gas	Inpex Japan
		✓		Transportation	AP Mueller Matersk
		✓		an airline	Boeing
		✓		an airline	Airbus
	✓			an airline	ETR
✓				an airline	Lufthansa
		✓		Railroad	Siemens
			✓	automobile manufacturing	Peugeot Citroen (PSA)
✓				automobile manufacturing	Volkswagen
	✓			automobile manufacturing	Renault
✓				automobile manufacturing	Mercedes Benz trucks
✓				automobile manufacturing	Autonomy
✓				renewable energy	Saga Energy
			✓	legal	Jid
			✓	Oil and Gas	CMPCA China
			✓	legal	France's double
			✓	Startup	German racket
✓				Railroad	Alstom
✓				Mineral	Autotech

National Resistance Council of Iran

The National Resistance Council of Iran had announced that, Iran is constructing a new underground nuclear facility. During a session of the National Resistance Council of Iran, it was revealed that two sites, "Sorkheh Hesar" in Tehran and "Marivan" in Abadeh, were involved in activities for the "production of nuclear weapons," and these sites were under the control of the organization called "Sepand," also known as the Organization of New Defense Technologies Research. The political branch of the People's Mujahedin Organization had previously stated in 2013 that the military activities related to the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic were entrusted to Sepand, and it was led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. However, Iran rejected the claim of the 'National Resistance Council' regarding covert atomic activities. In year 2018, the organization also declared that Fakhrizadeh had traveled to North Korea in 2013 to participate in the country's third nuclear test. The location of Fakhrizadeh's assassination is near some of Iran's atomic and military sites. In 2018, the Prime Minister of Israel mentioned him by name, saying, "Remember his name."

Netanyahu announced: We have obtained thousands of pages of secret information from Iran's nuclear program

Benjamin Netanyahu, in his statements on April 30, 2018, mentioned 55,000 pages and 55,000 digital files containing information related to Iran's military nuclear program, including a project called "Amad" for the production of nuclear weapons. He identified Mohsen Fakhrizadeh as one of the key figures in this project. Two months prior to Netanyahu's statements, the Iranian newspaper Javan, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had published an article titled "Amad, the Code Name of Accusations Against Iran's Missile Program." The article hinted that these documents could be used in the new round of pressures as evidence of Iran's efforts to equip ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. This suggested that Israel saw Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's activities as simultaneous in the missile and nuclear fields. In year 2019, the U.S. State Department expressed concern about the renewed activities of Iranian atomic scientists, who, according to the department, were active in the "production of nuclear weapons" program before 2004. It was stated that these individuals had been reassigned to other organizations under the leadership of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. In addition, The Wall Street Journal reported

that, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh had once again resumed his activities by establishing a nuclear research center.

Covert nuclear activities and more pressure on Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency had announced that Mohsen Fakhrizadeh had established a clandestine center called the "Defense Research and Innovation Organization" on Mojdeh Street in northern Tehran. Fakhrizadeh was among the Iranian officials sanctioned in UN Security Council Resolution No.1737, and according to this resolution, the "**7th of Tir**" facility is associated with the Iranian Defense Industries Organization and is directly linked to the nuclear program.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was known as one of the key figures in Iran's nuclear program, and the International Atomic Energy Agency had attempted to interview him, but Iran rejected such requests. The IAEA had also expressed concern about the disclosure of the names of Iranian nuclear scientists. Until the time of the assassination, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh refrained from public appearances in Iranian media, and his name was not openly discussed in the Iranian media space. He held the position of the head of the Research and Innovation Organization of the Ministry of Defense in Iran and played a role in the country's military and defense research activities. The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh occurred on November 27, 2020, and Iranian authorities accused Israel of the incident, vowing retaliation.

Chapter 11

Fate of negotiations to revive the JCPOA in Raisi government

The negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, have been on hold for a while. Some argue that efforts to revive the JCPOA should be abandoned, while many believe that, the future government will enter the negotiation arena with greater strength and achieve a better agreement. With the advent of the Biden administration, hopes for the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were rekindled. From the very beginning of the Biden administration, signals of readiness were sent from Tehran to the new officials in the White House. President Rouhani's perception was that he could capitalize on the time remaining and leave a legacy of sanctions relief for himself. However, Foreign Minister Zarif's final report to the parliament on the JCPOA showed that the negotiations for reviving the agreement in this administration were not yielding results, and one would have to wait for the incoming government of President Ebrahim Raisi to take action.

Three strategies regarding the follow-up of negotiations to revive the JCPOA

The political statements from both sides indicate that there are three possible strategies regarding the future government's approach to the JCPOA.

First, immediately after the inauguration of the new president, the negotiating team will resume its activities. Bakshayesh Ardestani told Farda Group in this regard as "The revival of the JCPOA will take place in Raisi's government, and Araghchi's team, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will pursue it."

Second, there is a temporary delay in Vienna negotiations until the complete establishment of the Iran's thirteenth government. This approach is mostly attributed to the Western perspective. Naser Imani mentioned, "The Western side says, we will wait for the future government of Iran to come into action and hear the opinions because it is possible that, they may not agree with some of the achieved agreements, and we have to sit down and negotiate from the beginning."

Third, keep the Vienna negotiations at the current level for an uncertain future. This perspective gained more prominence when Ayatollah Alamolhoda stated, "We thank the parliament for breaking the evil of the JCPOA." In fact, such statements suggest that, the government of Ebrahim Raisi may not have the intention to revive the JCPOA.

Viewpoint of Raisi's government on the fate of JCPOA

In the presidential election, Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi took a transparent position on the JCPOA and considered his government committed to implementing the provisions of this agreement. This clear message was directed towards the Western side and of course, some serious opponents of the JCPOA domestically, who hoped that, "with the arrival of Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi, the JCPOA issue would be entirely rejected." Mansour Haghighatpour, in an interview with a "Farda" reporter regarding Raisi's government's stance on reviving the JCPOA, said: Pursuing the JCPOA has not been without the will of the system so far. The logical and correct approach is for the negotiations to come to a conclusion. Of course, if the Americans accept that, they will no longer withdraw from the JCPOA. He added: If the Americans return to the JCPOA, the Iranian authorities have also stated that, we will return to the implementation of JCPOA commitments. But if the Americans do not return, it's a different matter. Raisi has also announced that, and I believe his government will firmly stand for the implementation of the JCPOA. Other parties involved in the JCPOA should also be asked to express the necessary commitment to prevent the Americans from escaping. This foreign policy expert stated: The JCPOA and nuclear negotiations were conducted to secure national interests. Surely, Raisi will examine this issue. If the opposing party commits to staying in the agreement and implementing the JCPOA, undoubtedly, Raisi's government will not abandon the JCPOA and will continue its implementation, from the overall statements, it appears that the key point in the revival of the JCPOA is the safeguarding of national interests. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will follow the negotiations, the 18-year history of nuclear negotiations shows that the Supreme National Security Council is the authority that makes decisions in this area. These decisions are made independently of political inclinations and the preferences of the incumbent government. Ghasem MohebAli a reformist activist and former diplomat stated in an interview with Arman newspaper: "Before and after the presidential elections, the country was in a special and critical situation. That is why the new government when it took office was not familiar with the country's management realities and perhaps they thought there might be other solutions besides the JCPOA and negotiations. However, as more time passed in the government and the realities became more

apparent to the officials, they ultimately concluded that there is no other solution besides the JCPOA and it is better to move in this direction." Moheba Ali continued: "Raisi has come to the conclusion that, with the JCPOA, he can overcome significant challenges and problems in the country and operate in an environment where the government will have more opportunities... This is while initially, when the government was formed, many members of the thirteenth government, including opponents and critics of the JCPOA, did not have such a perception." In another part of the interview, this former diplomat stated: "If all sanctions are supposed to be lifted, negotiations and dialogue should also take place on other issues... The JCPOA reached in 2015 was agreed upon for eight years and naturally ends in 2023. Therefore, there is a possibility that in future negotiations, the future of the JCPOA will also be discussed."

Motahari's allusion to the JCPOA negotiations of the Raisi 's government

Ali Motahari," the representative of Tehran in the tenth parliament, said: In my opinion, if we relieve the pressure on the people and build a strong economic foundation in society, we can better achieve the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, including the goal of Palestinian liberation. Ali Motahari, the former deputy speaker of the parliament who has always been a serious follower of the developments related to the JCPOA, examined the situation and challenges of the final agreement, as follows:

Why have the negotiations to revive the JCPOA reached an impasse? In my opinion, there has been procrastination in decision-making by both Iran and the United States, over time, the JCPOA has somewhat lost its effectiveness for both parties. If the agreement had been reached in February 2021, when the grounds for an agreement were provided, it would have been beneficial for both sides. If we had agreed and then allowed American companies to enter the competition in the Iranian market, the foundations of the JCPOA would have been solid, and the likelihood of the United States withdrawing from the JCPOA would have been very low. However, both sides lost time, and now they have reached a point where both feel that they are not achieving their goals with this agreement.

Objective result of theatrical politics

Opponents of negotiations with the United States, in defending their foreign policy stance, attribute recent developments such as Iran's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the revival of relations with Saudi Arabia, increased oil sales, and increased non-oil exports to the abandonment of the JCPOA and

adherence to FATF international standards. They consider these changes as refuting the theories of those who believed that none of these events could occur without the JCPOA and compliance with FATF standards. Although the common ground among many supporters of this movement is opposition to negotiations with the United States, they have exaggerated recent developments, which have actually not been influenced by Iran, to the point that they have no clear answer to these two questions: Firstly, if a breakthrough in foreign policy and abandoning the wall of sanctions has happened as easily as they claim, why is the revival of the JCPOA still the primary issue of governance, and a significant portion of the attention and capacity of relevant foreign policy institutions is focused on this matter? Secondly, what has been the tangible outcome of the policy of breaking the sanctions, joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and improving relations with both distant and neighboring countries in the economic situation of the people? Regardless of the fact that membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was contingent on the cancellation of Security Council sanctions, Iran's share of its \$3 trillion market does not even reach half a percent. On the other hand, the inevitable result of the sanctions that the government claims to have circumvented but, due to banking sanctions, has been unable to bring the money into the country, is the entry of ("Tahator") offset into the country's economic literature, which is a worrying regression. This is despite the fact that most international trade transactions are based on principles that are followed in all financial relationships worldwide. The non-membership of Iran in FATF, in addition to increasing transaction costs, has led to a lack of transparency in transactions and a reduction in commercial capacities. The tangible result of this showy policy has been the further spread of poverty and the impoverishment of a larger segment of society, placing the concern of "bread" at the forefront of people's ordinary lives and the cycle of their livelihoods. However, opponents of negotiations continue to speak of imaginary achievements and attribute all problems to sanctions and the West's hostility, indicating that they are either unaware of the realities of society or interpret events in the desired context of the past. From their perspective, anyone who mentions a bit of the real conditions and obstacles to achieving ideal conditions during negotiations is immediately labeled as a compromising or appeasing figure, especially if the opposite point of negotiation is war. However, it seems that the same conditions that forced the government to keep its diplomats away from the media for indirect talks with their American counterparts have now made sitting around a table and opening the door to comprehensive talks between Tehran and Washington more necessary than ever. It is enough for policymakers to prevent an extremist minority from deciding the fate of all people and lift the heavy shadow of a decades-long crisis between Iran and the United State

It is a difficult task for government to be the leader in the JCPOA debate

According to IRNA, the Islamic Republic News Agency: The suspension of negotiations by Iran and its postponement to the Raisi government is undoubtedly based on a higher interest than the interests of Raisi's government and his team, and expediency is the government wants to gain more concessions from the opposing parties in the current period. The ISNA news agency discussed the matter with Rahman Qahremanpour, an international affairs expert. Qahremanpour stated that the Americans, contrary to expectations are not willing to give us excessive concessions. It has been said that even during the Obama era, the JCPOA was not implemented in good faith. He added that relations between Iran and the United States are plagued by distrust. Those who wonder why all sanctions are not lifted should ask why discussions on all issues between Iran and the United States are not allowed. Therefore, the first reason is that the United States will not and does not intend to give the concessions some expect internally. Secondly, there is no consensus inside the country about the essence of the negotiation. Although the report does not articulate this well, it implies that there is no unanimity on the subject of the negotiations within the country, and this lack of agreement is another reason that no agreement has been reached so far. This international affairs expert discussed analyses suggesting that Iran's increase in uranium reserves and nuclear advancements has complicated negotiations. He acknowledged the reality of Iran's efforts to expand its nuclear industry, especially after canceling its JCPOA commitments in response to European parties. However, it remains uncertain whether insisting on gaining more concessions will lead to positive developments or erode the negotiation process. Regarding the conservative viewpoint that, the U.S. is unwilling to lift Trump-era sanctions, Qahremanpour argued that the primary reason for the negotiation impasse is the U.S. desire to ensure that talks extend to regional issues. This approach would allow the Biden administration to defend the negotiations domestically against Republicans while engaging Iran on broader regional concerns. However, the expert emphasized that the U.S. needs to demonstrate goodwill now rather than making promises for the future. The core of the issue, according to Qahremanpour, is America's reluctance to grant concessions, and the lack of internal consensus within Iran on the negotiation's essence is another reason for the deadlock. It appears that both Iran and the U.S. have concluded that concessions are unlikely from the other side. Iran might seek to pressure the U.S. by enhancing its nuclear capabilities, aiming for more concessions. Accepting one to two-month delay in negotiations doesn't necessarily mean conceding; instead, Iran seeks immediate gains. The strategic importance of the JCPOA has diminished for both Iran and the U.S. since 2014, making the multifaceted nuclear issue more complex to resolve. The current Iranian administration, led by Raisi, acknowledges

this complexity. It is believed that Raisi's government would have preferred Rouhani's administration to reach an agreement to return to the JCPOA because achieving a mutually desirable deal for both Iran and the U.S. seems challenging. The ideal balance for an agreement that satisfies both parties remains elusive. The resolution of the JCPOA is in the interest of both Iran and the U.S., as prolonging this crisis benefits neither. China and Russia also aim to revive the JCPOA more than before, indicating a broader international push for its reinstatement.

Official announcement of "negotiations with America" by Raisi's government

The Fars news mentioned: "The legal deputy of the president regarding the follow-up on The Hague court ruling on Iran's lawsuit against the United States stated: Legal negotiations regarding the damages incurred by the Iranian side and the amount that the United States must compensate us will be conducted by the legal deputy.

Mohammad Dehghan, the legal deputy, commented on the legal dispute between Iran and the United States regarding Iran's frozen assets, which has been raised in The Hague court. He stated, "There has been a framework for negotiation with the opposing party in this regard for a long time. There is a court named Iran and the United States that deals with disputes between the two countries." Emphasizing that both countries have representatives in this court, he clarified, "This is purely a legal matter and has no political aspect. Since it is entirely legal, we believe that the arbitration court between Iran and the United States provides the possibility for negotiations.

The legal deputy of the president stated, "The ruling of The Hague court is recent, and we need to notify the International Legal Affairs Center of this ruling to propose it to the American side and enter into negotiations with the representative of the opposing party. He added, "Negotiations with the United States regarding the payment of damages for some frozen assets are solely related to the legal deputy and are not defined under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Dehghan emphasized, "Legal negotiations regarding the timetable of damages incurred by the Iranian side and the amount that the United States must compensate us will be conducted by the legal deputy." Recently, following Iran's complaint against the United States regarding the case of some frozen assets, the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Tehran. This court, as a judicial pillar of the United Nations, in the case of some frozen assets of Iran, issued a verdict condemning Washington while rejecting the claims of the U.S. government. This verdict is not subject to appeal and is enforceable for both sides of the case. Overall, this ruling indicates the strength of Tehran's arguments and references.

Stand of Raisi's government: JCPOA was not a product of trust in America

While supporters of the thirteenth government in Iran consider the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) as a symbol of trust in Rouhani and Zarif towards the United States, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the revolutionary government stated: The JCPOA was not the result of trust in the U.S.

According to Ensaf News, Naser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referring to the negotiations to revive the JCPOA in Raisi's government, said: The JCPOA was not the result of our trust in the United States, and the continuation of negotiations for the revival of the JCPOA, the removal of oppressive sanctions, and the responsible return of all parties to the JCPOA are not based on the trust of the Iranian government and people in the U.S. regime.

One can read the report of Kanaani's press conference on Fars News

The spokesperson for the diplomatic apparatus commented on the leaked audio file of Robert Malley and the discussion on sanctions, stating: It is the responsibility of the U.S. government to clarify and enlighten what Malley has said in this audio file. Iran pursues negotiations on the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and talks on the removal of sanctions based on national interests and the interests of the Iranian people, seeking to uphold the rights of the Iranian nation. Iran has consistently declared that its red lines are national interests, and it is ready to pursue the negotiation process within the framework of these red lines and declared interests. He added: The Islamic Republic of Iran's view of the U.S. government is clear and transparent. We never negotiate based on trust with the U.S. government. The JCPOA was not the result of our trust in the United States, and the continuation of negotiations for the revival of the JCPOA, the removal of oppressive sanctions, and the responsible return of all parties to the JCPOA are not based on the trust of the Iranian government and people in the U.S. regime. Kanaani emphasized: The JCPOA was supposed to be signed and implemented, and the result of its implementation and the U.S. government's adherence to its commitments could have been the basis for some relative trust in the U.S. government, which the U.S. government did not create in practice for the Iranian people and government. In the ongoing diplomatic process for lifting sanctions against the Iranian people and the responsible return of all parties, including the U.S., to the JCPOA, Iran negotiates not based on trust in the U.S. government but based on its national interests and the provisions stated in the JCPOA. Iran will continue the diplomatic path. He continued: When the other party is ready for a responsible return to the agreement,

and Iran ensures the serious commitment of the other party to the JCPOA, the implementation of the JCPOA can be resumed. The Iranian side has demonstrated commitment to the agreement and acted responsibly in its implementation. Iran is ready for the necessary commitment to resume the responsible implementation of the JCPOA by all parties.

Raisi's government is concerned about returning to the JCPOA

The magazine "Foreign Affairs" argues in an analytical article that even with the resumption of nuclear negotiations, Iran is not seeking reconciliation or flexibility with the United States. Despite both the U.S. and Iran preparing for talks to revive the nuclear agreement from which Washington withdrew in 2018, decision-makers in Tehran are actively exploring new, more decisive foreign policies. According to the analysis by "Foreign Affairs," Iran believes that the U.S. has deceived and disrespected the country, prompting Tehran to seek increased economic and military capabilities to confront its long-standing adversary. While the Raisi administration may be inclined to resume nuclear negotiations, the revival of the JCPOA does not constitute the backbone of his foreign policy. During his presidency, Iran has adopted a new nuclear position based on two axes: enhancing its capabilities for a swift and equal response against the U.S. in case of Washington's non-compliance with its commitments and creating an independent economic system by separating Iran's economic resources from the JCPOA, focusing on self-sufficiency and an Asia-centric economy. Raisi is currently under pressure domestically to conclude the nuclear negotiations, given Iran's unfavorable economic situation. However, it is unlikely that, Iran will succumb to such pressure and coercion. Iranian authorities are now focused on strengthening their domestic industries and establishing new relationships with growing powers in Asia to create a resilient economy in the face of sanctions. Iran is concerned that a full return to compliance with the JCPOA may result in losing its nuclear leverage without obtaining the promised benefits, similar to what happened in 2015. Iran rapidly reduced the intensity of its nuclear program during that period. However, due to uncertainties about the permanent lifting of sanctions, international companies stayed away from the Iranian market. Iran once again facing a similar situation and is worried that returning to the JCPOA may bring no tangible benefits. While U.S. officials have expressed a willingness to negotiate to address Iran's concerns, they cannot provide a guarantee that the U.S. will not withdraw from the nuclear agreement after the end of the Biden presidency.

Iran considers the remarks of Robert Malley, the U.S. representative for Iran, regarding the possibility of lifting sanctions against Iran as worthless. Therefore, Raisi's foreign policy prioritizes creating and maintaining instruments that prevent

Washington from circumventing any agreements. Currently, Iran is adopting a retaliatory stance, reducing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protest of its condemnation of nuclear scientists' assassinations. Iran has also continued to strengthen its proxy forces in the region. On the other hand, unlike Rouhani, who sought to use the JCPOA as a tool to open Iran's doors to Western companies, Raisi's team is determined to shield Iran from the effects of sanctions by strengthening economic ties with China, Russia, and neighboring countries. Reviving the JCPOA could facilitate Iran's economic and security relations with the East, especially after its recent accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, even without the JCPOA, Iran considers non-American allies as more reliable trade partners. Iran is also interested in increasing its economic influence in the Middle East, particularly in countries where it holds political sway. Raisi's government aligns its interests with those of the Revolutionary Guards. An example of this can be seen in Iran's shipment of fuel to Lebanon through Hezbollah, demonstrating a long-term regional goal of establishing a dollar-free economic zone to resist U.S. economic warfare. It remains unclear how Iran can benefit economically from relationships with Lebanon and Arab countries, given their concerns about potential U.S. sanctions for engaging in trade with Iran.

Final position of the JCPOA in the Raisi's government

Ali Bigdeli, a university professor, believes that, although the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) failed to issue a resolution against Iran in the incident involving an Israeli ship due to Russia's opposition, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel are seeking to create an international consensus against Iran. They aim to justify additional sanctions if Iran does not engage in negotiations. There is also the possibility that Israel may take retaliatory actions against Iran, a separate issue that has been discussed but not yet acted upon. The fate of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is not primarily dependent on who becomes president but rather on the Iranian government's traditional stance, which is unlikely to change, and the United States is unlikely to retreat from its position.

The professor emphasizes that the key issue is not where the JCPOA will lead, regardless of who assumes the presidency, but rather that the Iranian political system intends to maintain its traditional approach to the JCPOA, anticipating no substantial changes, and the United States is not expected to alter its position. Iran needs to decide on a new JCPOA, and, as both the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the White House spokesperson have stated, Iran should not delay the opportunity for a reevaluation of the new JCPOA for an extended period. Given the sensitive conditions and the power display by Iran, it may seek to gain more concessions from the Americans at the negotiation table. Therefore, the JCPOA has become complex, and the arrival of President Raisi does not immediately solve the issue. The economic situation is critical, affecting people's livelihoods due to internal resource constraints. So, we need to change our perspective on the JCPOA; we must reconsider our foreign policy and adjust our arbitration approach towards the world. This lack of trust in international rules has brought about challenges for us. In fact, the new JCPOA proposed by the United States differs from the 2015 JCPOA, as the lifespan of the 2015 JCPOA for missile control expires in 2023. Consequently, the other party is seeking a new JCPOA. As President Biden stated in his inaugural address at the White House, the U.S. is ready to negotiate on the JCPOA with Iran, but the possibility exists that, the timeline may extend until 2050. We aspire to return to the past JCPOA, but the Americans have a new plan for the JCPOA, intending to prolong the timeline. On the other hand, our disagreement with the U.S. in the Vienna talks, which yielded no results, revolves around America's expectations beyond the JCPOA, including human rights issues and the missile debate. On the one hand, the arrival of a representative from the European Union in Iran can be examined from several perspectives. Firstly, it may not be of significant importance. Secondly, Iran has not placed much emphasis on this matter, but the European Union does not wish to close all doors to Iran. They are attempting to persuade Iran to

comply with the JCPOA and the demands of the United States. However, it depends on Iran whether Raisi, as mentioned in his inaugural speech, is willing to engage with neighboring countries, particularly Arab nations, and expressed readiness to warmly interact with them. He immediately stated that Iran supports oppressed countries worldwide, including Yemen. Yet, resolving the Yemen issue is impossible without addressing our problems with the sheikdoms led by Saudi Arabia. While expressing willingness to negotiate, the conditions from the U.S. have not changed with the arrival of Raisi. Therefore, we need to change our perspective on the region and the world. In reality, the analysis attempting to place the burden of the JCPOA on Rouhani and transfer it to Raisi was predictable. However, no significant event has occurred because major foreign policy decisions rest with the leadership. Moreover, until we resolve our issues with the JCPOA, we cannot surpass all our domestic challenges. Simply consolidating power within the system will not solve problems, as external investment is necessary.

The End

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